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Responsibility, the ability to respond, in general 
but also in the case of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), requires interpretative 
skills. Moral actors continuously interpret 
their environments and are asked to respond 
adequately. In modern times, corporations are 
often treated as moral actors and therefore have 
to implement organizational measures in order 
to meet societal demands. A connection between 
responsibility and hermeneutics (defined as the 
art of interpretation) therefore seems evident.
However, the CSR debate lacks such a connection 
and this study aims at filling the gap, using the 
hermeneutic philosophy of Gianni Vattimo (Turin, 
1936). The connection of Vattimo’s philosophy 
and CSR produces new and surprising insights 
into the concept of CSR and the ways individual 
members of corporations can be reconnected to 
CSR practices.
Joop de Zwart (Dinteloord, 1971) obtained master 
degrees in both Business administration and 
Philosophy and lectures at Avans University of 
Applied Science in Tilburg, the Netherlands. 
He is especially fascinated by those issues that 
offer opportunities to combine management and 
philosophy.
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9 PREFACE AND PERSONAL 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Once, my father told me an anecdote about his own educational career: in those days, the early post-war years, social background appeared to be more important than the results one achieved at school. It was 
considered inappropriate that my father went to the HBS, and so he never had 
the opportunity to study according to his capabilities. This story firmly settled 
in my memory and it helped me getting through some difficult moments at 
university.
  Dutch society in post-war years, certainly in small villages like Dinteloord, 
was still very much a society living in the aftermath of what the Italian 
philosopher Gianni Vattimo (Turin, 1936) would call pensiero forte (strong 
thought). The ‘death of God’ had not yet arrived at Dinteloord. The story my 
father told me, together with similar experiences, might explain why I became 
so inspired by the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo. Both his appeal for liberation 
by means of modest, weak thought, pensiero debole, as his coming to peace with 
his Christian roots fit well within my own itinerary. 
 My father did not live to witness me finishing my master degrees in both 
Business Administration and Philosophy, and, obviously today cannot witness 
me finishing my PhD. These first lines serve as a dear remembrance...
This book marks the end of an exciting intellectual journey. I started with an 
idea that it might be interesting to combine management studies with the ideas 
of Gianni Vattimo, an Italian postmodern philosopher. Fortunately, René ten Bos 
enthusiastically embraced this idea and helped me with a further delineation 
10
of this broad idea towards CSR. I very much enjoyed the way René accompanied 
me during this journey.  
 Because of the enthusiasm and critical remarks of René, and the support of 
my employer, Avans University of Applied Sciences, I have been able to start and 
complete this study. Especially grateful I am to Peter Hollants, former director 
of the Academie voor Bouw & Infra, who supported my ambitions from the start. 
His colleagues and successors (Carla Faassen, René Tönissen and Corné Verhees) 
and Emile Quanjel, head of the research group of my department, never ceased 
to support me. Finally, I want to thank my friends and family.
The journey is almost finished now. It was a journey that took me through 
many interesting texts about CSR. It also took me through virtually all the 
works of Gianni Vattimo. During my stays in Italy, it sometimes was a bit 
embarrassing (and annoying) to notice that I became more and more capable of 
a conversation about postmodern Italian philosophy, but completely hopeless 
when I had to buy a pair of trousers. I hope that, from now on, my everyday life 
Italian again will get the attention it deserves.
Waalwijk, March 2016.
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
T he title of this study immediately reveals the claim of this thesis: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is defined as an interpretative practice. Thus, this thesis connects CSR to hermeneutics, to the art of interpretation.
 This introductory chapter paves the way for how this connection is made: it 
starts with some remarks on how responsibility is perceived in this thesis, as an 
‘ability to respond’, both in general as in the more specific case of CSR. Immediately, 
responsibility is connected to one of the central issues of this thesis: nihilism and 
the question whether nihilism necessarily implies relativism. 
 The subtitle suggests a ‘rediscovery’ of CSR, which implicitly refers to the method 
that has shaped this thesis and that is presented at the end of section 1.1: the 
method of destructive questioning, a method Martin Heidegger mentions in his 
Being and Time. Heidegger uses questions with the explicit goal of dis-covering 
phenomena. In this thesis it is CSR that needs to be revealed in a novel way. This 
revelation is performed by means of the hermeneutic philosophy of Gianni Vattimo. 
In section 1.2 hermeneutics is introduced, while an entire chapter (the third) is 
dedicated to the philosophy of Vattimo).
 Section 1.3 contains a further delineation of the CSR debate: CSR is discussed 
in a number of ways and on a number of places and in this section choices are 
made about the way the CSR debate is defined in this thesis. The last section of this 
chapter summarises the argument until then.
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1.1 RATIONALE: RESPONSIBILITY, THE CORPORATION AND 
CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY
‘Give a hearing to the poor and return their greeting politely’ (Sirach 4:8).A biblical text on responsibility might surprise the reader. Although it may sound sympathetic and contains a general kind of wisdom, 
there is a significant possibility that for many readers this text has no a priori 
authority at all. Chances are that one reader is a Buddhist, another a Muslim or 
an atheist, each having their own more or less authoritative texts or sources 
that give a (moral) direction to their life. This plurality of truths illustrates 
the ‘nihilist condition’ that we live under, according to the Italian philosopher 
Gianni Vattimo (Turin, 1936). There is no ultimate truth, no one foundation that 
has definitive authority.
 Can Vattimo, and his philosophy of ‘weak thought’ speak to Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) scholars and practitioners? His attention for the nihilist 
condition and its consequences, among which the question whether it is 
possible at all to still reflect meaningfully upon responsibility is in contrast with 
CSR scholars, who tend to neglect the nihilist condition. Is it too philosophical 
a subject for CSR scholars? Some (e.g. Swanson and Schwartz, to be discussed 
later) address ethics but mistake nihilism for relativism. This study introduces a 
philosophical approach into the realm of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
that acknowledges the nihilist condition and that at the same time tries to 
avoid a relativist position, the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo.
The text from Sirach mentions two words – ‘hearing’ and ‘return’ – which are 
crucial for response-ability, the acknowledgement of someone, the poor in case 
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of the quotation, asking a question and the response given to the question. It 
thus shows response-ability as I have defined it in the title of this study: as an 
interpretative practice. Hearing and responding are interpretative actions and 
this is no less the case with CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility presupposes 
some kind of response-ability, with the corporation as an interpretative actor. 
 This study explicitly asks attention for CSR as an interpretative practice and 
looks for enrichment of the debate on CSR in exactly that part of philosophy 
concerned with interpretation: hermeneutics. Hermeneutics – the art of 
interpretation – has developed from an auxiliary discipline of theology and 
law to the common language of contemporary philosophy. Through the one 
fragment by Friedrich Nietzsche (Werke VIII, 1. 7[60]) – ‘there are no facts, only 
interpretations’ – hermeneutics and nihilism are connected. This connection is 
thoroughly elaborated in the works of Gianni Vattimo; hence his works are at 
the centre of this inquiry.
Responsibility: The question of responsibility is at the centre of ethics. The 
‘ability to respond’ in a specific situation is closely connected to the question 
whether one should respond at all. If the latter is the case, the exact measure 
of the response can be established. Peter Singer, in his The Expanding Circle 
(2011), shows how the circle of those, to whom we bear responsibility, during 
the course of history gradually widened. He focuses mainly on responsibility 
(of prosperous westerners) towards the extreme poor as far as human beings 
are concerned. Singer also reflects upon responsibilities towards animals and 
does not rule out the possibility that the expanding circle has not finished 
expanding yet. Hans Jonas (1979) focuses on our responsibilities towards 
the possible existence of future generations on earth. This same idea of 
responsibility is articulated in the Brundtland statement (1987): we ought to 
behave in a sustainable manner.
 In modern times, reflection has become almost obligatory, regardless 
of the conclusion of this reflection in a certain situation1. Reflection on my 
responsibilities in a certain situation starts with a reflection upon the ones to 
whom I bear responsibility. Before I can respond, I must be aware of a question 
asked, as well as of the one who is asking the question. Returning to the Sirach 
quotation again, one needs to acknowledge the other, the poor, before one can 
start to ‘give a hearing’. 
 Reflection upon something or someone to whom one bears responsibility is 
one side of the problem. The other side is the moral actor, the one bearing the 
responsibility. In classical ethics, this actor usually is an individual, while in our 
1  In the so-called Dublin descriptors, part of the Bologna agreements on European higher education, one of 
the requirements of all bachelor and master students is ‘to inform judgments that include reflection on relevant 
social, scientific or ethical issues’ (retrieved from www.ehea.info).
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age this is by no means self-evident. In politics, for example, responsibilities 
are also attributed to governmental institutions. Recently, the Dutch 
environmentalist organization Urgenda initiated a lawsuit against the Dutch 
state, in order to force the government to improve its climate policy. According 
to Urgenda, the Dutch government behaves irresponsibly – even illegitimate – 
towards future generations2. This means that Dutch government is considered 
to be a moral actor.
 However, the content of this ethical concept ‘responsibility’ is by no means 
clear. Derrida (quoted in Lucy 2004) called it ‘this thing called responsibility’ 
and pointed at the aporetic character of the ‘thing’: ‘it has to do with the 
impossible possibility of a prescribed or general ‘choice’ that is also a ‘personal’ 
or singular decision.’ Derrida sharply analyses the friction that responsibility 
generates: a friction between a general idea of what one should do and a 
personal act in a specific situation. This introduces yet another aspect of 
responsibility (which we shall encounter in the next chapters): the idea of a 
common good and the question who decides about that. Is there a general 
agreement about what is good? Are there universally applicable criteria to 
establish what is good and what is evil? The ‘nihilist’ condition suggests that 
there are no universally applicable standards, but many ethicists insist that 
there must be.
 Bauman (1993, 54) uses responsibility to indicate a non-universal ethical 
attitude. He opposes duty and responsibility: ‘Duties tend to make humans 
alike; responsibility is what makes them into individuals’. In this interpretation, 
responsibility is almost defined as the ethical concept of postmodernism. 
However, many other scholars do not agree with this interpretation and – as 
we shall see in chapter two – certainly not in the field of CSR. Jonas (1979) 
searches for a principle of responsibility, that again has the form of an 
imperative (a universally applicable criterion). He uses the word responsibility 
to indicate an ethical concept that fits the modern era. Duty is connected to the 
old imperative, while responsibility is the imperative of modern times.
 The old imperatives have become obsolete, due to the technological 
advances in modern times. These technological advances are not always 
without drawbacks. On the contrary, Jonas is more than aware of the dangers 
that threat human civilization. Human activities cause effects that go far 
beyond simple interpersonal relationships. New imperatives should be 
developed, that take into account the enormous – and often unforeseen – 
consequences of human activity, both towards people living far away from us 
(cfr. The Expanding Circle, Singer would probably agree) and towards future 
human existence on earth. According to Jonas, duty is an ethical concept 
2  http://www.urgenda.nl/themas/klimaat-en-energie/klimaatzaak/, retrieved at 2015-08-04.
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that only takes into account vis-a-vis situations. It has to be replaced by 
responsibility, the future-oriented imperative that fits a society, dominated by 
technologies that have the capacity to completely devastate human civilisation.
Responsibility as an independent ethical concept is relatively new. Classical 
ethical theories focus on virtues or on duties, so there is no such thing as 
responsibility-ethics in classical ethical theory. Texts like the one from Sirach 
do show how notions of responsibility have always been present in our culture. 
In chapter 2 these notions shall be further elaborated. In modern ethics, it has 
earned its place, although there are few philosophers like Jonas, who have 
developed a consistent ethics of responsibility. It is used in a number of ways, 
and this study searches for a nihilist understanding of responsibility. Can one 
still reflect upon responsibility when one pre-supposes the nihilist condition? 
It certainly is not a straightforward concept. And how does it apply to the 
corporation?
The corporation. The twentieth century is characterized by an explosive 
increase of the degree of organization in western society3. Organizations 
seem to be present in every aspect of our lives. Drucker (2008, 1946), in the 
preface to the 1983 edition, puts it like this: ‘Today we take for granted modern 
organization. Indeed we know that modern developed society is a society of 
organizations in which the major social tasks are all being performed in and 
through institutions, whether they be business corporations or government 
agencies, hospitals, schools or universities, or the armed forces.’ These 
organizations, especially when they are corporations, legal constructions, are 
also considered to be moral actors. No matter how, organizations are held 
responsible for ‘their’ deeds, reflection is deemed necessary on the exact 
measure of these responsibilities. Again Drucker (op. cit., xvii): ‘But what all of 
the institutions of the modern society of organizations also have in common is 
that they function and perform within a larger society and community and thus 
face what we now call ‘social responsibilities’’. As early as in 1946 (!) Drucker 
already paid some attention to these responsibilities. Ten Bos, Jones and Parker 
(2006, 165 – 169, 242) illustrate the complex and difficult nature of the very 
concept of responsibility, related to business practices, thereby underlining the 
importance of thorough reflection upon the concept of responsibility.
Today’s society is faced with interesting and complex challenges. Extreme 
poverty in large parts of the world and a huge pressure on the natural 
resources and the ecological capacity of our planet, which, paradoxically, only 
will increase if we are successful in fighting poverty, make it necessary for 
3  Drucker (1993) calls the era after WW II the ‘management revolution’, while Mintzberg (1989) calls the 
twentieth century the ‘century of management’.
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us to continuously reflect upon the way in which individuals, nation states 
and organizations have a responsibility towards the poor and towards other 
species, living both now and in a (distant) future. However, the nature of these 
responsibilities is not evident. 
 Because of the above, together with the conviction that ‘if we can start to 
reconsider some of our basic understandings of certain business practices, it 
can make a difference to our world’ (Painter-Morland and ten Bos 2011, 2), this 
study focuses on the question of responsibility related to the realm of the 
organization: Corporate Social Responsibility.  
Business, organization and corporation are three words used above, although 
the subject of this investigation is corporate social responsibility. Should I be 
more consistent in using only the word corporation? At the moment I do not 
think so, because in the debate on CSR different words are used as well. In the 
early debate on CSR the focus is on the businessman as a moral actor, while 
later the corporation becomes the focus of the debate. Words like business(-
man), corporation and organization all are used by scholars to indicate 
more or less the same. In everyday life, concepts like the corporation are not 
used consistently either. Most important here is that artificial ‘persons’, like 
organizations, are treated as moral actors. It is not (only) this or that individual, 
but this or that company that behaves in a certain way. Companies, manmade 
(intangible) artefacts, have developed into ‘persons’ with responsibilities of their 
own4.
 The awareness of the corporation as an artefact, a manmade instrument to 
achieve a certain goal, means that one can treat the organization as technology 
in the way Heidegger (2007) does in his The Question Concerning Technology 
(Die Frage nach der Technik). Although Heidegger focuses on mechanical 
technology, his thought can be applied to organizations as well. Organizations 
are technology, a certain way of creating order in the world5.  
 In modernity, in modern society, technology becomes a dominant way of 
looking at the world. For Heidegger and critical theorists like Adorno and 
Horkheimer this means an ever-growing dominance of technology over 
our lives. They share a certain pessimist worldview as far as the position of 
individuals in such a technology-dominated world. The technological way of 
4  Eells (1956, 10), referring to Compton: ‘... as corporations become more dominant, society naturally (!) expects 
them as creatures (!)...’. Eells already observed that society treats corporations like ‘creatures’ and even uses the 
word naturally to indicate that it is more or less self-evident that corporations are treated as such. There are 
interesting reflections on the question of the corporation as a moral actor (e.g. French 1979 and Ladd 1984), but I 
start from the observation by Eells, that corporations are indeed treated as moral actors. 
5  Heil (2011) searches for the ontological fundamentals for ethics and in chapter 3 he especially focuses on the 
idea of the corporation as technology. His study of ‘Heidegger and the Corporate World’ (the subtitle of his book) is 
yet another example of attempts made to connect the corporation, ethics and continental philosophy. One of the 
recommendations for further research explicitly mentions philosophers who are inspired by Heidegger, such as 
Gadamer; although my research was almost finished when I read Heil, it verifies the choices I made for this study.
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looking at the world is a constant strive for control, an attempt to submit the 
forces of nature. For Heidegger, this search for control is illustrated by examples 
from natural resources (e.g. the river Rhine, in modern times is reduced to a 
source of energy and logistics). In case of management of organizations, the 
being in control is aimed at people and groups of people.
 One of the important premises of this study is that CSR fits within the 
idea of modern thought. It is about managing the corporation’s business and 
society relationships, about ‘being in control’. In the words of Gianni Vattimo, 
CSR scholars still remain within modern, metaphysical thought. For Vattimo, 
metaphysics, with its aim of dominance, its aim of being in control, is in fact 
violent thought (this will be elaborated in detail in chapter three). Is there 
another, more peaceful and friendly way of looking at CSR? I think there is and 
that we can find such an alternative way of looking at CSR by turning towards a 
philosophy that takes seriously the critique on modernism. 
Corporate Social Responsibility. For more than sixty years now, an abundant 
body of knowledge has been produced on Corporate Social Responsibility. 
According to Carroll (1999, 2008) it all began in 1953, with The Responsibility 
of the Businessman by Howard Bowen (although Drucker claims to have started 
writing about the issue in 1946). Apparently Bowen, and a large number of 
authors after him, felt a need to write about the theme of responsibility related 
to businessmen and corporations.
 Notions of CSR developed during the years, addressing many different 
issues. It seems that Singers idea of the Expanding Circle of responsibility also 
applies to the corporate level: originally CSR focused on local or national issues 
because corporations were not as globally orientated. CSR consisted mainly of 
responsibilities towards the local community. Nowadays, corporations have to 
consider issues on a global scale. After sixty years, it is not only sensible for the 
businessman or woman to reflect on his (or her) responsibilities, it is simply 
necessary.
Nevertheless, reflection – or, to be more precise, philosophical reflection – on 
CSR is virtually non-existent, as far as the international debate is concerned 
and as we shall see in a later chapter. Is a concept like responsibility not an 
ethical concept and as such a concept suitable for philosophical reflection? And 
cannot the same be said about concepts like corporate and social? 
 CSR belongs to the realm of business ethics – although Frederick (2006, 
70) observes that business ethics and CSR have been two almost completely 
separated debates for a long time – and the use of the word ethics, being 
a philosophical discipline, arouses expectations. But, as Parker and Ten Bos 
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(2006) argue, these expectations are not met at all: business ethics does not 
take philosophy and ethics seriously. If – in business ethics in general – there 
is any attention for philosophical ethics at all, it is restricted to some classics, 
like Aristotle, Kant and the founding couple of utilitarianism, Bentham and 
Mill. Contemporary philosophy, let alone continental philosophy, is neglected 
completely. This lack of interest for philosophy and ethics also characterized 
the debate on CSR (Painter-Morland and Ten Bos, 2011). Summarized in one 
hypothesis: the debate on CSR lacks a philosophical approach.  
 This study starts from where Ten Bos and Painter-Morland (2011), 
respectively Ten Bos and Dunne (2011) have finished and presents a 
philosophical reflection on CSR, based upon the method used by the latter: 
(1) their use of Heidegger’s strategy of destructive questioning and (2), their 
(Heideggerian) hermeneutic perspective (although this hermeneutic perspective 
is further elaborated along the thought of Gianni Vattimo).
 Destructive questioning: Dunne (2008) and Ten Bos and Dunne (2011) turn 
to Heidegger for their analysis of CSR. More specific, in Sein und Zeit they find 
the questioning strategy of Heidegger that starts with an awareness of the 
phenomenon being questioned before the actual questioning begins (the 
distinction between the Befragte and Gefragte). In this thesis, the Befragte (that 
what is asked about) is proposed as a threefold manifestation of CSR. Corporate 
social responsibility appears in three ways:
1. As a debate. Without exactly knowing what is written about CSR, 
we do know there is a body of knowledge on the subject. Books and 
research papers have been published for more than half a century.
2. As corporate output. Corporations create websites, policies, and reports 
to communicate their planned CSR activities. 
3. As more or less unplanned communications by representatives 
of corporations, therefore appearing also as a part of someone’s 
everyday life.  
The use of this threefold appearance of CSR makes a second hypothesis 
surface: the debate on CSR is mainly concerned with the first two appearances of 
CSR. The third one is mainly neglected, causing a sense of a theory – practice gap.
 Ten Bos and Dunne explicitly address the gap between theory and practice, 
while the threefold appearance of CSR remains implicit. They emphasize 
the complexity of responsibility issues, it not being merely a technical 
or managerial problem, but also a social and developmental (2011, 259). 
Responsibility cannot be reduced to managerial tools, but has a connection 
with someone’s everyday life. Ten Bos and Dunne use the case of the BP 
Mexican Gulf oil spill as an example. On the one hand there is the official 
communication by the company, trying to respond as responsible as possible. 
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On the other hand there is the behaviour of its CEO at the time, Tony Hayward, 
who completely undermined the company’s communication. With a remark like 
the infamous ‘I’d like my life back’ he showed how responsibility is not only 
about managerial tools and techniques. They cease to work, because in the end 
an individual has to respond at a certain moment and place6. In a split second, 
one representative can say or do something with disastrous consequences.
 Another author asking for attention to the separation of theory and practice 
is Mollie Painter-Morland (2008). In her Business Ethics as Practice she argues 
that, although attention for business ethics has increased, this attention can be 
characterised as a ‘checkbox mentality’. She calls this ‘the dissociation of ethics 
with business practice (2008, 2)7.
 Hermeneutic philosophy: with the choice of Heidegger as a source of 
inspiration, ten Bos and Dunne not only turn to continental philosophy, but, 
somewhat more specific, also to hermeneutic philosophy. This branch of 
philosophy has developed further during the century, represented nowadays by 
famous philosophers like Jürgen Habermas and the – although somewhat less 
famous – Italian Gianni Vattimo. The latter is a contemporary (hermeneutic) 
philosopher, whose thought is at the core of the analysis performed in this 
book. Before turning to the philosophy of Vattimo, however, hermeneutics in 
general will be introduced.
6  Bonhoeffer, in his never completed Christian Ethics, states that ‘speaking about ethics is neither abstract, nor 
in cases, but very real’ (‘Er zal dus noch abstract, noch casuïstisch, maar heel concreet gesproken moeten worden’). 
This treatment of ethics also criticizes the theoretical ethical approaches and states that ethics and responsibility 
develop in a situation. Even case studies are never real, but are already abstractions, taken away from everyday 
life.
7  Visser (2007) also argues that ‘research focusing on the individual level is relatively underdeveloped’ and 
that more research into the application of psychology is needed. Although I agree with him, I here propose a 
philosophical inquiry. 
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1.2  HERMAN… WHO?8  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO 
HERMENEUTIC PHILOSOPHY 
Hermeneutics, the art of interpretation, is derived from the Greek mythological figure of Hermes, the messenger of the Gods. It was his task to bring the messages from the realm of eternity to that 
of temporality. This translation from the unclear and unfamiliar to human 
language is expressed by the Greek verb hermeneuo, which has three meanings: 
(1) formulate, (2) translate (from one language to another) and (3) explain9. 
Ferraris (2008, 5) suggests that the root of the word hermeneutics might be the 
same as that of the word sermon, which also relates the concept to religious 
practice.
 Originally, hermeneutics was a subsidiary discipline of theology, law and 
philology, dealing with the interpretation of texts. In Ion, a short dialogue by 
Plato, we encounter an interpreter of Homer, a rhapsode, and Socrates says: ‘a 
man can never be a good rhapsode without understanding what the poet says. 
For the rhapsode ought to make himself an interpreter of the poet’s thought to 
his audience; and to do this properly without knowing what the poet means is 
impossible’ (530C).
 The quotation from Ion shows exactly that interpretation is a combination 
of the three meanings of the word: you have to understand the text in order 
to explain it to someone else. The application of the text finally means that 
8  An anecdote by Vattimo (2012): in 1972, when he first lectured in the US, students replied with this question 
when he started his lecture on hermeneutics. 
9  A variety of this threefold meaning, subtilitas intelligendi (understand), subtilitas explicandi (explain) and 
subtilitas applicandi (apply) (Joisten 2009) can be found in later Biblical hermeneutics and is used also by 
Gadamer.
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the text is more than merely a historical object. Important texts are read 
because they have an existential meaning, here and now. This explains why 
hermeneutics has been such an important discipline in theology.
 One of the decisive moments in the history of hermeneutics is the 
Reformation. In fact, one of the important disputes of the Reformation is a 
hermeneutical one: who decides on the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures? 
Luther defies the claim that tradition has an authority of its own and claims the 
right to read the bible ‘as it is’: sola scriptura. Luther thus allows the possibility 
that a reader discovers a meaning that does not exactly match the teachings 
of the church. In such a case the biblical text has greater authority than the 
teachings of the church.
 Biblical hermeneutics in the era of the Reformation is always hermeneutics 
that searches for a given meaning in a text: the Bible is a given text with a 
given meaning, waiting to be discovered. Reading the text implies a search for 
objective meaning, in case of the Bible no less than a search for eternal truths. The 
Reformation, with its principle of sola scriptura, however, can also be considered to 
be an important step towards the demolition of these eternal truths, because of 
an immanent paradox: Holy Scripture does not define itself. Tradition has defined 
the table of contents of the Bible. If one questions the authority of tradition, one 
ultimately questions the authority of Holy Scripture itself. 
 The Reformation era meant a great deal for the development of 
hermeneutics, but it still remains the auxiliary discipline of theology and law. 
How did we arrive at the point that hermeneutics became an important branch 
of philosophy? 
With the works of the German philosopher Friedrich Daniel Ernst 
Schleiermacher (1768 – 1834), hermeneutics becomes a philosophical problem, 
developing from a technique of interpretation to what later would become a 
recognition of the interpretative structure of human existence (Vattimo 1968, 
10).  Schleiermacher plays an important role in that development, as does his 
successor and biographer Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 – 1911). Later in this section 
(in the paragraphs on Heidegger) this idea of the interpretive structure of 
human existence will be further elaborated.
 Schleiermacher is responsible for what is called general hermeneutics. 
His predecessors treated hermeneutics as a technique, helpful for biblical 
hermeneutics, law or philology. Now interpretation as such is questioned: what 
does it mean to understand?
 Understanding is not limited to the interpretation of classical or canonical 
texts anymore. Its principles apply to every aspect of language (Vedder 2003, 
47). Language, whether written or spoken, whether one’s native tongue or 
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another, is something mysterious that has to be understood. Misunderstanding 
one another is rule rather than exception.
 Schleiermacher uses the conversation as an example to show what 
interpretation means: to understand each other, one has to take into account 
more than the words the other speaks. There is a relation between the life of 
the other and the words and opinions that he or she expresses. Understanding 
one another – or rather, avoiding misunderstanding – implies an investigation 
that goes beyond the words the other speaks. 
 The interdependence of the individual phrase and the life of the other (or 
the context of a text) is expressed by the concept of the hermeneutic circle. To 
understand the whole of a text one needs to know the constitutive parts (words 
and phrases), and to understand the constitutive parts one needs to know 
the whole text. Interpretation is conceived as a circular activity, continuously 
shifting from whole to part and back again. The hermeneutic circle applies at 
different levels: between a text and its literary context (a sentence, related to 
a chapter, a book, other books) and between a text and the interpreter (Zwiep 
2005, 414).
 Is it because of the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 – 1911) that the works of 
Schleiermacher have not been forgotten? His history of hermeneutics and the 
two-volume study of Schleiermacher have been important for philosophical 
hermeneutics. Dilthey also made his own contribution to hermeneutics: he 
especially asked attention for hermeneutics as a methodology for human 
sciences. Dilthey provided a foundation upon which Gadamer was able to build 
further. However, Gadamer could probably never have developed his thought 
without the work of the philosopher who really turned over hermeneutics: 
Martin Heidegger.
 
With Heidegger hermeneutics not only became a serious philosophical 
problem, but the central philosophical problem: one may speak of an ontological 
turn in hermeneutics, which now does not only provides a methodological basis 
for (human) sciences, ‘it is about the most fundamental conditions of man’s 
being in the world’ (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2014).
 Ferraris (2008, 245) calls this the radicalizzazione of hermeneutics, and 
especially draws attention to Heidegger’s analysis of the role of Friedrich 
Nietzsche in modern philosophy. He quotes Vattimo (1971) on Heidegger: ‘il 
pensiero è ermeneutica’ (thinking is hermeneutics) and now ‘deals with the 
meaning – or lack of meaning – of human life: it has turned into an existential 
task’ (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2014).
 According to Heidegger (1999)10 it was not a turn, but a return to the 
10  This work consists of a number of lectures that took place in 1923.
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existential task: ‘but it is precisely here [in the hermeneutics of Dilthey] 
that a disastrous limitation shows itself. The decisive epochs in the actual 
development of hermeneutics (Patristic period and Luther) remained hidden 
from him, since he always investigated hermeneutics as (...) what he considered 
to be its essential task – a methodology for the hermeneutical human sciences.’ 
 Heidegger’s hermeneutics differs from the hermeneutics of his predecessors. 
In his writings there is hardly any attention for the interpretation of texts; 
Heidegger is concerned with the hermeneutics of Dasein. By means of the 
concept of Dasein, Heidegger asks attention for everyday, normal existence: one 
always already is, before reflection starts (cfr. Das Befragte mentioned in section 
1.1).
 The task of the hermeneutics is ‘making the Dasein which is in each case our 
own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being, 
communicating Dasein to itself in this regard, hunting down the alienation 
from itself with which it is smitten. In hermeneutics what is developed for 
Dasein is a possibility of its becoming and being for itself in the manner of an 
understanding of itself’ (Heidegger 1999, 11). Heidegger thinks of the Dasein 
as possibility, as a continuously being on the move from itself towards itself. 
Hermeneutics is conceived as the task to discover these possibilities. 
 An interesting aspect of the thought of Heidegger is his scepticism towards 
tradition: the fixation of given possibilities hinders the disclosure of new ones. 
This scepticism later focuses on the tradition of modernism, on technology and 
natural sciences that also tend to monopolise our thinking and prevent us from 
the discovery of other opportunities to understand our being in the world. 
Heidegger’s suspicion towards tradition stands in contrast with the 
hermeneutics of his student Hans Georg Gadamer (1900 – 2002), who was 
responsible for a second hermeneutic turn. Gadamer builds upon the work 
of Heidegger (accepting the ontological turn), but wants to fully understand 
the consequences of hermeneutics for human sciences, thus returning to the 
project of Dilthey again. Human sciences are fundamentally different from 
natural sciences: for the interpretations of texts, of works of art one needs 
competencies, different from those needed for natural sciences.
 Gadamer turns to the humanistic tradition in order to find the competencies 
needed for interpretation (2010, 15 – 47): Bildung, sensus communis, Urteilskraft 
and Geschmack. An important role in this approach is played by tradition. The 
interpreter is always part of a tradition and needs knowledge of this tradition 
in order to understand and appreciate a text. Next to that the reader must be 
eager to learn, from a text and from tradition. According to Gadamer reading 
starts with openness, a willingness to learn.
 Gadamer has been criticized from several perspectives: Emilio Betti, Jacques 
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Derrida and Jürgen Habermas. The Italian Emilio Betti argues that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics lacks a clear method and opens the way to relativism11. 
His approach to hermeneutics is a more rigid one, aimed at an objective 
understanding of a text. 
 Derrida appears to argue exactly the opposite: the eagerness to understand 
shows a will to control, a metaphysical remnant of the will to power. Gadamer 
is not playful enough and too much attached to the Western tradition. Where 
Betti proposes more rigidity, Derrida seems to suggest to abandon method 
altogether. Some (van Tongeren 1999 and Oudemans 1988) accuse Derrida 
of being not entirely honest with Gadamer: Derrida creates a caricature of 
Gadamer which he then criticizes. Vattimo builds upon the work of Gadamer as 
a more willing reader, but at the same time he tries to be post-metaphysical.
 A third critique is articulated by Jürgen Habermas, the famous representative 
of the Frankfurter Schule. Habermas, according to Rorty, has ‘little use for 
Nietzsche’ (2004, xii) and rejects the ontological turn in hermeneutics. Instead, 
he tries to remain faithful to modernism; faithful to ‘an intellectual legacy 
that Vattimo thinks it would be better to renounce’ (2004, xii). Furthermore, 
Habermas criticizes the importance of tradition in the philosophy of Gadamer. 
Within the Frankfurter Schule, there has always been much attention for the 
(possible) manipulative and oppressing force of (capitalist) tradition. Gadamer 
seems to give too much attention to tradition and is too willing a reader of the 
constitutive texts of tradition. How can one emancipate from tradition?
 Vattimo (1989, 20) argues that the recognition of the importance of history 
does not necessarily imply some kind of a metaphysical historicism, without 
any possibility to criticize tradition. On the contrary, ‘stressing the perspectival 
and nihilist elements of Gadamer’s hermeneutics’ (Grondin 2007, 214) Vattimo 
makes clear that tradition opens up countless opportunities for interpretation.
On the other hand, Habermas and others are afraid that this multi perspective 
approach to history leads to relativism. Postmodern thought has often been 
accused of being relativist. Vattimo has paid attention to this and argues at 
several places that nihilism does not equal relativism. 
The last paragraphs introduced an essential part of this introduction: nihilist 
hermeneutics. Vattimo has taken hermeneutics a step further exactly by 
‘stressing the perspectival and nihilist elements of Gadamer’s hermeneutics’. 
The importance of a classical text does not necessarily give it decisive 
authority. That is, if it would be possible to read a text decisively in the first 
place. 
11  The debate between Gadamer and Betti is described in Zwiep (2013, 207 – 209) and Ferraris (2008, 366 – 
368). Zwiep considers Betti somewhat undervalued, because he published many of his works in Italian and only 
some in German. 
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 Vattimo elaborates the Nietzschean claim that there are no facts, only 
interpretations. There is no one foundation, no one Truth, which indicates a 
nihilist condition, also described as the death of God or the end of metaphysics. 
In chapter 3 we shall turn to that more in detail. 
 But if God is dead, is everything permitted then? If one takes seriously 
the nihilist condition, does not one become a relativist? Many do think so, in 
general as in the debate on CSR (Swanson 1999, Schwartz 2011, and Scherer 
and Palazzo 2007), but Vattimo’s philosophy is more precise: he develops a 
nuanced philosophy that takes the ontological turn in hermeneutics seriously 
without becoming a relativist. In this thesis I search for an escape from this 
universalism – relativism trap, which is a false dilemma. By means of nihilism it 
may be possible to develop a position towards CSR that is not necessarily relativist. 
Now I can return to the point where I started in the introduction and to the 
title of this inquiry: the ability to respond is an act of interpretation. Establishing 
the nature of responsibility, the questions articulated by society, the role of the 
corporation and of its employees, it is all interpretation, hermeneutic practice. 
It is this insight that is at the heart of this thesis: Corporate Social Responsibility 
should be closely linked to hermeneutics12. 
 Strangely enough, hermeneutics has been neglected in the CSR debate. This 
study tries to fill this gap. Not only by formulating a critique. That has been 
done before. Being critical, being destructive is only one side of ethics. The 
other, productive side of ethics tries to look for ways that bring us further (van 
Tongeren 2012b, 43). With the optimist philosophy of Gianni Vattimo, who sees 
opportunities rather than threats in the nihilist condition, this productive step 
is taken.
 So the aim of this book is twofold: first I want to examine the tradition of 
CSR, in order to get a more precise view of what is exactly means and also 
of what is ‘wrong’ with it. Then I want to look at the hermeneutic philosophy 
of Gianni Vattimo in order to investigate the possibilities for a new approach 
to CSR. But is it already clear what ‘the debate on CSR’ is? Is there consensus 
about what I am about to investigate? The next section will address the 
tradition of CSR and therefore serves as a delineation of this study.
12  Painter-Morland (2008, 266): ‘As interpreters, ethics officers require hermeneutic skills.’ This study wants to 
emphasize this hermeneutic character, not just for ethics officers, but for professionals in general. Where Painter-
Morland focuses on ethics as practice, with some attention for hermeneutics, I want to further elaborate this 
within the context of CSR.
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1.3 ON THE QUESTION OF  A KOINÈ OF CSR
The Greek word koinè refers to the commonly used Greek language of the Hellenistic era (from around 330 BC until 330 AD). Koinè Greek was the common language of those days, ‘spoken as freely on the streets of 
Rome, Alexandria and Jerusalem as in Athens’ (Dana and Mantey 1955, 7)13. 
Vattimo often uses koinè to indicate hermeneutics as the common language of 
contemporary philosophy. The question whether there is a common language of 
Corporate Social Responsibility gives focus to this section.
 Inspired by De Bakker et al. (2005), as by Carroll (1999 and 2008) and many 
of the scholars following (or criticising) the latter, one could argue that at 
least this language knows some ‘dialects’ (e.g. Corporate Social Performance, 
Corporate Citizenship). The debate thus is considered to be a family of 
interrelated, intertwined and interdependent debates, the one referring to, 
criticising or being inspired by the other14.
 Some issue-driven debates are not evidently related to CSR but do provide 
its vocabulary. Early literature on sustainability or on social issues has nothing 
to do with the question of the role of the corporation. For example, Malthus and 
the Club of Rome were only concerned by ecological problems, just as Harriet 
Beecher Stowe in the US, the early socialists and in the Netherlands Multatuli 
13  In the development of the Greek language, the koinè era is the third period of five. Preceding this era are 
the formative period, ending with Homer (around 900 BC), and the classic period (from Homer to the Alexandrian 
conquests, around 330 BC). The fourth period is the Byzantine (until 1453 AD) and the fifth and final one is the 
modern period, until the present day (Dana and Mantey 1955, 6-7).
14  Dahlsrud (2006) gives an analysis of no less than 37 definitions of CSR; the language seems to have no 
common language even as far as its subject matter is concerned. Although there is difference in the exact use of 
the vocabulary, Dahlsrud concludes that there is quite some agreement about the concept. 
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were socially engaged15. The emancipatory movements in the twentieth century 
also had no primary intention to examine the role of business in achieving their 
goals. Issue-driven societal movements influenced the debate on CSR and these 
movements enriched the language of CSR16.  
 Frederick (1986) rightly observes that in some cases separate debates exist, 
each with their own language: he points at the fields of business ethics and 
CSR. Ten Bos, Jones and Parker (2006) argue that the same goes for business 
ethics and philosophical ethics and Ten Bos and Painter-Morland (2011) argue 
the same more specifically for business ethics, CSR and continental philosophy. 
Here, the debates seem to live completely separate lives, being Fremdsprache to 
one another, but addressing the same or related issues.
Until now, the word ‘language’ was used in the meaning of a jargon, and one 
may rightfully conclude that there is no such thing as a koinè of CSR. This also 
accounts for the ordinary meaning of language: CSR is made up of English 
words and is an English abbreviation. This might immediately shape the 
meaning of the concept. The Dutch equivalent MVO, for example, has a different 
order of the constitutive concepts (in English MVO would be translated as 
Socially Responsible Entrepreneurship) and would fit much better with Bowen’s 
focus on the businessman than the CSR focus on the corporation.
 Visser (2005) emphasizes the American nature of Carroll’s CSR Pyramid, and 
suggests that it is not self-evident that this pyramid can be implemented in 
African culture without adaptation. Jonker, Stark and Tewes (2011) even use the 
English term in their German book, referring to Bowen as the founding father 
of CSR, while virtually ignoring the German literature on Wirtschaftsphilosophie. 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie has a tradition that goes back at least half a century 
earlier than CSR, starting when Fritz Berolzheimer published his System des 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie (Munich, 1904 – 1907)17. For Jonker, Stark 
en Tewes, the focus of CSR is different from Unternehmensethik. According 
to them, the latter is concerned with the manager and/or entrepreneur, 
while CSR focusses on the corporation. They even differentiate between CSR 
and Corporate Citizenship (responsibility beyond the primary goal of the 
corporation), but the second chapter of this study will show that this is not 
15  Thomas Robert Malthus (1766 – 1834) was among the first to write about the limits of population growth. 
The Club of Rome did more or less the same, with the disturbing report Limits to Growth of 1972. Harriet Beecher 
Stowe and Multatuli were socially engaged novelists, the former famous for Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) and the 
latter for Max Havelaar (1860), a Dutch novel about injustice in the Dutch East Indies.
16  In recent years, also spirituality has entered the debate, with the establishment of the SPES forum, thanks to 
the work of (among others) the Belgian ethics professor Luc Bouckaert.
17  The titles of the five individual parts of this work immediately shows that one cannot simply translate this 
into English: the translation of Wirtschaftsphilosophie into philosophy of economics covers only a part of this 
broad field, among which are also Wirtschaftsethik and Unternehmungsethik. These subsidiary disciplines can be 
compared to what we know as business ethics or CSR.
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entirely in line with at least some of the authors in the field of both Corporate 
Citizenship and CSR. Jonker, Stark and Tewes (2011, 8 – 9) also point at the 
distinction between Wirtschaftethik and Unternehmensethiek, and thus they 
create a model that appreciates different levels or scales.  
 The dominance of the English language in the debate means that the 
debate is very much a monolingual, perhaps even monocultural18 affair, ignoring 
all kinds of interesting and related fields of research, like the aforementioned 
German concept of Wirtschaftsphilosophie, the Italian concept of Economia di 
commune19 and probably many more, with the new BRIC economies becoming 
increasingly important players in the global economic arena. In Egypt, a 
company (or community) like Sekem shows how in a predominantly Muslim 
society socially responsible companies are founded20. 
 It takes too far in the context of this study to examine all these ways 
of looking at the ethics of business and the social responsibility of the 
corporation. In academia, one has to respect the rules of the game, and 
sometimes this means a retreat to a specific discourse, knowing that this 
tradition has its limitations. Future research and initiatives could perhaps 
address this specific issue: the languages of CSR and business ethics. 
 CSR is not an isolated tradition, but rather a tradition that is determined by 
(societal) issues and influenced by related debates and perhaps even by cultural 
differences. Nevertheless it still can be considered a debate. For this study, the 
debate of CSR mainly follows the debate as analysed by Carroll (1991, 1999 
and 2008), De Bakker et. al. (2005), Frederick (2006), Dunne (2008), Ten Bos 
and Dunne (2011), and Visser (2011). This means that the focus is on CSR and 
other approaches to business and society issues (e.g. Corporate Citizenship, 
Spirituality in Business) are considered to be ‘dialects’.
18  In their Rondreis door de organisatietheorie Polling and Kampfraath approach organization theory from a 
cultural perspective. It would be interesting to approach CSR from this perspective as well and study the many 
different ways it is implemented in different countries and cultures. 
19  www.edc-online.org. 
20  www.sekem.com. My first encounter with this company was through a Dutch documentary (VPRO tegenlicht, 
5th October 2014).
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1.4 TOWARDS A HERMENEUTIC ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
At this moment I shall summarize the argument. The previous sections contain a number of (sometimes implicit) premises and hypotheses that together shape this study and this section provides with a brief overview 
of these premises and hypotheses.
The corporation:
Premise 1: corporations play an important role in modern society.
Premise 2: society treats corporations as entities with certain responsibilities.
Premise 3: corporations are ‘modern’ in a Heideggerian way (technology, aimed 
at ‘being in control’).
Society:
Premise 4: plurality of opinions in society makes it plausible to presuppose that 
we live under ‘the nihilist condition’.
Responsibility:
Premise 5: the ability to respond is an ability that is interpretative and therefore 
hermeneutic.
Corporate Social Responsibility:
Hypothesis 1: CSR appears in three ways, 1) as a debate, 2) as (planned) 
corporate output, and 3) as (unplanned) behaviour of corporate representatives.
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Hypothesis 2: CSR scholars pay little or no attention to ‘the nihilist condition’; 
therefore, a reflection upon CSR from a nihilistic point of view does not yet 
exist. Like the corporation, CSR is ‘modern’.
Hypothesis 3: CSR scholars – especially after 1980 – focus on CSR as ‘corporate 
output’, hence an approach that appreciates level of ‘(unplanned) behaviour of 
corporate representatives’ is non-existent. This focus causes a theory – practice 
gap. 
Hypothesis 4: CSR has always been a predominantly Anglo-Saxon affair. A 
European CSR, based upon continental thought, would add to the debate.
Premise 6: CSR, like responsibility in general, is an interpretative practice.
Hypothesis 5: As an interpretative – hermeneutic – practice, CSR could benefit 
from philosophical hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics: Gianni Vattimo has not yet published anything about 
corporations or CSR, although his philosophy, according to me, could add value 
to the debate on CSR. Is there a possibility of a nihilist, hermeneutic approach 
to Corporate Social Responsibility? 
Hypothesis 6: The philosophical hermeneutics of Gianni Vattimo adds value to 
the CSR debate and to CSR practices. It even offers an opportunity to – again 
returning to the quotation of ten Bos and Painter-Morland – ‘reconsider some 
of our basic understandings of certain business practices’ and so perhaps even 
may ‘make a difference to our world’.
Following the two-step approach by van Tongeren, mentioned earlier, the 
structure of this book becomes apparent: first, CSR will be analysed, which 
means turning to the important texts of the CSR tradition first, before turning 
towards the (hermeneutic) philosophy that provides the materials to produce a 
new perspective on CSR.
 The first step, chapter two, is an analysis of CSR as it is known now. Before, 
CSR was introduced as it looks ‘at first sight’: as a debate, as planned corporate 
output and as unplanned behaviour of corporate representatives. The second 
chapter further explores the concept of CSR. The debate on CSR gets most of 
the attention. Apart from the problems, described in section 1.3, the debate 
gives a clear idea of the tradition of CSR, of the language we speak, although I 
start with a section on the more general traditions CSR is rooted in  (Greek and/
or Judeo-Christian thought), and (societal) issues pre-dating what is generally 
considered to be the start of the CSR debate.
 To talk about CSR as planned corporate output and unplanned behaviour 
of corporate representatives – that shall be done during the analysis of the 
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debate as well – is a difficult task: either one refers to the debate again, or 
one enters the realm of social sciences. How I can talk about these issues and 
remain philosophical is a methodological problem, which I have solved using 
aphorisms.
 Thus the first step, a critique of CSR, is taken in chapter two. In the third 
chapter the focus shifts completely towards philosophy, more specific to the life 
and works of Gianni Vattimo. This chapter is necessary to perform the second 
step of the analysis. Without knowledge of nihilist hermeneutics it is impossible 
to construct a new perspective on CSR. 
 In the fourth and fifth chapter I shall search for a synthesis of the second 
and third chapter and give an answer to the question: is there a possibility 
of a nihilist hermeneutic approach of Corporate Social Responsibility? The 
consequences of this approach become clear and provide the ingredients for 
some recommendations for further research, both philosophical and scientific. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY,  
AN INTERPRETATION  
OF A TRADITION 
In this chapter, Corporate Social Responsibility is examined beyond the first idea that it appears as a debate, as corporate output, and as individual behaviour. As a debate, it developed within a cultural context, with roots in this culture 
and interdependent with it (in section 2.2 I examine these roots more closely). 
Other scholars have already told stories of CSR, but the stories told are not similar; 
different classifications were made, different accents according to the goal of the 
respective authors. Section 2.3 is dedicated to these classifications, while in section 
2.4 the content of the debate will be analysed. Reflections upon CSR as corporate 
output and as individual behaviour make up for section 2.5. A conclusion finishes 
the chapter.  
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2.1  INTRODUCTION  TO THE CHAPTER
We are seeking a Reformation in business, along the same lines as the one precipitated by Martin Luther in 1517’ (Visser 2002 and 2011). This so-called reformation, or a revolution (Hollender and Breen 
2010) in CSR calls for new businesses: Businesses acting according to the new 
principles of CSR 2.0, principles of Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility 
(Visser 2011).
 ‘CSR 2.0’ is one concept in a long line of – sometimes competing – concepts, 
or should we say ‘business models’ in their own right, together shaping the 
CSR debate. There is ‘a’ debate, with scholars referring to one another, at one 
moment critically, at another more benign. In the example of Visser: he – on 
the one hand – uses the acronym CSR to show that he is a part of ‘the’ CSR 
tradition, while on the other hand he changes the acronym, replacing social by 
sustainable, and uses ‘2.0’ to show something must change radically.
 Others (e.g. Frederick 1978, 1986 and 1998) likewise enriched the debate on 
CSR with conceptual innovations, thereby contributing to the tradition of CSR 
whilst at the same time making it more complex and diverse. As already shown 
in the introductory chapter it is difficult to speak of a koinè, a common language 
of CSR. This chapter seeks to clarify the tradition of CSR.
 A problem of a clarification of the CSR tradition arises immediately when 
one asks when the tradition started or where it came from. Languages and 
traditions evolve, they do not just pop up from out of the blue. From what or 
where did CSR evolve? Which are the roots of the debate? Although Carroll and 
others maintain that the debate started after the Second World War, it is rooted 
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in a cultural context that predates this starting point. Section 2.2 explores 
these roots, and tries to explain why it seemed important to start discussing an 
ethical concept like responsibility in a business context. 
 In section 2.3 the focus shifts towards the debate itself, although this is 
still one of the two preliminary sections. The section handles the different 
ways scholars have classified the debate. In the introduction the metaphor 
of a language and its dialects was used. The way scholars have distinguished 
between these dialects, like Visser did in the example of CSR 2.0, shows how 
they have interpreted the development of CSR and what schools of thought 
appeared during this development.
 Then, in section 2.4 attention turns towards the content of the debate as it 
developed after World War II. This section is by far the largest of this chapter 
and analyses the main concepts and disputes that shaped the debate during 
the years.
Returning to the distinction made in the first chapter, between CSR as a 
debate, as planned corporate output and as unplanned behaviour of corporate 
representatives, until now the chapter has mainly been concerned with the 
first appearance of CSR. The sections 2.2 to 2.4 mainly focus on the debate. 
The fifth section of this chapter reflects upon the other two appearances of 
CSR. This is done by means of aphorisms to avoid a methodological trap: this 
study is a philosophical reflection rather than empirical research21. I consider 
the aphorism to be the most appropriate way to remain philosophical without 
immediately returning to the debate again.
 The final section consists of a summary of the main argument of the chapter, 
and positions the chapter within the broader framework of the thesis. 
21  There is an abundance of empirical research on CSR, but for example the research by Van Zon 
(2014) or the one by Graafland and Mazereeuw – van der Duin Schouten (2012), research focuses 
on the attitude towards sustainability. These attitudes are not reflected upon, they are investigated. 
This study does not deny that, but aims at completing a gap: the neglect of the philosophical 
perspective of ethics.
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2.2  THE ROOTS OF THE  CSR DEBATE
When the debate on CSR started is difficult to establish. Although Carroll nominates Howard Bowen to be the father of CSR and his Responsibilities of the Businessman the starting point of the debate, 
he also mentions some important events of the period before World War II. 
He acknowledges that Bowen also refers to studies before him and did not 
start his work out of the blue. The Centre for Ethical Business Cultures (2010) 
refers to Dempsey and David and their articles on business responsibility in 
1949 as two of the first post-war authors writing on the subject of corporate 
responsibility. Drucker, as we have seen in the first chapter, claims to have been 
the first one to address corporate responsibility issues as far back as 1946. 
However, according to Jonker, Stark and Tewes (2011, 12), Bowen presented the 
first systematic contribution to the debate.
 Dunne (2008, 142 - 149) reflects upon the difficulties of establishing a 
starting point of the debate and focuses on the post-war debate. In order to 
perform a hermeneutic analysis of the debate, it is necessary to make some 
remarks on the origins of the debate. Although the focus is on the post-
war debate in section 2.4, this debate has a cultural context, in which it is 
rooted22. What are the roots of the CSR tradition? What inspired Bowen and his 
successors? 
22  Xun (2012, 471): ‘CSR appears to be a Western-defined concept, because its origin is deeply 
rooted in the democratic capitalist countries’.
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 To begin with, CSR is western thought, with a long tradition of responsibility, 
tracing back to Greek and Judeo-Christian thought23. In modern history, 
the events of the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century and the rise of 
management in the early 20th century have been hugely important for the 
development of business and society issues.
 
Pre-modern times: in antiquity, there are several traces to be found that are 
relevant for this quest for the roots of the tradition we are part of. I would like 
to distinguish between the value of responsibility and some issues.
1. Value of responsibility: responsibility (although one shall look in 
vain for the word itself) is a theme that is addressed both in Greek 
and in Hebrew antiquity. The ancient Greeks knew the concept of 
liturgy (lithourgheia). Although we now know liturgy in connection to 
religious practice it originally meant the responsibility of (wealthy) 
citizens to the polis. In Opus Dei Giorgio Agamben dedicates an entire 
chapter to the development of the concept of liturgy. Composed of 
laos, meaning people, and ergon, liturgy originally meant something 
like public work, work done for the benefit of the people. When the 
Hebrew Old Testament was translated into Greek (the Septuagint) the 
rabbis chose to use litourgheia for the translation of cultic concepts, 
giving it a religious content.
  At several places in the biblical Old Testament responsibility 
comes to the surface. There are laws on interest (Deut. 23: 2024, 
although this counts for fellow Israelites and not for foreigners), 
condemnation of dishonest business practices (e.g. the prophet 
Micah (6: 9 – 1225), the (probably never practiced) jubilee year, where 
everyone was freed form debts and slavery (Deut. 15: 1 – 1826). 
23  The catalogue of an exhibition the Catherijneconvent museum in Utrecht (2014) dedicated to 
charity throughout the centuries, especially in the Netherlands, refers to Armstrong’s claim that all 
religions pay special attention to charity. This supports the idea that it might be possible to develop 
CSR in different countries, with appreciation of different religious backgrounds.
24  ‘Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon 
usury: that the LORD thy God may bless thee in all that thou settest thine hand to in the land 
whither thou goest to possess it.’
25  ‘(9) The LORD’S voice crieth unto the city, and the man of wisdom shall see thy name: hear 
ye the rod, and who hath appointed it. (10) Are there yet the treasures of wickedness in the house 
of the wicked, and the scant measure that is abominable? (11) Shall I count them pure with the 
wicked balances, and with the bag of deceitful weights? (12) For the rich men thereof are full of 
violence, and the inhabitants thereof have spoken lies, and their tongue is deceitful in their mouth.’
26  Deut. 15: 2 (on the release of debts): ‘And this is the manner of the release: Every creditor that 
lendeth ought unto his neighbour shall release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbour, or of his 
brother; because it is called the LORD’S release.’
Deut. 15: 12 (on the release of enslaved fellow Hebrews): ‘And if thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an 
Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years; then in the seventh year thou shalt let 
him go free from thee.’
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Deuteronomy 27 even contains a curse of those who discard the 
rights of the weak (widows, orphans and foreigners)27.
  The New Testament shows several passages on responsibility. 
Examples are mainly found in the Gospels (e.g. the Good Samaritan 
in Luke 10: 25 – 37, the rich man and the poor Lazarus in Luke 16: 
19 – 31, the parable of the sheep and the goats, Matthew 25: 31 – 46), 
and also in the first letter of St. John, chapter 3: 17 (‘But who so hath 
this world’s good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up 
his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in 
him?’).
  This paragraph contains an implicit premise: the rich of antiquity 
are the ancient equivalents of the corporation in modern times. There 
is always an unequal division of power that in the prophet Micah is 
modelled with different categories of people: the ones possessing 
worldly powers, both tradesmen (cfr. note 22) and governing classes 
(Micah 3: 1 – 4 and 3: 9 – 12) and the ones possessing religious 
powers (Micah 3: 5 – 7 and 11, although in many prophecies (e.g. 
Amos) one can find similar accusations). It seems that in CSR there 
is a similar scheme: the corporation and its management are 
considered to be the powerful, while consumers, labourers and other 
stakeholders are more or less powerless.
2. Issues: Human activities always have had an impact on the 
environment, be it sometimes on a small and local scale. The 
story of Easter Island shows what the consequences – even on a 
local and small scale – can be when a society is unable to interact 
constructively with its environment. Van Zon and Kuipers (2002)28 
analyse a number of examples, starting from the problems the 
Mesopotamians already had due to their agricultural activities and 
the irrigation systems needed to maintain those activities. They argue 
that agricultural societies, even the earliest ones, had a much greater 
impact on their environment than the societies of hunter-gatherers 
(op. cit. 23 -24). 
  Plato, in his Kritias (111 A – E), hints at the consequences of 
deforestation for Athens, decreasing the capacity to absorb heavy 
rainfall. Subsequently once fertile soil washed away decreasing the 
agricultural capacity of the region. Van Zon and Kuipers (2002) refer 
to a number of authors who wrote about the problems caused by 
mining, deforestation and population growth. They explicitly relate 
27  Deut. 27: 19: ‘Cursed be he that perverteth the judgment of the stranger, fatherless, and widow. 
And all the people shall say, Amen.’
28  I first encountered this research in the master thesis by Diepstraten (2009). 
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the decline of political (naval) powers in both the Mediterranean 
area (Athens and later Venice) and the North Sea area (Holland) to 
deforestation, caused by the maintenance of a powerful fleet (op. cit., 
58 – 66).
  The ancient Greek had their myth of Prometheus: he offered fire 
to mankind, after stealing it from the Gods. This myth shows a deep 
understanding of the dangerous potential of fire, of technology. Hans 
Jonas begins his Das Prinzip Verantwortung with a reference to this 
ancient myth and van Zon and Kuipers use it, together with many 
examples, to show that sustainability has been an issue throughout 
human history.
  The emphasis of van Zon and Kuipers (2002) clearly was an 
ecological one. One could easily write a story on social issues as well. 
For example, the Torah already gives guidelines on how to handle 
slaves, and slavery continued to be a source of debate throughout the 
centuries29.  
Industrial Revolution: It was because of the industrial revolution that the issues 
like scarcity and pollution became more relevant than ever. Frederick Taylor 
(1913) explicitly mentions scarcity as a rationale for his book. Next to that a 
new issue arose because of the side effects of laissez faire capitalism that came 
up with modern industry. It is in this era that thought on responsibility towards 
labourers develops. Heald (1970, 3 - 4) traces back responsibility, especially as 
it developed in the US, to the first decades of the nineteenth century, when not 
just textile machinery, but also the ideas about attitudes towards employees, 
were imported in the US. These ideas were developed and put into practice by 
someone like Robert Owen, now especially known to us as one of the utopian 
socialists. The Boston Associates, those who introduced textile manufacturing in 
the US, genuinely wished to avoid the conditions they observed in the European 
factory towns (Heald 1970, 5) and therefore developed not just their factories, 
but broader facilities for their employees.
 The changes, brought about by radical changes, caused by the Industrial 
Revolution and, simultaneously, laissez faire capitalism, obviously inspired some 
businessmen to think about their moral obligations towards their surroundings. 
Heald (1970, 1) mentions three sources from which this concern about the 
companies’ environment originated. First there are humanitarianism and 
29  The letter of St. Paul to Philemon contains a request (to Philemon) to accept a slave 
(Onesimus) who fled and sought refuge with the apostle. This letter throughout the centuries has 
been an important source for the debate on slavery from a Christian perspective. His remarks on the 
position of women in (for example) Ephesians 5: 22 -24, likewise has been of immense importance 
for the development of Christian perspectives on women’s emancipation.
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Christianity, which ‘reminded men of their mutual ties and obligations’. Next to 
that there was, because of scarcity of good labour, an understanding that decent 
labour conditions were beneficiary for business as well.
 In 1891 the Roman Catholic Church formally expressed its concern on social 
issues by means of the encyclical Rerum Novarum. This became the basis of 
what would later become the social teachings of the church and criticized both 
laissez faire capitalism and the socialist alternatives. The encyclical addresses 
the responsibilities of both workers and employers and the importance of 
it has been stressed on many occasions by successors of Leo XIII30. In 1991, 
his successor John Paul II, in Centesimus annus, celebrated the centennial of 
Rerum Novarum. By that time the social teachings of the church also included 
issues like ecological problems and globalization. The first pope to address 
the ecological challenge was Paul VI in 1971 (Apostolic Letter Octogesima 
Adveniens). Recently, in May 2015, in an encyclical on ‘our common home’ pope 
Francis reflects on our responsibilities towards the planet.
Early twentieth century: in the early twentieth century philanthropists like 
Carnegie and Rockefeller, and in the Netherlands the Philips31 family illustrate 
how CSR was put into practice and these examples explain why several authors 
call this the philanthropic era (Murphy 1978, quoted in Carroll 2010 and Visser 
2011). However, the denomination of the pre-war era as philanthropic does 
not do it justice. It marginalises an issue, specific for this era and of great 
importance for the CSR debate: the increasing importance of management in 
corporations. 
 The debate on the responsibilities of management, thoroughly described 
by Heald (1970, 54 – 78), was caused by the increasing size and complexity 
of corporations. In his important Principles of Scientific Management (1913) 
Taylor stressed the importance of a separation of labour and management, but 
due to the development of large corporations, a separation of ownership and 
management also developed. The hierarchical layer of (strategic management) 
in the corporation decided on far stretching (strategic) issues, without taking 
entrepreneurial risk. They did not own the corporation. This idea, which is a 
perfect example of the principal-agent problem, caused some concern: would 
this new class of professionals act responsibly when they had opportunities to 
decide on important issues without taking the entrepreneurial risks?
30  Through Quadragesimo Anno and Centesimus Annus, the church emphasized the importance 
of the original encyclical, ‘celebrating’ its anniversary; Pius XII did so on the fiftieth anniversary by 
means of a radio speech. Many other encyclicals and apostolical letters refer to Rerum Novarum, and 
together they now form the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
31  Liker (2004, chapter 2) and Womack, Jones and Roos (2007, 48 - 49) trace back the roots of 
the Toyota Production System, in which quite a lot of CSR can be found as well, to the pre-war era. 
Especially Liker emphasizes the element of responsibility as a cornerstone of ‘the Toyota way’.
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 This debate on management also illustrates the complexity of the debate 
on CSR. The philanthropists like Carnegie or – in our days – Bill Gates, are 
not taking corporate decisions. They made a fortune with their business and 
choose to act philanthropically with the revenues. They are free to do as they 
please with their personal belongings. Therefore one could question whether 
we are talking about CSR at all. Even when one uses the Dutch abbreviation 
as a guiding principle (section 1.3), which focusses on entrepreneurship, rather 
than the corporation, the same question is justified: giving away revenues 
of entrepreneurship has nothing to do with the way one actually runs an 
enterprise, with the way the entrepreneur does business.  
 Apart from the rise of the managerial ‘class’, it was the development 
of corporations into large national, multinational or even transnational 
organizations that made the question of CSR an urgent one.   
 Both Heald (1970) and Bowen (1953) show that in the era before Second 
World War already a body of knowledge developed, and businessmen were 
certainly thinking about their duties and obligations towards society. Some of 
them were convinced that this obligation was limited to the shareholders of 
the firm, while others felt an awareness of their obligations towards employees, 
or even towards what we nowadays would call secondary stakeholders.
In this section some of the roots of the debate were examined. These roots 
are to be found in Greek and Judeo Christian traditions, as in modern times in 
the consequences of the Industrial Revolution (the development of a capitalist 
system) and in the management revolution of the early twentieth century. Out 
of these roots the tradition of CSR could grow and prosper after World War II.
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2.3 CLASSIFICATIONS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY
After examining the roots of CSR and some pre-war reflections on business and society relationships, the focus now shifts towards the way storytellers of CSR have classified the debate. Some of the stories 
are descriptive (Dahlsrud 2006 and De Bakker et. al. 2005; the latter is a 
bibliometrical analysis, without normative claims), while others try to persuade 
the reader to change his or her ways (Elkington 1997 and Visser 2011). Authors 
like Carroll and other representatives of the tradition of Corporate Social 
Performance, try to develop managerial tools that can be used by practitioners. 
The criterion of ‘good CSR’ in CSP is its fitness for use by practitioners. 
 The most rigid of classifications is the one mentioned at the first lines of the 
chapter, the one that divides CSR in 1.0 and 2.0. Visser further divides CSR in a 
number of ‘ages’: the ages of greed, philanthropy, marketing, management and 
– finally – the age of responsibility. Interestingly, these ages do not indicate a 
certain chronology. All of them are still relevant and recognizable until this day 
(which is also the case with the CSR varieties distinguished by de Bakker et. al. 
2005).
 Although Visser uses the word ‘age’, he rather appears to indicate a certain 
approach towards CSR. The examples he uses to illustrate the age of greed are 
corporations that can be considered irresponsible (e.g. Enron and WorldCom). 
The other 1.0 ages are ‘better’, but still inadequate32. With the subtitle ‘the 
32  The age of philanthropy is characterized by the phrase ‘first get rich, then get generous’. 
There is always a tone of disapproval, because these corporations appear to be not intrinsically 
responsible.
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new DNA of business’ he seems to believe that there is such a thing as an 
intrinsically responsible corporation. Hollender and Breen (2010), with their use 
of words like responsibility revolution and the subtitle ‘how the next generation 
of business shall win’, also represent this normative category of authors. 
Does their idea of a next (and more responsible) generation of businesses 
also indicate a belief in a more or less intrinsically responsible corporation? 
It remains to be seen whether there really is such a paradigmatic difference 
between 1.0 and 2.0 CSR. That is an issue that will be addressed in the next 
section. 
 Murphy (1978, quoted by Carroll), with his division in eras – the era of 
philanthropy, of awareness, of issues and of responsiveness – is less explicitly 
normative, although he also describes the evolution of the debate. Visser and 
Murphy share the concept of philanthropy, although Murphy uses this concept 
to characterise the pre-war era. Visser uses it to indicate a certain approach to 
CSR (first get rich, then get generous) that is put into practice until this day. 
De Bakker et. al. (2005), Visser (2011) and Carroll (1991, 1999, 2008) wrote their 
histories, looking back at the debate. William C. Frederick, an author whose 
career covers almost the entire post-war debate, develops a classification of 
his own during the debate. His 1960 paper contributes to what he would later 
call CSR1, followed by critical papers (1978, 1986 and 1998) calling for new 
approaches to CSR, finally arriving at CSR4.
  Frederick (1978) recognises the need for a tool-oriented approach of CSR; 
after the first developments of CSR (CSR1), with an emphasis on reflection, CSR 
should focus on ready-to-use instruments. The result is CSR2, corporate social 
responsiveness. At that same moment, Frederick already foresees the drawbacks 
of such a development. In 1986 Frederick calls for CSR3, Corporate Social 
Rectitude. Waddock (2003) observes that this concept never became a success. 
 During the eighties, Frederick regularly addresses the same question Daniel 
Pink asks in his TED talk of July 2009: ‘why doesn’t business do what science 
knows?’ These reflections, applied to CSR, in 1998 lead to CSR4, Cosmos, Science 
and Religion. The acronym now has completely changed its significance. 
The content of this latest approach toward CSR will be discussed more in 
detail later in this chapter. From the point of view of classification of CSR, 
this approach towards CSR calls for a more science-based approach of CSR 
and simultaneously it gives room to spirituality. Waddock (2003) – although 
especially focussing on the development of corporate citizenship – addresses 
this, referring to a Harvard conference on the subject. Also in Europe the 
attention for spirituality, related to management and CSR grew, especially 
thanks to scholars like Boeckaert and Zsolnai and the creation of the SPES 
forum in 2004 (the first initiative for SPES was taken in 2000).
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 With the development of CSR1 to CSR4, Frederick has showed to be both 
a participant in the debate and a critic of it. Time and time again he asks 
attention for the flaws of the debate and provokes the exploration of new ways. 
He proves that being part of a tradition does not necessarily mean that one 
cannot be critical towards it.  
Already in the introduction, I referred to the use of many different names of 
CSR. Such a variety of names can be confusing. Some authors, like Frederick, 
invented varieties of the acronym CSR, while others used completely different 
names to indicate more or less the same: Corporate citizenship, Business and 
society, while in the Netherlands sustainable entrepreneurship (duurzaam 
ondernemen) is preferred by some. After the turn of the millennium, spirituality 
became increasingly popular as well.
 
All this suggests a kind of development, but where that development 
leads to remains a question. Murphy and Carroll emphasize a development 
from implicitness and vagueness to a more usable approach for corporate 
executives. Using the Frederick vocabulary, they are mostly concerned with the 
development from CSR1 to CSR2.
 The scholars writing in the sustainability tradition, like Visser (2011) and 
Elkington (1997), try to persuade readers to really change their actions towards 
a sustainable world. They fill in what the others sometimes leave unclear (just 
vaguely referring to a ‘better world’ or ‘good society’ as we are about to see in 
the next section): CSR ought to be aimed at a world, functioning according to 
the Brundtland (1987) principles. CSR in this way becomes an imperative. 
Searching for the stories of CSR one comes across several divisions and 
several ways the story has been told. An author, who starts from an issue 
like sustainability or emancipation, tells a very different story than an author 
who searches for traces of (ir-) responsible behaviour of entrepreneurs or 
corporations. 
 Issue driven authors share a tendency towards prescriptive ethics. They 
share a drive to change the world, while authors like de Bakker only have an 
ambition to describe the debate. Carroll and Frederick seem more interested 
in the debate itself: if they want to change anything, it is in the first place the 
debate itself. In the next section, I shall combine the stories told and again 
construct a story of post-war CSR, fed by the most important texts that shaped 
the debate. 
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2.4 A HISTORY OF POST-WAR CSR: A RECONSTRUCTION
2.4.1 THE FIRST DECADES OF THE 
DEBATE (1953 – 1980): CONCEPTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND ISSUES         
Murphy divides this period in three eras: the era of awareness (1953 – 1967), the issue era (1967 – 1973) and the era of responsiveness (1973 – 1978). 
There seems to be a widespread agreement, as we have seen, on who gets 
the credits for having started the debate on CSR, although this actually is not 
entirely correct (cfr. 1.1, where Drucker, Dempsey and David were mentioned). 
In 1953, Harold Bowen published his, as it appeared later, revolutionary 
Social Responsibility of the Businessman. This work was commissioned by the 
Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, as a part of a series of 
six volumes on Christian Ethics and Economic Life. His point of departure is 
the conviction that large corporations have such an impact on society that a 
single stakeholder approach is insufficient. This conviction does not lead him to 
discuss capitalism as such, but especially laissez faire capitalism33. 
 In the preface of his book, Bowen states that ‘the way to greater 
responsiveness of businessmen toward their social obligations lies in the 
processes of broadly based discussion and individual soul-searching on the 
33  Businessmen have to take responsibility ‘if the economic system of free enterprise is to 
continue and to prosper’ (Bowen 1953, 5): the preservation of the capitalist system even seems to 
be a goal of the author, although he also acknowledges that one should not cling to the system. 
Protestants should always be ‘suspicious of utopian thinking’ (op. cit. 33). A refreshing view, far away 
from the dogmas of neoliberal thought.
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part of actual participants – not in the spelling out of answers by outside 
observers.’ Later (op. cit. 1953, 32), he again articulates this idea of responsibility 
as an individual quest, relating it to religious life: ‘as a Christian, what are my 
social responsibilities?’ The outside observer now is the church that also cannot 
provide blueprints for the concept of responsibility. 
 The fifties show a number of authors, further elaborating the concept of 
CSR, and it is fascinating to reread some of those contributions. Eells (1956) 
and Selekman (1959) both are explicit in their focus, although this is not 
acknowledged in later comments on their works. While Bowen started from 
the question how to be a good Christian, Eells and Selekman start from a very 
different concern: after the experiences with one totalitarian regime, Nazism, 
and the threat of another one, Communism, how can the free American society 
be protected against these threats? 
 Eells (1956, xiv): ‘They (business corporations) must develop and 
accept a theory of corporation giving that strengthens a free society.’ 
Corporate philanthropy thus has a specific goal, ‘strengthening American 
constitutionalism’ (op. cit. 86). Selekman (1959, 15) agrees: ‘the business 
community itself (…) increasingly articulated a philosophy of ethical and moral 
responsibility. In the cold war with Russian communism, as had been true in the 
actual war with Nazi Germany, private business saw itself as part and parcel of 
the democratic free world, in contrast to the government-dominated industries 
in Fascist and Communist nations.’
 An important issue in US society in the first decade after World War II was 
fear of communism (as the infamous McCarthy trials illustrate) and Corporate 
Social Responsibility authors share the worries of their compatriots. However, 
it is also interesting to see that in Eells, for example, all kinds of themes pop 
up that later become important in the CSR debate. The stakeholders theory 
of the firm and corporate citizenship (on page 14 he explicitly uses the word 
citizen), the corporation as a person (op. cit. 10, with reference to Compton: 
‘as corporations become more dominant, society naturally expects them as 
creatures…’) with the related problem of corporate conscience (op. cit. 85). The 
foundations for the debate thus are laid.
 Later critique can be argued to undervalue the contribution of these 
authors, especially when they think they are vague and abstract. It is just that 
the practice they were concerned with is not the same as it was in later years. 
The questions and worries of the fifties are not the same as the issues of the 
late sixties. The sixties are subject of the next part of this section.  
During the second half of the awareness era, the body of knowledge developed 
more rapidly. Four authors stand out, according to Carroll (1999 and 2008). 
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The first one is Keith Davis (1960, 1966 (with Blomstrom) and 1967). In Davis 
(1975), he again takes up his argument, that business’ responsibility arises 
from the immense power business has. Together with Robert L. Blomstrom, 
Davis coined the so-called Iron Law of Responsibility: ‘In the long run, those who 
do not use power in a manner society considers responsible will tend to lose 
it’ (Davis 1975, 20). This argument is somewhat comparable to the ‘principal 
– agent’ principle, society being the principle and the company the agent. 
This idea is verified by a concept used by Davis (1973, 314 and 1975, 20), that 
of the ‘trustee’. The company is a ‘wise trustee’, serving the ‘claimants of the 
organization’. The idea that power (or impact) comes with responsibility is of 
course completely consistent with the earlier ideas of Bowen. Davis may well 
be considered a forerunner of what would later be called stakeholder theory.
 Carroll (1999, 272) also quotes the definition of social responsibility, given 
by Davis and Blomstrom (1966): ‘Social responsibility, therefore, refers to a 
person’s obligation to consider the effects of his decisions and actions on 
the whole social system. Businessmen apply social responsibility when they 
consider the needs and interests of others who may be affected by business 
actions. In so doing, they look beyond their firm’s narrow and technical 
interests.’ This consideration, asking attention for the whole social system, 
brings him close to another important author: William C. Frederick, who was 
already mentioned before and to whom we shall return again later in this 
chapter. In 1960 (revised in Frederick 2006, 20, quoted in Carroll 1999 and 
2008) he states that ‘Social responsibility in the final analysis implies a public 
posture toward society’s economic and human resources and a willingness to 
see that those resources are utilized for broad social ends and not simply for 
the narrowly circumscribed interests of private persons and firms.’ The idea 
of a trustee is apparent implicitly, although more vaguely in this definition. 
Philosophically, this seems to be a utilitarian point of view, with an open eye for 
the broader goals of the whole of society, more than just the goals of individual 
persons or companies. 
 Carroll (1999) also mentions Joseph W. McGuire, who in a 1963 book states 
that ‘the idea of social responsibilities supposes that the corporation has not 
only economic and legal obligations but also certain responsibilities to society 
which extend beyond these obligations’ (McGuire, quoted in Carroll 1999, 271). 
Later (Carroll 1999, 272), it is mentioned that corporations should act ‘justly’, as 
a proper citizen should. Here, again a glimpse of corporate citizenship appears 
in the debate on CSR, which would only fully develop many years later. 
 The final author, relevant for the era of awareness, is Clarence C. Walton, 
who defines social responsibility as follows: ‘In short, the new concept of 
social responsibility recognizes the intimacy of the relationships between the 
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corporation and society and realizes that such relationships must be kept in 
mind by top managers as the corporation and the related groups pursue their 
respective goals.’ (Walton, quoted in Carroll (1999, 275 and 2008, 27). This 
view also leans toward the later developed stakeholder theory of the firm, and 
especially mentions top management, but in vague terms, that they must keep 
in mind related groups. It is this vagueness that, in the years that would follow 
aroused some critique and caused the step toward would Frederick (1978) 
would call CSR2. 
According to Murphy (1978) and quoted in Carroll (1999, 2008), the issue era 
stretched from the late 1960’s until 1973. In this period, both the ‘S’ and the 
‘R’ develop rapidly. Frederick (1973, adapted for 2006) describes the different 
social revolutions (issues) and shows the relation of these revolutions with 
business practice34. The social issues influence the question of corporate 
responsibility. In the case of the ecology movement, one can even distinguish 
an independent ‘sustainability’ movement in management literature, not 
necessarily embedded in the debate on CSR. 
 The concepts of CSR develop, according to Frederick (1978, adapted for 
2006) from CSR1 to CSR2: from Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate 
Social Responsiveness. Important in this transition are the publications by 
Johnson (1971) and the Committee for Economic Development (CED, also in 
1971). The former – quoted in Carroll (1999 and 2008) – defines ‘a socially 
responsible firm is one whose managerial staff balances a multiplicity of 
interests. Instead of striving only for larger profits for its shareholders, a 
responsible enterprise also takes into account employees, suppliers, dealers, 
local communities and the nation.’ (Carroll 1999, 273 and 2008, 28).
 Johnson, for the first time, explicitly defines not only that business has got a 
responsibility, but also to whom this responsibility extends. Business, according 
to him, and those who manage them, seek ‘multiple goals’ and try to achieve 
‘utility maximization’. He considers social responsibility ‘an integral part of a 
shift to a more sophisticated market economy’ (Johnson 1971, 135). This ‘more 
sophisticated market economy’ is exactly what Bowen proposed as far back as 
in 1953.
 While Carroll reads Johnson from his own perspective, with a special interest 
for the corporate level, Johnson himself seems to be a scholar more in the line 
of Bowen, also addressing the individual level of the executive: ‘the executive is 
called upon to be a twentieth century Renaissance man, trained in a wide range 
of fields and talented in many ways (134)’. He uses the idea of a Renaissance 
34  Frederick (2006, 26 – 29): the black movement, the ecology movement, the women’s liberation 
movement, the youth movement, the consumer movement, the anti-war movement, the work ethic 
revolt.
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man to point at the complex (multi- or interdisciplinary) nature of executives’ 
work. 
 
The CED contribution to CSR, according to Carroll (1999 and 2008) a ‘ground-
braking’ (2008) or ‘landmark’ (1999) one, mentions ‘the changing expectations of 
the public’ (Carroll 1999, 275 and 2008, 29). The full definition is the following: 
‘Business is being asked to assume broader responsibilities to society than ever 
before and to serve a wider range of human values. Business enterprises, in 
effect are being asked to contribute more to the quality of American life than 
just supplying quantities of goods and services. Inasmuch as business exist to 
serve society, its future will depend on the quality of management’s response to 
the changing expectations of the public.’ 
 Although it seems to be taken for granted that this all is the case, a move 
towards ‘responsiveness’ is made here. A second important element added by 
the CED to the CSR body of knowledge is that they distinguish three ‘circles’:
·	 The inner circle includes the clear-cut basic responsibilities for the 
efficient execution of the economic function – products, jobs and 
economic growth.
·	 The intermediate circle encompasses responsibility to exercise this 
economic function with a sensitive awareness of changing social 
values and priorities; for example, with respect for environmental 
conservation, hiring and relations with employees; and more rigorous 
expectations of customers for information, fair treatment and 
protection from injury.
·	 The outer circle outlines newly emerging and still amorphous 
responsibilities that business should assume to become more broadly 
involved in actively improving the social improvement (for example, 
poverty and urban blight) (quoted in Carroll 1999, 275 and 2008, 29).
This committee, composed of (amongst others) business people, represented 
a broader societal view on the relationship between business and society. 
The report was preceded by an opinion survey, again with an overwhelming 
outcome in favor of a wider interpretation of the responsibility of businesses.
In 1979 Archie Carroll published a paper that proved to be of great importance 
to the debate and marked the beginning of a new era. Before turning to that era 
of Corporate Social Performance, or – using the vocabulary of Frederick – CSR2, I 
will turn to two critics of CSR: William Frederick, who focuses on the redirection 
of CSR, and Milton Friedman, who criticizes the very idea of CSR.
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2.4.2 CRITIQUE:  
FREDERICK AND FRIEDMAN 
This section is dedicated to two critical contributions to the debate. The first one is a call for change within the debate by William Frederick. The second 
one is a critique from outside the debate by the famous economist Milton 
Friedman. Both contributions became canonical.
Frederick (1978) observes a need for a change in the debate. A change from 
what he calls CSR1 towards CSR2 in order to overcome the shortcomings of the 
former. However, CSR2 will have its own drawbacks, again causing a need for a 
next step in CSR: CSR.3 .
The flaws of CSR1:
1. The content or substance – the operational meaning – of CSR1 is 
supremely vague.
2. Which ‘institutional mechanisms’ could make CSR work?
3. ‘The trade-off between economic goals and costs on the one hand 
and social goals and costs on the other cannot be stated with any 
acceptable degree of precision.’
4. The moral underpinnings of CSR are ‘neither clear nor agreed upon’.
All four aspects of the criticism breathe a need for an approach that leaves the 
discussion whether CSR is relevant behind, in favour of the more operational 
question how. Words like ‘vague’, lack of ‘operational’ meaning, ‘precision’ and 
‘clear’ indicate a need for clear definitions and especially for criteria for CSR. 
Clear criteria for CSR make it possible to measure and benchmark corporate 
CSR performance. The need for ‘institutional mechanisms’ articulates the lack of 
organizational instruments needed to implement CSR into corporate practices. 
The flaws address a lack of both clear ends as ready-to-use instruments for CSR 
practitioners.
The effects of CSR2:
1. It takes the ‘moral heat’ of CSR. Less attention for morality and more 
for actual issues.
2. Emphasis on tools, techniques and organizational structures.
3. It encourages empirical research into business-and-society issues.
4. It draws attention to the internal and external constraints on 
organizational responsiveness (…) ‘having sloughed off the abstract 
speculations of CSR1, the CSR2 viewpoint can concentrate on these 
constraints as problems to be solved rather than as philosophical 
principles to be debated.’
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Number 1 and 4 show a shift in focus from ethics – ‘morality’ and ‘philosophical 
principles’ – to ‘problem solving’ and ‘actual themes’. The choice of words of 
these two items almost show a disdain for (philosophical) reflection and a 
preference to practicability. Apparently, theory does not fit practice at that 
moment and a theory that focusses on ‘tools, techniques, organizational 
structures and empirical research’ (2 and 3) would make a better match. CSR 
in the way Howard Bowen preferred it, as reflection rather than ‘the spelling 
out of answers’ seems to have become obsolete. Instead, a focus on the actual 
issues and problems to be solved suggests that answers already have been 
spelled out. But the drawbacks, immediately acknowledged by Frederick, show 
that CSR2 is not a solution for the entire CSR problem.
The flaws of CSR2:
1. CSR2 does not clarify the meaning, which means that vagueness still 
exists in concepts like ‘social betterment’.
2. It does not clarify the nature of the relationships between business 
and society.
3. It is a static theory, not examining the nature of societal change.
4. It does not provide us with moral values. ‘The result is an implicit 
reliance on established organizational values and prevailing (…) 
societal values.’
Ignoring morality does not provide the wanted clarity automatically. An 
interesting feature of the article is a complete absence of philosophical ethics. 
It is not until 1985 that he acknowledges a gap between (business) ethics and 
CSR. Meanwhile, he uses terms like ‘philosophical principles’ without turning to 
the discipline of philosophy. This article illustrates (at least) three things: that 
1) CSR seems to struggle with its ethical content, that 2) CSR is intrinsically 
metaphysical, to which I shall return in the next chapter and 3) that CSR 
apparently is trapped in a false dilemma, because it seems necessary to choose 
for either CSR1 or CSR2. 
Frederick’s analysis marks an important point in the debate on CSR. It seems 
that two tracks are possible:
1. CSR as a managerial ‘toolkit’.
2. CSR as reflection on the moral values, both organizational as societal.
In my opinion both tracks are relevant, but in the debate that follows, starting 
with an important paper by Carroll, an implicit choice for the first track 
seems to be made: the corporation is at the centre of CSR literature and the 
corporation more and more becomes (or remains) the only level of analysis.
 By putting the corporation at the centre of attention, the focus is on what 
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Donna Wood would later describe as corporate output. The individuals and 
groups forming the organization are neglected. CSR is drifting away from what 
has been referred to as ‘everyday life’. Corporate Social Responsibility scholars in 
this era prefer to use Corporate Social Performance (CSP).
 Corporate Social Performance creates (or enlarges) the gap between 
theory and practice. A focus on corporate output helps the management of the 
corporation to communicate with the environment of the company on a formal 
basis: interested stakeholders can get a glimpse of what the corporation is 
‘doing’ as far as CSR is concerned. One can read about the CSR policy, about 
codes of conduct, about interesting projects, about the stars and stripes the 
company has earned in CSR benchmarks. Large corporations may even have 
special employees or entire departments concerned with CSR; far away from 
the everyday life of the other employees, who may deliver interesting personal 
narratives that help the CSR department to enhance the quality of corporate 
output. CSR is alienated from professional work.
Apart from the critique within the CSR debate itself, a more fundamental 
critique was articulated by Milton Friedman. It has been so influential that it 
has become a part of the CSR debate. 
 ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’ is the title of 
the 1970 article. The argument can be analysed along different lines, as Salazar 
and Husted (2006) and ten Bos, Jones and Parker (2006) show. The former 
emphasize the agency theory in the Friedman argument, while the latter pay 
more attention to Friedman’s argument on the relation between business and 
society in a democratic, capitalist system.
 Friedman (1970 and 1974) analyses the responsibility of executives in terms 
of agency theory: the investors (shareholders) are the principals, and their 
agents should not waste their energy (and corporate money) on anything else 
than making a decent profit, within the boundaries of law and ethical customs. 
This presupposes a few things: 
1. CSR expenditures are not in line with company goals and do not 
contribute to shareholders value (if it does, Friedman considers 
it to be window dressing). Partly because of the vagueness of the 
concept of CSR, Friedman is able to construct an argument that is 
always valid: CSR expenditures are defined in such a way that they 
don’t contribute to companies’ profits (if they do, they are not CSR 
expenditures anymore).
2. Friedman focuses on altruistic agents and non-altruistic principals 
(Salazar and Husted 2006, 139). Of course, when the principal expects 
CSR behaviour from his or her agent, there wouldn’t be a problem. 
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Or would there? Friedman (1974) emphasizes that it is difficult to 
identify what is or isn’t responsible. He does that using the example 
of German companies, supporting the Nazi regime during the thirties 
of the twentieth century.
3. Shareholders are the only principals of the corporation. Arrow (1985) 
explores the possibility of other principals, but Friedman (1970) – 
although he acknowledges the existence of customers and employees 
as stakeholders of the corporation – uses other stakeholders to 
underline his argument: ‘His customers and employees can desert 
him for other producers and employers less scrupulous in exercising 
their social responsibilities.’ Friedman simply presupposes that the 
other stakeholders argue according to his own doctrine. If customers 
and employees demand a corporation to behave responsibly, 
Friedman’s argument falls apart completely.  
Friedman has a strong point, considering the agency theory, even if one accepts 
a multi-principal adaption and if one accepts the implicit definition of CSR 
that it is the same as corporate philanthropy. If, for example, a company spends 
time and money at charity, it does not only (potentially) violate shareholders’ 
interests, but also those of employees; in case of reorganization or bankruptcy, 
the lack of focus on primary goals like continuity time and money spent on 
charity could in retrospective be considered means wasted.  
 Friedman appears to be more than a scientist when he talks about 
economy. In Friedman (1970, quoting his own Capitalism and Freedom of 1962) 
he states that CSR is a ‘fundamentally subversive doctrine in a free society’. 
This statement is no scientific hypothesis, but rather a quasi-religious one. 
Friedman believes that a free society is a society governed by the principles 
of free competition. This is an example of utopian thought that will be further 
elaborated in the next chapter.  
 The agency theory approach does not cover the entire Friedman argument. 
Ten Bos, Jones and Parker (2006, 133 – 136) especially draw attention to three 
other parts of the argument:
1. Capitalism is characterised by conflicts of interest. The interests of 
a company not always coincide with the interests of labourers or 
consumers. Labour unions act in the interests of their members, 
as do consumer organizations for theirs. This is the way, according 
to Friedman, how a capitalist society should work. Trying to solve 
everything within the walls of the corporation would take the conflict 
out of the political arena, where it belongs. 
2. Business executives are not elected democratically. Why should they 
be bothering about what is socially correct. Again, it is the democratic 
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system that brings forward the rules and norms business has to 
deal with. Apparently Friedman does not trust the corporation as a 
suitable place to discuss social issues. 
3. Friedman refers to law and ethical customs as the boundaries 
within which the company has to move. A government that is able 
to guarantee this boundaries is more important than corporation 
executives trying to act responsible, each in their own way: ‘the 
people who preach this hogwash talk as if everyone is always in 
favour of the same things, and there is no problem about which 
causes the money should be spent to further’ (1974, 6).
The arguments by Friedman have always remained relevant. Although he 
personally pleas for a decrease of governmental influence, his argument seems 
to contradict that. A strong government and a critical public domain provide the 
necessary conditions for corporations to exist within. The opinions articulated 
in the public domain provide companies with the boundaries within which 
they have to operate. So, if the public domain calls for companies to produce 
all kinds of CSR reports, corporations have to behave according to these 
requirements. 
 Notwithstanding the plausibility of the argument, there is an also strong 
argument against it that connects the Friedman argument with the gap 
between theory and practice that is such an important part of this study: 
the separation thesis. The separation thesis is the conviction that economic 
values are different – and should be separated form – moral values. Harris and 
Freeman (2008) argue that this separation thesis is in fact a separation fallacy. 
The attempt to separate ethics from economics (or, as they quote Putnam, make 
a distinction between fact and value, ‘is’ and ‘ought’) is a fruitless endeavour. 
In scientific research it can be useful to make such a distinction for the time 
being. However in business practice, situations can never be analysed as if 
there is such a distinction between facts and values. Everyday life situations are 
complex and the separation fallacy creates abstractions that do not relate to 
everyday life. It may give a possibility to reject responsibilities, a possibility to 
avert one’s eyes from a situation without feeling uncomfortable about it.  
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2.4.3 THE EIGHTIES AND BEYOND: 
CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE, 
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, 
SUSTAINABILITY AND BUSINESS AND 
SPIRITUALITY
One of the key texts of the CSR debate is the 1979 paper by Archie Carroll. It is an attempt to deal with the flaws, mentioned in the previous section. 
Carroll tries to synthesize elements that were already addressed by earlier 
scholars:
1. A basic definition of social responsibility that would later be known 
as the pyramid model (Carroll 1991). Carroll (1979, 499) distinguishes 
between four categories of obligations of corporations towards 
society: economic, legal, ethical and discretionary responsibilities35. 
2. An enumeration of the issues for which social responsibility exist.
3. A specification of the philosophy of response.
This very much looks like a strategy to address stakeholders and issues like 
the one Freeman would later present in his 1984 book. The basic definition of 
responsibility does not contain reflection on responsibility, but rather avoids 
such reflection.
 The Carroll approach focuses on a part of the critique on CSR1 and wants 
to offer a framework that can be used by practitioners. Many scholars have 
discussed this framework in the following decades. Some of them seem to be 
aware of problems with the concept, but fail to really address them, let alone 
solve the problems. They tend to follow the ‘toolkit track’.
 Several important scholars in the field build upon the work of Carroll: 
Wartick and Cochran (1985), Wood (1990, 1991a and 1991b), Swanson (1995 
and 1999) and Schwartz (2003 (together with Carroll) and 2011). They all take 
steps forward in the development of ever more precise frameworks of CSP.
 Wood (1991a) (building upon Wartick and Cochran (1985)) emphasizes the 
need for ‘measurable outcomes’ in CSR frameworks, although she also seems 
to be aware of the problems of the CSP approaches. In her own model, Wood 
mentions the individual level (managerial discretion) and refers to Ackerman 
(1975), who ‘wrote about corporate social responsibility as ‘the management 
of discretion’, referring not to philanthropy or community involvement 
35  In Carroll (1979) the four responsibilities are described as economic (be profitable), legal 
(obey the law), ethical (be ethical) and philanthropic responsibilities (be a good corporate citizen). 
The ethical level is described as ‘obligations to do what is right, just, and fair and to avoid harm’ 
while the philanthropic level implies that one ‘contributes resources to the community; improve the 
quality of life’. 
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programs, but to the discretion extant in the total realm of managerial actions 
and choices. Thus, the principle of managerial discretion is premised on the 
following ideas: (a) managers exist in an organizational and social environment 
that is full of choices; (b) managers’ actions are not totally prescribed by 
corporate procedures, formal job definitions, resource availabilities, or 
technologies; and (c) managers are moral actors on the job as well as in other 
domains of their lives (...) managers have choices about how to fulfil many of 
these responsibilities’ (op. cit. 699).
 The individual level and the reflections of this individual upon his or her 
responsibilities and the reflections upon responsibilities of the corporation are 
neglected in the remainder of the paper. For Wood and Frederick alike, ethical 
motives of managers are to be researched empirically. Ethics belongs to the 
realm of the social sciences. Although the quotation offers an opportunity 
to respect the ‘reflection track’, the Wood framework remains within the 
instrumental ‘tool track’.
 Elsewhere (Wood 1990) she states that ‘a concept that permits action 
without reflection on responsibility is conceptually inadequate to replace CSR’. 
And, referring to Wartick and Cochran, ‘responsiveness complements but does 
not replace responsibility’. Wood seems to be fully aware of the gap the ‘toolkit 
approach’ leaves. However, why are these statements made? They are neglected 
in the remainder of the work, and in Wood (1991b) it comes to the surface 
why she does not think it is necessary to reflect on CSR, or on the manager as 
a moral actor: ‘We may be able to skip asking so many tangled questions on 
responsibility, and asking more concrete questions about outcomes (...) then we 
shall move closer to answering the questions of CSR, and in the process move 
also toward the good society and a better world.’
 So, while a part of the Wood framework consists of ‘principles of 
responsibility’, she argues that asking questions about these principles might 
be skipped. A focus on corporate output will bring us (automatically?) closer to 
a better world. Ten Bos and Dunne (2011) ask attention for the concept of the 
‘better world’ and a ‘good society’: who decides on the criteria of what is better 
or good?  
 Of course, Wood does contribute to the CSR debate. She emphasizes the 
need for observable outcomes and further develops the model, first created by 
Archie Carroll. For the instrumental approach to CSR this has been important. 
The (reflection upon the) criteria for those outcomes remain implicit. So indeed, 
CSR2 does not clarify the meaning of ‘social betterment’. The words of William 
Frederick, quoted earlier, remain valid.
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In the previous sections, as well as in the introduction, CSR was criticized for its 
lack of (philosophical) ethical content. It was regularly argued that philosophy 
and philosophical ethics are largely ignored in the debate. In several texts, both 
by Frederick and Wood, ethics is subject to social sciences and so in the first 
place subject to descriptive ethics.
 Normative ethics is never far away, but it remains below the surface. When 
Wood claims that the focus on corporate output will bring us to a better 
world, there seems to be an implicit understanding of such a better world. In 
most texts on CSR, the author shows such an intuition of what the nature of 
responsibilities of corporations or businessmen and women should be. The 
authors writing from the sustainability perspective seem to have answered the 
questions for the reader: we ought to behave more in line with the Brundtland 
statement.
 With Swanson (1995 and 1999) and Schwartz (2003 (with Carroll) and 2011) 
we encounter some scholars who dare to address the lack of ethical content 
in the CSR debate and who also have the ambition to do something about it. 
Swanson (1995) tries to revise the Wood framework by incorporating normative 
dimensions in the model. This ‘reoriented CSP model’ does not say anything 
yet about the normative dimensions itself but is rather a research proposal, as 
Swanson (1999) is. In her 1999 paper, Swanson draws attention to the ‘relative 
nature of CSR’, in contrast to formalism, which ‘looks for absolute principles 
that have universal application’ (518). Swanson, aware of the problematic 
character of formalism, proposes a ‘more realistic position’, preferably ‘a 
communicative ethic or a dialogue based on mutual respect among corporate 
managers and groups in the community’. This proposal is not further developed, 
so philosophical approaches that fit this idea of communicative ethics, like 
Habermas or Jaspers are not introduced in the debate. Although Swanson 
addresses the question of ethics and CSR, she in the end does not take the 
decisive step towards ethics. 
 Schwartz and Carroll (2003) and Schwartz (2011) also recognize that in 
Carroll (1979 and 1991) the ‘definition of the ethical domain is not broadly 
developed’ (2003, 508). In the 2003 paper, an attempt is made to incorporate 
ethical standards in the Carroll framework: (a) the conventional standard, (b) 
the utilitarian standard and (c) the deontological standard. The conventional 
standard, according to Schwartz ‘can be explained by the moral philosophy 
known as ethical relativism’ (2003, 511 and 2011, 32 – 34).
 Schwartz tries to close the gap between CSR and (business) ethics. The 
result, however, is that the critique of ten Bos, Jones and Parker applies to 
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his proposal as well: business ethics does not take ethics seriously36. The 
ethical standards seem to have to fit in a ready-to-use framework and thus are 
reduced to a rather simplistic level. Like many textbooks on business ethics, 
philosophical ethics is reduced to brief summaries of the main arguments 
of the classics in the field. In order to really understand the consequences 
of ethics for CSR, one might have to dig deeper. In the next chapter, such 
an approach is proposed, when the life and works of Gianni Vattimo are 
introduced. Reflecting upon responsibility is by no means easy and may demand 
some effort to really understand the nuances of the philosophy involved. 
 Swanson and Schwartz both have tried to deal with a fundamental problem 
in the CSR tradition in general and the CSP tradition in particular. They both 
remain within the ‘tool track’ and in the end fail to really address the problem. 
The debate still focuses on corporate action and output, on what I have called 
the planned communication of the corporation. The everyday life situation, 
so important for the unplanned corporate communication, is still ignored. 
The corporation is considered to be a moral actor of its own, without the 
acknowledgement that this moral actor is dependent of the behaviour of other 
moral actors, be it as individuals or as (in)formal groups.
 Another problem in both Swanson and Schwartz – and this also is a problem 
that is of vital importance for this thesis – is that they create a false dilemma: 
they both place relativism in opposition to formalism. Either one searches for 
‘absolute principles that have universal application’, or one is a relativist. Gianni 
Vattimo, as we will see, unmasks this argumentative mistake and proposes a 
different position: nihilism. He argues that nihilism does not necessarily imply 
relativism. It is this nihilistic position that is ignored by both Swanson and 
Schwartz and that I shall turn to in the next chapters.
 Relativism seems to be an unacceptable perspective for CSR scholars 
and business ethicists. Therefore, they continue to look for the holy grail of 
universally applicable standards. Painter-Morland, in her Business Ethics as 
Practice, analyses four modernist attempts to save universalism in business 
ethics: an approach based upon Kantian ethics (represented mainly by Norman 
Bowie), one based upon Rawlsian ethics (Hartman), Integrated Social Contract 
Theory by Donaldson and Dunfee, and a communitarian approach (with, 
amongst others, Etzioni as an important representative).
 The attempts to translate Kantian and Rawlsian ethics into the realm of 
business ethics presuppose a kind of rationality that deliberately abstracts from 
everyday life. These approaches towards ethics do not intend to bridge the 
36  In For Business Ethics (translated in Dutch: Het Einde van de Bedrijfsethiek), they articulate a 
sixfold critique of business ethics: it does not take seriously philosophy, society, ethics (the ethical, 
the meaning of ethics and the objective of ethics) and politics. Some of these issues are at the base 
of this study as well, be it applied to CSR.
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gap between theory and practice, but they rather cause and maintain it. Ethics, 
inspired by these important philosophers, fits well within the ‘toolkit approach’, 
but not within CSR as individual behaviour of corporate representatives. 
 Donaldson and Dunfee coined the concept Integrative Social Contract 
Theory, with so-called hypernorms to provide with the normative content. These 
hypernorms are defined as ‘principles so fundamental to society that they shape 
and inform all those ‘second-order’ norms that are formulated to guide specific 
kinds of human behaviour’ (Painter-Morland 2008, 71). So again we encounter 
a search for universal principles, although Donaldson and Dunfee at the 
same time introduce a moral free space to allow practitioners some creativity 
in their actual doing business. Free space gives practitioners a possibility to 
introduce specific cultural characteristics into their actions, without violating 
the universal principles agreed upon. In order to avoid a relativist position, 
Donaldson and Dunfee seem to be trapped in the same false dilemma Swanson 
and Schwartz are trapped in. These positions are firmly rooted in modern 
thought. They show a trust in rationally deductible principles that transcend the 
particular. This again causes, according to Painter-Morland, an alienation from 
complex everyday life situations.
 Communitarian approaches to business ethics do criticize the ethical 
theories that originated from the Enlightenment. The return to Aristotelian 
virtue ethics along with the interdependence of his ethics and politics is 
absolutely inspiring, as is the thought experiment that compares the polis with 
the corporation. At the same time, the very idea that there is such a thing as 
a common goal, with which individuals should align, creates a tension: what 
opportunity does the individual have to dissent? In the next chapter I shall 
elaborate the potentially violent character of unities over individuals, and I fear 
that communitarian approaches tend to foster this violent potential, rather than 
weaken it. Painter-Morland again argues that this approach towards business 
ethics cannot cope with complexity of ethics as practice. 
 She also illustrates how in business ethics modernist attempts to save 
universalism have maintained the separation between theory and practice. Why 
not consider a position that acknowledges the tension between the universal 
and the particular? A position that acknowledges that one tends to lose the 
particular out of sight when one abstracts from it? A position that accepts the 
nihilist condition and does not try, against the odds, to discover some holy grail 
of morality. ‘If business ethicists were to take up this challenge, ethics would 
become once more a practice, instead of something that needs to be managed’ 
(Painter-Morland 2008, 93). A practice indeed and based upon this study one 
might add: an interpretative practice. 
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Many of the last pages were dedicated to the work of Archie Carroll and some 
of his successors: the Carroll framework was criticized by many, but all off them 
try to add to it. The Carroll framework remains at the basis of other frameworks. 
Dunne (2008), ten Bos and Dunne (2011) and Frederick (1998a and 1998b) 
articulate critiques of a more fundamental nature.
 Dunne and ten Bos were mentioned several times already. This study partly 
builds upon their analysis and their – or rather Heidegger’s – technique of 
destructive questioning. They have addressed fundamental problems of the 
debate on CSR, especially the problem with the theory-practice gap. Because 
of the attention already given to their contributions, I shall not further discuss 
them here.
 A story about this era of CSR would not be complete without looking at 
Frederick again. During the debate he time and time again seems to be able to 
write something peculiar, which he did again twice at the end of the nineties. 
The two articles were very much related, and their message is comparable: a 
call for a move from CSR3 towards CSR4.
 In his articles, Frederick continues to develop a critique that is in line with 
the earlier one (1986), where he called for scholars and practitioners to be 
more aware of each other, and for scholars to move beyond their individual 
disciplines. This last issue is developed further in both 1998a and 1998b. 
 In 1998a, Frederick focuses on research with a direct link to human 
behaviour (evolution, primate research, complex systems theory), while in 
1998b he emphasizes the possible relevancy of all natural sciences for 
business scholars and argues that the CSR concept has reached a dead end37: 
‘As cosmologists spin out their theories of how it all began and how it might 
end, as neuroscientists debate the meaning of human consciousness, as space 
scientists guide the early Columbus-like explorations of our solar system, as 
primatologists probe for the moral roots of behaviour and language in our near 
human bonobo cousins, as palaeontologists uncover yet older fossils of human 
precursors (…) surely one would be brave and perhaps just a little foolish to 
believe that this veritable knowledge gusher from the natural sciences has 
nothing to say to those who study business and society. It would be as if the 
entire business system and all business practitioners were sealed within a glass 
sphere, cut off from nature and of its myriad effects’ Frederick (1998b, 259).
 The first problem Fredrick addresses is what he calls the ‘CSR trap’. This trap 
is caused by the very nature of the CSR concept, whether we call it CSR, CSP, 
37  Frederick (1998b, 260 – 262): CSP has reached a crisis. CSR’s ‘prominent paradigm – the 
stakeholders concept – has run its course and produces very few new or theoretically significant 
insights’. He repeats his critique on business ethicists who are, according to him, being stuck in 
conventional philosophy (which is hypotheses of this thesis). CSR is not in the first place about 
improving management and corporate functioning.
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or whatever other possibility. The focus is always on the C, the corporation, 
in ever growing detail. So we get entangled in a debate, which focuses at the 
corporation instead of at society. Frederick proposes a possible way out of this 
trap: CSR4, with a C now representing cosmos, decentring the corporation in 
favour of broader issues: ecology and life (both human and non-human). What 
Frederick proposes is a radical turn, with the ethical issues at the centre and 
the corporation at a more modest position. What the implications of this radical 
turn are remains unclear, although that might be exactly the purpose of the 
article. 
 The S in this renewed acronym stands for science, where the critique is 
repeated, that social sciences have too much neglected the natural sciences. 
Frederick refers to Snow’s idea of two cultures, one of science, the other of 
humanities and their incapability of understanding each other. Frederick adds 
third culture sciences, that of for example artificial intelligence, fuzzy logic and 
nanotechnology. Business is already connected to these fields, but at a scholarly 
level CSR authors generally neglect these issues. 
 Frederick adds an interesting remark, concerning these third culture 
sciences: they are normative sciences (1989b, 264). Is this what makes it possible 
that triple bottom line thought has become an imperative? This line of thought 
is a logical step beyond Frederick’s earlier work. There he argued that ethicists 
should be more aware of social sciences. Now he is also concerned with these 
so-called third culture sciences. But what about the (un-)awareness of scientists 
of ethical theories? Should we simply declare Aristotle and Kant obsolete? 
Frederick again seems to have a specific view on the relationship between 
science and philosophy, with an implicit priority to science.
 The biggest surprise in the article might well be the R, which now 
represents religion. Is it because of the American context Fredrick writes within, 
with so many people still being explicitly religious? Not at all, Frederick refers 
to the existential sources the individual – also the executive – uses to give 
meaning to his existence: ‘in their scholarly role, CSR students need not and 
should not be advocates of any particular religious canon but rather elucidators 
of the influence that religious impulses exert on organizational decision 
making and workplace behaviour’ (Frederick 1989b, 269)38.
 This proposal places a bomb under the traditional ways business schools 
do their job. Attention for natural sciences and even religion would have great 
impact on the curricula. Whatever conclusion the reader may draw from this 
38  In an earlier footnote, I already mentioned Bouckaert and others, who ask attention for 
spirituality in business. Nyenrode Business University for several years maintains a chair in business 
and spirituality. Does the article of Frederick fit with this movement towards spirituality?
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article39, it provides us with a truly interesting and non-confirmative idea, far 
away from the traditional CSR debate, although not providing us with solutions 
for the fundamental problems mentioned before. Frederick at least dares to 
provoke his readers to think beyond conventional concepts. Whatever content 
the acronym gets in the end, the article invites readers to rethink CSR and 
perhaps even invent their own C’s, S’s and R’s, thus reaching for the Übermensch, 
that will be discussed in the next chapter.
According to Carroll (1999), the nineties show ‘very few unique contributions 
to the definition of Corporate Social Responsibility’. Most scholars build upon 
the foundations laid in the years before. However, although this is certainly 
the case with CSP, the bibliometrical analysis by De Bakker et. al. (2005) shows 
a growing popularity of two other fields of interest: corporate citizenship and 
sustainability/triple bottom line. In the last part of this section these issues will 
be addressed as well.
Corporate Citizenship (CC) has always been present in the debate, often implicit, 
but now and then, dating as far back as the fifties, the term citizen appears 
explicitly (e.g. Eells, 1956). During the fifties, the classics of CSR were occupied 
with the role of the corporation in maintaining the free society, as opposed to 
the (communist) totalitarian state, which is an implicit reference to citizenship. 
Garriga and Melé (2004) also refer to Davis (1973) and call the attention of 
the nineties a ‘renewed interest’ in the subject40, according to them influenced 
by ‘the crisis in the welfare state and the globalization phenomenon, the 
deregulation process (…) have meant that some large multinational companies 
have greater economic and social power than some governments’ (56 – 57). 
 The power of large enterprises often seems to be a specific reason for the 
reflection on citizenship (Jones and Haigh 2006, Waddock and Smith 2000, 
Post 2000). The word ‘global’ often appears in papers. A critical sound can be 
heard by Matten, Crane and Chapple (2003), who question the idea that large 
corporations can be treated as citizens the same way persons can. They again 
address the interesting question: who or what can be considered to be a moral 
actor? The corporation as a citizen implies a view of the corporation as a 
responsible moral actor, more specifically a citizen. 
 The idea of a ‘good’ or ‘responsible’ citizen evokes the same questions as 
the good society before. In many cases, corporate citizenship equals CSR. 
An extreme example of that is a paper by Carroll (1998), in which simply 
39  Dunne (2008, 180) calls the argument ‘incoherent and bizarre’, not making any sense. 
Personally, I value Frederick for his nonconformist approach during the debate.
40  Crane, Matten and Moon (2008) also mention the continuous attention for citizenship, with an 
increased attention in the last decades. 
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renames his four aspects of CSR as four ‘faces of Corporate Citizenship’. The 
four faces (a good corporate citizen is 1) profitable, 2) law-abiding, 3) ethical 
and 4) philanthropic) exactly resemble the four layers of his pyramid (Carroll 
1991). Thus, ‘economic responsibilities’ have become an ‘economic face’, ‘legal 
responsibilities’ have become a ‘legal face’, ‘ethical responsibilities’ an ‘ethical 
face’ and finally ‘philanthropic responsibilities’ have become the ‘philanthropic 
face’ of CC.
 What is the main difference, then, between CSR and CC? Matten, Crane and 
Chapple focus on the political role of corporations, while Waddock and Smith 
(2000) emphasize the ‘day-to-day practices of the firm as they impact (and are 
impacted by) stakeholders’. The latter even state that CC goes ‘well beyond 
what is traditionally considered to be ‘socially responsible’ behaviour’ (op. cit. 
59). The central issue in their paper is relationships with stakeholders. It is not 
surprising that Freeman wrote the foreword of Crane, Matten and Moon (2008). 
CC appears to be more or less an auxiliary theory of the stakeholder approach 
to the firm. 
 Waddock and Smith express a rare interest in day-to-day practice and 
thus appear to address the everyday life aspect of CSR. The way they further 
elaborate this concept does not really fulfil the promises. Interesting questions 
are ignored in the further reflections (e.g. what does ‘citizenship’ actually mean? 
What are ‘day-to-day practices of the firm’ and how do they relate to practices of 
(groups of) practitioners within the firm?) 
 In the Corporate Citizenship tradition the same problems remain apparent: 
who defines the concept and who decides on the criteria for ‘good’ citizenship. 
It seems that the idea of corporate citizenship never gets beyond being an 
interesting and inspiring metaphor. 
The last issue, mentioned by de Bakker and others (2005) is triple bottom line/
sustainability. Although they refer to these two as separate issues; in this study 
they are regarded to be one. Elkington (1997) explicitly connects the idea of 
triple bottom line41 to the issue of sustainability. 
 In the final decades of the last century the urgency of ecological and social 
issues was evermore emphasized. After the initial reports by the Club of Rome, 
the 1987 UN report Our Common Future put the sustainability issue high on 
the international agenda and during the nineties the debate on the issue 
developed further. Again it seems that the debate ignores philosophical ethics: 
although the argument of Our Common Future is similar to Hans Jonas’ concept 
of responsibility (1979), Jonas is never mentioned (neither do for example 
41  Ten Bos and Bevan (2011): the first author who wrote about the concept of triple bottom line 
actually was Braden Allenby.
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Elkington, Visser and Hollender refer to his Prinzip Verantwortung).
 As so many others, Elkington (1997, 3) refers to the huge power businesses 
have, even compared to governments and NGO’s. The problems we are facing 
ask for what he calls a ‘sustainable capitalism transition’ (1997, 2) with an 
important role for corporations. The corporation has to move from a single 
bottom line approach (profit) toward a triple bottom line approach (results 
should be accounted for on three areas: economic, social and environmental).
 In order to achieve this sustainable corporation, business managers need 
to move from a ‘3-D’ world to a ‘7-D’ world. These dimensions represent 
‘revolutions’ that, according to Elkington, are taking place:
1. Markets: according to Elkington, competition will increase both 
on a global as on a domestic level. Companies are questioned 
continuously at different markets and part of this intensified 
competition is the triple bottom line performance.
2. Values: the entire idea of triple bottom line performance implies a 
value shift. The presupposition Friedman suggests has to change 
in this view. Companies that exist for the sole purpose of making 
a profit, cease to exist. Corporations have to create value on social, 
environmental and economic levels.
3. Transparency: the CSR debate is quite unanimous about this item. A 
‘good’ company is a transparent company.
4. Life-cycle technology: the sustainability debate often is fed by 
technological developments. Not only corporations, but certainly also 
engineers have an important role in the creation of a sustainable 
world. Therefore, more than in the ‘classic’ debate on CSR, we are 
confronted with technological issues. Life-cycle technology, cradle-
to-cradle engineering, but also management concepts like lean 
management get attention. Where, during the responsiveness era, the 
quest for techniques, organizational systems and tools started, we can 
see that quest maturing in this era of sustainability.
5. Partnerships: a much heard trend in recent literature is that of 
cooperation. Alliances must be formed to cope with the triple bottom 
line demands. This includes also PPPs, public private partnerships, 
where corporations cooperate with (non-)governmental organizations 
to reach their goals and create extra value.
6. Time: the time scale must shift towards long-term decision-making. 
Company boards must look far beyond the next dividend distribution 
and politicians beyond the next elections. 
7. Corporate governance: the seventh trend seems to overlap the 
transparency one and is rooted firmly in the stakeholders’ view of the 
firm.
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Cannibals with Forks suggests a path (of no less than 39 steps) along which 
corporations can achieve such an enormous transition. Elkington calls these 
steps shifts from old to new ‘paradigms’42. 
Elkington writes in a style, incomparable to the ‘classics’ of the CSR debate. 
Every author wrote from a conviction that business and society issues should be 
addressed, but a growing number of authors increase the sense of urgency. On 
the back cover of Cannibals with Forks the word ‘imperative’ is used. More than 
ever, the authors seem to prescribe the criteria for ‘the good society’. Likewise, 
Wayne Visser distinguishes between CSR 1.0 and CSR 2.0 and Hollender refers 
to this as the Responsibility Revolution. 
The use of a term ‘imperative’ suggests that something has happened during 
the debate. Once scholars were searching for definitions, tools and techniques 
and still discussing the nature of responsibility. Now CSR has become part of 
deontological ethics, independent of but similar to the responsibility ethics by 
Jonas. 
Hans Jonas (1979) develops his principle of responsibility from an anti-
utopian point of view. He emphasizes the need for a heuristics of fear. He 
criticizes the hopelessly optimistic point of view towards technological 
progress, that mankind will always be able to solve problems, although we do 
not yet know how. Jonas proposes a different approach: we must be aware of 
the dangers ahead of us and therefore we may not take the risk that we cannot 
solve them.
 Sustainability authors, like the examples mentioned above, on the one hand 
appear to behave consistent with this heuristics of fear. They call for a change 
of practices. On the other hand, they are less revolutionary then the titles of 
their books and papers suggest. They search for ways to sustain our economies 
and remain within the capitalist paradigm and what they propose is nothing 
more than a slightly altered capitalism. Jackson (2009, 198) suggests separating 
the question of growth from the question of capitalism; capitalism can be 
altered, seems to be the message. However, an analysis like the one of Jackson 
does not directly affect CSR: it is macro-economic; how does this relate to the 
corporate level? 
 Do any of these scholars really question the fundamentals of managerial 
decision-making? They add to the managerial toolkit the social and 
environmental issues, but the economic side is not really criticized. Yes, long-
term decision-making should replace short-term, dividend-oriented decision-
making. But how is this done? 
 If a long-term orientation should be at the base of managerial decision-
42  These paradigms are actually values, and should not be confused with the Kuhnian concept of 
paradigm. 
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making, should one not be discussing the still dominant economic methods 
from the finance curriculum? If the future represents such a high value, how 
does this relate to the discounted cash flow methods that explicitly presuppose 
the opposite? 
 Are we capable of sustainable thinking, without questioning the underlying 
presuppositions of (capitalist) society? Is ‘sustainability’ a manifestation of 
human arrogance, the idea that humanity can just about solve every problem? 
Or is ‘sustainability’ rooted in a fear that we are so hopelessly stuck within 
a destructive system that there is nothing else but the hope that mankind 
can save itself and this planet by means of technological innovation? Then 
sustainability is nothing but a quest for a better world, hoping that we are not 
yet too late. 
  
The sustainability debate is not as different as is seems to the other dialects 
of CSR. As CSP, it aims at corporate output and provides with tools to improve 
sustainability performance. Especially tools like ISO 26000 for organizations in 
general and more project-oriented tools like LEED and BREEAM for the built 
environment provide practitioners with ready-to-use instruments. 
Again, the individual and his or her everyday life practice are ignored, as 
is the reflection on responsibility. CSR, in the sustainability era, has moved 
far away from the original ideas of someone like Bowen, with his so-called 
protestant suspicion towards everyone who wants to prescribe moral laws. CSR 
has become more ‘modern’ than ever before: we are told what is good for us 
and now we ought to behave according to sustainability principles. Reflection is 
no longer necessary. One just needs to follow the paths prescribed.  
The first decade of the new millennium showed an increased attention 
for another manner of speaking about business ethics/Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Spirituality in business. On the one hand, the attention for 
spirituality was caused by the continuing globalisation and the subsequent 
increase of the importance of Eastern cultures in the economic global 
landscape, with a focus on the spiritual and philosophical heritage of India, or 
– more in general – the East (Pruzan 2011, 3).  On the other hand, the attention 
for spirituality is rooted in a critique of traditional approaches to business 
ethics and corporate social responsibility43. This is a critique that resembles 
what is articulated in this inquiry. This critique also resembles the one 
articulated by Frederick and his call for CSR4.
 Both Bouckaert and Zsolnai address the problem of a separation of theory 
and practice in Western ethical thought. In general terms, ‘Western ethical 
43  Bouckaert, one of the main scholars on spirituality and business, uses CSR and business ethics 
virtually as synonyms, now referring to the one, then to the other and sometimes to both of them in 
one breath. 
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theories provide abstract models to be applied or followed by moral agents’ 
(Zsolnai 2010, 87). More specific, ‘ethics, values and personal character are not 
simply ‘management tools’ (...) the tool and the wielder of the ‘tool’ are one’ 
(Pruzan 2011, 16). Here, the emphasis on what I call the tool-oriented approach 
to CSR is explicitly linked to the gap between theory and practice as well as the 
abstraction of CSR from everyday life. It exactly matches the third hypothesis 
from the introduction. 
 Bouckaert, on several occasions (e.g. Bouckaert 2010 and 2011) 
mentions something he calls the ‘business ethics paradox’. Ethics, perceived 
as a managerial tool, often does not have the desired results, or even is 
counterproductive. Bouckaert explains this phenomenon by referring to 
Henri Bergson, who in 1932 published Les deux sources de la morale et de la 
religion. The two sources of ethics, according to Bergson, are social pressure 
and mysticism. CSR as managerial toolkit fits the first source, social pressure. 
The lack of attention for the second source is another way of saying that CSR 
has no connection with everyday life of the representative of the corporation. 
According to Bouckaert, an approach of CSR that does not take into account the 
source of mysticism can never solve the paradox of business ethics. 
Zsolnai (2010, 90) and Losoncz (2011, 91) also address a phenomenon, 
related to the business ethics paradox, called the ‘crowding out effect’. This 
effect implies that external motivators have a negative impact on intrinsic 
motivators. Could this imply that the toolbox approach to CSR not only 
undervalues the reflective approach, but that the toolbox approach could 
undermine intrinsic ethical motivation as well? It is certainly an interesting 
hypothesis and another reason to search for ways to bridge the gap between 
CSR tools and everyday life situations.
 This ‘spirituality school’ appears to do exactly what this study tries to do as 
well. It implicitly even verifies two of the premise (the third and fourth) of this 
study. The third premise (corporations (and CSR) are ‘modern’) can be derived 
from the aforementioned: the business ethics paradox results from an approach 
aimed solely on ‘management’, on being in control. The toolbox approach treats 
the corporation and its members as instruments as well, without a necessity 
to address the individual, let alone spiritual, level. The fourth premise from the 
introduction (that we live under the nihilist condition) is verified by the very 
existence of this variety of CSR: it accepts and even presupposes diversity of 
opinions and ways of looking at the world44. 
 The attention for spirituality in business and management is consistent, as I 
shall show later, with postmodern philosophy as it criticizes a purely technical 
approach to management and even gives room for and fully appreciates ways 
44  Nandram and Borden (2010, 7) accept ‘the diversity perspective’ and that there are ‘many 
models of spirituality’.
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of looking at the world that are not scientific at all. In words close to Martin 
Heidegger: the world is disclosed not only with the vocabulary of science and 
technology, but also with other vocabularies, such as spirituality of any kind 
(and this tries to re-connect CSR with the individual practitioner). 
 However, the spirituality debate fails to recognise the interpretative 
character of CSR as well; its prominent scholars acknowledge important flaws 
in the tradition of CSR and search for solutions within the realm of spirituality. 
But what does this – rather vague – concept mean? Nandram and Borden (2010, 
9) propose a working definition: ‘a process designing ones’ activities (personal 
of professional) in such a way that they are aligned with the authentic Self (of 
the individual or the business)’. In order to align activities with the authentic 
Self, Nandram and Borden distinguish four main processes (2010, 9 and 247):
·	 Psychic processes: the process of finding the authentic Self, through 
‘tools such as meditation, yoga, prayer, learning, reflection and 
contemplation, etc.’
·	 Mental processes, which consist of everything it takes to determine 
the need of the Authentic Self.
·	 Vital processes that are about ‘bringing balance and a continuous 
connection between the authentic Self and the needs of the 
environment.’
·	 Strategic or physical processes, which ‘consists of concrete steps in 
terms of behaviours and values to implement and align thought, word 
and action to the authentic Self.
In the Spirituality debate researchers take seriously the separation between 
theory and practice, although the name ‘spirituality’ might cause people to 
feel uncomfortable: are we not entering a field that is too distant from the 
technological approach, a completely irrational field? Borden and Nandram 
(2010, 246) acknowledge that the inner aspects of spirituality might be 
‘somewhat mysterious and threatening to our scientific minds’. But this certainly 
does not mean that they move away from serious science. On the contrary, the 
contributions to both Borden and Nandram (2010, eds.) and Zsolnai (2011, ed.) 
explicitly seek for a systematic approach towards spirituality in business. It is 
just that these scholars might be argued to take issue with the separation thesis 
as well. They acknowledge the complex nature of ethical practice.
 The aforementioned vital processes explicitly address the relation between 
the individual and the environment. Some of the contributions to the debate 
on spirituality and business (e.g. Chakraborty 2011, 38, Allinson 2011, 72/73 are 
quite clear about it: spirituality contributes to a more sustainable world. The 
rationale for this branche of CSR thought is shared with other ones, although 
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they search for a solution at the specific place of spirituality.
 Nevertheless, the debate on spirituality has some drawbacks. Although there 
is a search for a ‘new management paradigm’ (as the subtitle of Nandram and 
Borden (2010, eds.) suggests), it remains somewhat vague. There apparently 
is an authentic Self that needs to be discovered. What is this Self? Is it 
something? Is it comparable to the Cartesian res cogitans? It seems to exist, but 
must one simply believe that? 
 Although this approach towards CSR reaches closest to what this enquiry 
intends, it does not explicitly address the most important points of departure 
of this thesis: the nihilist condition and hermeneutics. Therefore, the main 
question that shaped this study is not answered by the contributors to the 
spirituality debate. It would, however, be interesting to examine the possibilities 
of a contribution of Vattimo’s philosophy to the spirituality debate. His 
reflections upon religion and the principle of charity – to be discussed in the 
next chapter – may offer interesting material as well.
Until now, the tradition of CSR seemed to have been mainly a scholarly 
tradition, although the debate developed not only in academia. Several 
platforms were created during the nineties with corporate participation 
(although the example, mentioned in 2.4.1 (the CED) also was a committee 
with business participants). In 1995 the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development was created, and in 1996 the European Network 
for Social Cohesion, later changed into CSR Europe. The number of national 
CSR organizations, all working under the CSR Europe umbrella shows how 
enthusiastic CSR was implemented on the continent. Most western European 
countries had a national CSR organization during the nineties, while Eastern 
European countries followed during the first decade of the 21st century. 
 The hypothesis, raised in the introduction, can be repeated here: the 
popularity of CSR on the European continent has been increasing over 
the years, which justifies an approach from the perspective of continental 
philosophy45. As it becomes more global, CSR should be less predominantly 
Anglo-American. In the next chapters, such a perspective will be proposed.
 The previous paragraphs show that CSR has become increasingly well 
known. Corporations seem to have adopted it as a self-evident part of their 
daily routine. The fact that CSR seems to have become a self-evidency is 
verified by a few contributions to the debate by famous authors outside the 
field of CSR. Instead of criticizing CSR, like Friedman once did, now gurus like 
Mintzberg (1983) and Porter (2006, together with Kramer) embrace the concept. 
45  Freeman, in his foreword to Painter-Morland and Ten Bos (eds., 2011, xiii), even speaks about 
business ethics as ‘a captive of Anglo-American analytic philosophy’. 
70
For this moment the analysis of the debate on CSR finishes. The first 
hermeneutic step, the reading of (classical) texts that together shape the CSR 
debate, is taken. That is, for this moment. Future research should again turn to 
the debate and find out what still is to be re-discovered in the texts, that often 
show astonishing freshness, even decades after they have been written.
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2.5 TWO OTHER WAYS  WE ENCOUNTER CSR  
IN THE WORLD
In the previous sections, the main focus was the debate on CSR. The tradition of CSR as a discussion among scholars is one of the three ways we encounter CSR in the world. Although the two other ways (planned corporate output 
and unplanned action by corporate representatives) have been mentioned 
several times in the previous sections, they have not been especially analysed. 
However, the analysis at this moment in the thesis causes a methodological 
pitfall. Because the philosophical third chapter still has to follow, I cannot say 
anything yet about the consequences of hermeneutic philosophy for corporate 
output and individual behaviour of corporate representatives. And this study 
claims to be a philosophical inquiry, so how can I avoid interference with 
empirical studies of CSR? 
 The way out of this methodological pitfall I consider to be the most 
appropriate is an old method, the aphorism, although this might cause 
suspicion. The aphorism is not exactly scientific and therefore probably some 
may question the use of it in the context of this study. Rather than scientific, the 
aphorism is experimental and perhaps even playful, which makes it – seen from 
the perspective of the next chapter – a suitable instrument in this thesis.
 The history of the aphorism dates back into antiquity (e.g. Hippocrates, 
400 BC) and many authors have used it since then. A famous example is the 
Pensées by Pascal (17th century), but the unquestioned master of the aphorism 
is Friedrich Nietzsche. Safranski (151) hints at the idea that Nietzsche suffered 
from the idea that he was not able to create a philosophical system, and 
therefore had to remain aphoristic. Nietzsche, however, in the Genealogy 
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of Morals (preface, section 8), called the aphorism a form that is not taken 
seriously enough. Although he continued to work on his Will to Power, which 
seems to have been his intended philosophical masterpiece, he highly valued 
the aphorism.
 What exactly is an aphorism? Normally, it is a short piece of thought. In 
contemporary vocabulary, the average size is roughly about a tweet, although 
there are no limits as far as the length of an aphorism is concerned. Because 
of its limited length, the aphorism is a very condensed form, which can be 
intensive to read, because it forces the reader to think beyond the actual text 
(Tanner 2000, 40). The aphorism does not have the formal structure of a book 
or an essay, so it leaves the conclusion to the reader. Ferrer (2004) calls the 
aphorism ‘thinking underway’.  By its nature, it is suitable to initiate further 
thought. As Marsden (2006, 30) puts it: ‘beyond the reader-writer circuit of 
exchange it is possible to encounter the aphorism as a tool in the creation 
of new weapons, new bodies, new organs’, and ‘it can be a detonator for new 
philosophical thought.’
 Whether the aphorisms really have detonating qualities is up to the reader. 
I would be satisfied if they produce the odd frown or smile now and then. 
Thinking underway is a less ambitious criterion and for me the aphorisms 
indeed have been examples of thinking about CSR that is underway.
2.5.1 CSR AS CORPORATE OUTPUT
Although individuals write and publish, corporations claim to possess this capacity as well. Corporate output seldom shows the name of the actual 
creator. 
Environmental analysis often is the starting point of CSR ‘production’: 
proactive when corporate management recognises stakeholders and/or issues 
themselves, reactive when it fails to do so.
Very few irresponsible companies have been designed to be irresponsible.
The corporation, treated as a person, remains a construct, although people tend 
to treat them as if they really are persons.
The Kierkegaardian wisdom – a life can only be lived forward, but is understood 
backwards – also applies to CSR: heroes of responsibility today could be the 
examples of irresponsibility tomorrow.
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Accepting a corporation as responsible is the most fertile ground for 
irresponsible corporate behaviour.
Responsible corporations can only remain responsible if they are distrusted 
continuously.
2.5.2 CSR AS PART OF EVERYDAY LIFE
1.  At some point there is an individual going to work, being confronted 
with some choice: how to respond to an e-mail. Today ‘she’ decides to 
delete one mail... 
This could very well lead to a scandal of international proportions.
2.  At some point there is this one person, critical but shy. Today ‘he’ does 
not dare to criticize his colleague on a decision he has made... 
This could very well lead to a scandal of international proportions.
3.  At some point there is a group, working together for many years. They 
are more friends than they are colleagues. ‘They’ take an investment 
decision together... 
This could very well lead to a scandal of international proportions.
Individual practitioners have to cope with everyday life. Their job is a part of their life and in this life they encounter countless smaller and 
bigger challenges and choices. In these everyday life situations they escape 
management control systems.
Everyday life also means being part of a society. What if that society was Nazi 
Germany? Imagine someone looking back at 2015 from a 2100 perspective: 
could it be imaginable to think that he or she would think our practices were as 
despicable as those of them who designed the gas chambers?
Case studies are abstracted from everyday life. It is almost impossible to 
do otherwise (except perhaps by means of a dramatized case study like the 
documentary ‘The Smartest Guys in the Room’ of 2005). For educational reasons 
case studies have to be abstractions. Therefore, case studies verify the theory 
practice gap instead of bridging it.
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If one insists on the use of case studies, consider this one: the St. Matthew 
Passion by J.S. Bach, especially the air Erbarme dich, and the story that precedes 
it. St. Peter at first claims to follow Jesus Christ, even if this means dying with 
him. Later, in everyday life in the garden of Caiaphas, he renounces him. When 
the cock crows, Peter is confronted with the discrepancy of his behaviour and 
cries bitter tears. Similar useful course material for CSR can be found in Greek 
tragedies.
You can find corporate social responsibility on corporate websites. To find corporate 
irresponsibility you have to dig deeper, to the underlying practices. This is a key 
problem with CSR, what earlier has been called the gap between theory and 
practice.
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2.6 CONCLUSION: FINISHING THE FIRST STEP OF THE 
HERMENEUTIC ANALYSIS OF 
CSR
Corporate Social Responsibility has been investigated in this chapter. The first step of the hermeneutic analysis almost has been taken: a critical review of the existing material. At first sight CSR appears a) as a debate, 
b) as planned corporate output, and c) as unplanned behaviour of corporate 
representatives. Looking more closely at CSR, these three manifestations of CSR 
cause some trouble. What exactly does ‘the CSR debate’ mean? How can I cope 
with b) and c), whilst remaining philosophical? The very idea of a philosophical 
approach of CSR caused some methodological problems, which I solved in the 
following way:
·	 The debate on CSR was put in a cultural context. What are the roots 
of the debate?
·	 How did other CSR scholars classify the debate? 
·	 A study of the constitutive texts of the CSR debate.
·	 Aphorisms were used to cope with b) and c).
Thus, the first step of the hermeneutic analysis was taken and in this section, 
the results are recapitulated.
CSR is rooted in a tradition that is broader than the concept itself. It is part of 
Western thought, with roots that can be traced back into antiquity: in Greek 
and Judeo-Christian thought strong conceptions of responsibility can be 
found. In Greek antiquity, the concept of lithourgheia addressed a responsibility 
towards the community, while Biblical notions of responsibility focused 
more on responsibilities towards weak members of society.  The example 
of the encyclical Rerum Novarum shows a Roman Catholic perspective on 
responsibility in business, while Bowen wrote from a protestant point of 
view. The ancient notions of responsibility are always responsibilities of rich 
towards poor, of mighty towards weak. It seems that the concept of corporate 
responsibility implicitly replaces the rich and mighty of tradition with the 
corporation. Many authors refer to the power corporations have in modern 
society. Some large companies have (financial) powers that exceed the power of 
entire (third world) countries. The rule (Davis) that follows is that responsibility 
comes with power; even within the single stakeholder or shareholder approach 
of the corporation, the golden rule of responsibility applies: a bad reputation 
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may very well harm shareholders’ interests on the long term. Is it this deeply 
rooted conception of responsibility that urges scholars and practitioners to 
apply it to the realm of the corporation?
 The broader tradition of which CSR is a part, is also a capitalist one that 
developed from the Industrial Revolution onward in the first place, and from 
the Managerial Revolution onward in the second place. Issues that were 
addressed in the era before World War II were related to these developments: 
labour conditions, pollution, scarcity caused by industrialisation and principal 
agent problems caused by the separation of ownership and management. 
CSR scholars remain within the capitalist framework. No one proposes an 
abolishment of capitalism. The authors of the fifties even explicitly embrace the 
capitalist system as a basis for the American society that needs to be protected 
from totalitarian systems like Nazism and communism. Even sustainability 
authors never propose more than a modification of capitalism. However, 
could it be, to repeat one of the aphorisms of 2.5.2, that – like we now look 
back critically towards certain business practices in Nazi Germany – that once 
capitalism, including the modified ‘sustainable’ variety, will be looked back upon 
with embarrassment?
After World War II, CSR developed rapidly, with different issues causing different 
challenges for business and CSR scholars. CSR became a tradition of its own, 
and it developed as a living language, with a continuously evolving vocabulary.  
 In the early years of the debate, responsibility was often linked to a person. 
Bowen (1953), Davis and Blomstrom (1966) and Johnson (1971) all mention the 
individual practitioner as a moral actor. At the same time (Eells (1956), referring 
to Compton) scholars ask attention for the way society increasingly considers 
corporations as ‘creatures’. 
 The development of the corporation as a moral actor dominates the debate 
during the eighties and beyond. CSR scholars in this era tend to focus on 
corporate output. If the individual level is addressed at all, it is by means of 
managerial tools to prevent ‘wrong’ behaviour. The individual level is merely 
looked at as a reason to implement further managerial tools. This tendency to 
get in control underlines that corporations and CSR literature are both ‘modern’ 
in the way Heidegger analyses in the Question Concerning Technology.
  CSR becomes a search for tools, aimed at being in control. Responsibility 
in this view implies an analysis of the corporate environment and the 
development of communication strategies with this environment in order to 
prevent or reduce damage or show responsible behaviour. Responsibility is 
translated into a set of organizational measures, without any moral content. 
Is there a way out of what Frederick calls the ‘CSR trap’? Or, more in the 
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vocabulary of this thesis: can CSR be freed from the technical dominance? Can 
CSR be made less modern? 
The modern character of CSR is verified in the debate on sustainability. In 
this body of knowledge decisions on what is right or wrong are already made 
and further tools are presented to achieve sustainability goals. Noble as the 
intentions may be, again reflection upon what is right or wrong is absent and 
perhaps even more forceful than ever, CSR becomes prescriptive, it becomes an 
imperative. 
 Although sustainability has become an imperative, remaining within 
the capitalist paradigm implies that its scholars are optimistic about the 
possibilities to alter capitalism in such a way that it either becomes really 
sustainable or that mankind is able to solve the ecological and human 
problems in a technological way.
 The sustainability authors seem to miss an important point: the intrinsic 
friction between the different goals and the incommensurability of paradigms. 
The very idea of a responsibility towards future generations and the value of 
future (human) existence on earth is completely contradictory with the basic 
assumptions of the finance curriculum: future value has an (exponential) lower 
value in managerial decision-making compared to present value. As long as in 
managerial decision-making value is translated into cash flows, and discounted 
cash flow methods are used to analyse these cash flows, this intrinsic friction 
remains between profit (prosperity) and planet. It is beyond the reach of this 
thesis to further explore this problem, but it would certainly be interesting to 
perform further research into the issue. 
Many contributions to the debate of CSR address what would later be 
called the ‘stakeholders view of the firm’: corporations should implement 
procedures that assure regular analysis of the corporate environment and the 
determination of relevant issues and actors that can be of any significance to 
the firm. Together with that, many authors share a notion of good citizenship or 
stewardship, without clearly identifying what ‘good’ means or who decides on 
what is good.
 Frederick (1998b) asks attention for the central position of the corporation 
and – by changing the C from corporation to cosmos – tries to decentre the 
corporation. At the same time, by changing the S and R to science and religion, 
Frederick proposes a reconstruction of the entire management curriculum. With 
his concept of religion (the existential sources of the individual) he slightly 
aligns his thought with that of Bowen, Davis and Blomstrom and Johnson. Next 
to that, he moves in the direction of the scholars who have recently started 
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to explore the field of Business and Spirituality. This movement addresses 
some of the same problems as the ones addressed in this study, although the 
interpretative character of responsibility remains undervalued. 
Donna Wood (1991a) did address the importance of reflection, although she 
never elaborated the concept in her model. Her reference to Ackerman (1975, 
quoted in Wood), with the acknowledgement of managerial discretion, being 
something not entirely manageable and a part of an everyday practice, full 
of choices, appears to resemble one of the main arguments of this thesis. 
Managerial work, certainly where responsibility issues are involved, is 
continuously interpretative.
 Both on the level of the corporation and on the level of the individual, 
responsibility is a matter of interpretation. Deciding what is beneficial for the 
‘good society’, a ‘better world’, deciding on the consequences of the former 
questions for the policy of the corporation and deciding on one’s personal 
choices implies the recognition of issues (questions asked), the recognition 
of actors asking questions and of replies to be given, both at the level of the 
corporation as at the level of the individual. Corporate social responsibility is 
hermeneutical practice and the corporation is a platform, sometimes an arena 
of interpretations. 
The scholars who do acknowledge the importance of (philosophical) ethics 
for CSR, have misunderstood nihilism for relativism. Too shallow an approach 
of ethics causes a lack of understanding of (post)modern ethics. It seems 
necessary to address the relationship between nihilism and relativism more 
closely. Painter-Morland (2008) and the contributors to Painter-Morland and 
Ten Bos (2012) already paved the way for such an exercise. This study carries 
on from where they stopped and continues to explore the possibilities of a 
continental dialect of CSR.
 The question of a somewhat less modern conception of the corporation and 
CSR, the relationship between relativism and nihilism, the interpretative nature 
of CSR and the exploration of a possible application of virtue ethics in CSR 
takes us to the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo: his work brings together these 
issues and an analysis of his philosophy can help move CSR towards a less 
(exclusively) tool oriented approach.
This chapter showed that CSR has developed into a corporate oriented body 
of knowledge. This tradition is by no means rejected in this chapter, as if the 
development of managerial tools has been a ‘wrong’ development. It is just an 
attempt to show that there is a gap in CSR theory, and therefore a possibility 
to enrich the debate with a complementary track: a reflective track that does 
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justice to the early contributors to the debate, who aimed at ‘individual soul 
searching’ (Bowen) at the part of the businessmen (and women) and who 
considered the manager to be a Renaissance man (Johnson), a Renaissance 
man who has a strong need for (although this is my own interpretation) 
interpretative competencies.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
GIANNI VATTIMO:  
HIS LIFE, INTELLECTUAL 
CONTEXT AND PHILOSOPHY
 
‘Above all, I searched for freedom’46
46  ‘Su tutto ho cercato la libertà’ (Vattimo and Paterlini 2006, 195).
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  TO THE CHAPTER
Gianteresio Vattimo (Turin, 1-4-1936) is among the prominent thinkers of this era. Many of his works are translated in English, German and Spanish, although this counts especially for his more recent books. One 
of his earlier works – Il soggetto e la maschera (1974), which Vattimo considers 
to be one of his most important works – has never been translated into English 
or German, let alone Dutch.
 In the Netherlands, only a few works are available in Dutch47. Two out of 
three works belong to what I later shall call the religious turn in Vattimo’s work. 
For Dutch readers Vattimo first of all seems to be a philosopher with a special 
interest for religion. They miss the essence of his philosophy if they are unable 
to read him in other languages. Fortunately, Paul van Tongeren (2012a) has 
paid some attention to the other writings of Vattimo, although his reading of 
Vattimo is very brief and within the context of his work on Nietzsche’s concept 
of European nihilism.
 In this chapter I shall give an outline of the life and thought of Gianni 
Vattimo. This outline is the preparation for the next chapter, in which the 
47  De transparante samenleving (La societa trasparente, 1989. The Dutch translation appeared in 
1998), Ik geloof dat ik geloof (Credere di credere, 1996. The Dutch translation appeared in 1998) and 
Het woord is geest geworden (Dopo la cristianità, 2002. The Dutch translation appeared in 2003). 
Next to that, the dialogues with Rorty (Dutch translation: De toekomst van de religie, 2006) and 
Girard (Waarheid of zwak geloof: dialoog over Christendom en relativisme, 2008) were translated, but 
these works also belong to this era of ‘the religious turn’. The study by Meganck (2005) is especially 
dedicated to the religious work as well, although it contains chapters that treat the general thought 
of Vattimo. However, his reading of Vattimo also is hindered because he never refers to the earlier 
works of Vattimo. Meganck is limited to the French and Dutch translations of the work of the Turin 
philosopher. 
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synthesis of the previous chapter and this one must lead to a number of new 
insights for the CSR scholar and practitioner. 
 Section 3.2 is dedicated to the biography of Vattimo. A conversation with 
someone is not only about understanding his spoken or written opinions, but 
also about the context of these opinions. This is also the case in a conversation 
with Vattimo: some biographical remarks make it easier to understand the 
development of his philosophy.
 From section 3.3 onward the focus will shift to the philosophy of Gianni 
Vattimo, with special attention for the concept that made him famous: pensiero 
debole. This section starts with a rationale for this pensiero debole: why is it 
so important for Vattimo? After this, the 1983 texts on the concept will be 
examined more closely.
 The famous texts on il pensiero debole, published in 1983 leave quite 
some issues unaddressed. These issues get attention in the remainder of the 
chapter. The first issue is that of postmodern thought. Vattimo, and his pensiero 
debole, are considered to be postmodern. What does that mean? A number of 
reflections on Vattimo’s thought as postmodern thought are presented. Then 
there is the ‘religious turn’ in the work of Vattimo: how does pensiero debole 
relate to that? A special section is dedicated to that question, especially 
because Vattimo coins a concept – carità – that is intimately connected to the 
Vattimian interpretation of the concept of responsibility. 
The next section addresses the most recent works of Vattimo, his more 
politically coloured writings, and their relation to il pensiero debole. Has Vattimo 
done away with his ideals? Unaddressed until then, and the subject of the last 
section, is the idea of a postmodern subject, related to the Nietzschean concept 
of the Übermensch. Vattimo uses this concept regularly and it might provide us 
with some clues for CSR as well, especially for what in the previous chapter was 
called the ‘reflective track’ in CSR, with more attention for the businessman or 
executive (or employee in general) again. The chapter ends with a concluding 
section on the life and works of Gianni Vattimo48.
48  Some remarks on the references to the works of Vattimo: Because of the number of works 
Vattimo has produces, the chapter would become impossible to read, if the works were referred 
to as ‘Vattimo (year)’. Therefore I chose to simply use the full titles, in English if a translation 
is available (the first time combined with the Italian title), and in Italian if that is the only title 
available. If, in a passage, one title is used often, I abbreviate it. The first time, the whole title is 
mentioned, the abbreviation is placed behind it between brackets.
 Some words remain in the original language. German words, like Verwindung, are used 
untranslated by Vattimo, so I have chosen to do the same. In case of l’oltreuomo, Vattimo’s 
translation of the Übermensch, I have chosen to use the Italian word, because it has become a 
specifically Vattimian concept. The German Übermensch is used when it refers to Nietzschean texts.
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3.2  THE LIFE OF  GIANNI VATTIMO
‘(…) this book [Vattimo 1963 JdZ] and the one on Nietzsche, 
which I wrote ten years later, remain the two decisive moments 
in my development and for the development of my personal 
philosophical theory’49
3.2.1 YOUTH AND  
EARLY DEVELOPMENT
During the Second World War, after a bomb destroyed their home, the family moved from Turin to the Calabrese town of Cetraro, to live near relatives of 
his father, who died from pneumonia when Gianni was only one year old (NED, 
18 and Zabala 2007, 4). After the war the family returned to Turin again.
 Apparently the young Gianni was a very devout catholic; from his twelfth 
onward, he started to attend holy mass every day (Zabala 2007, 5 and Vattimo 
1996 and 2011, 7). Later, he became a member of a Catholic youth movement in 
Italy, which got him involved in the development of early Italian television at a 
very young age (Orizzonte, 1954 (Hubberd 2008, 68). 
In 1954 Vattimo also started his university studies, where he studied with 
Luigi Pareyson, whom he calls his greatest teacher. An intellectual and personal 
friendship developed, which endured until the death of Pareyson in 199150.
The early nineteen sixties were of great importance for the Turin philosopher. 
After writing a study on Aristotle,51 he started to read Adorno, ‘without 
understanding much of it’ (NED (24), also mentioned during his Lolle Nauta 
49  Vattimo and Paterlini (2006). Non essere Dio (NED), p. 36. 
50  NED, 176: ‘quando è morto (…) ho sentito profondamente la sua mancanza.’ (‘after his death, I 
deeply felt his missing’)
51  Il concetto di fare in Aristotele (1961). 
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lecture (Groningen, December 13th, 2012)). When he told his teacher, Luigi 
Pareyson, that he wanted to study Adorno, Pareyson replied: ‘why Adorno. Read 
something more current, study Nietzsche52.’ Vattimo followed his teacher’s advice 
with great consequences: Nietzsche’s thought infused all of his later work. 
 Another great influence on Vattimo’s early thought is the Letter on 
Humanism, by Martin Heidegger. In Magnificat he describes how before his eyes 
possibilities opened up to renew his (religious) heritage in a philosophical way. 
A philosophy, at the same time closely linked to politics, a politics of liberation 
and liberty. At that moment he was on his own in the Alps, enjoying the feeling 
of liberty during one of his many climbs: ‘before me there were the huge spaces 
of liberty that the high mountain offered; behind me the conviction of being at 
the beginning of a great philosophical adventure.’53 
 From 1962 until 1964, Vattimo received a scholarship (the Humboldt 
scholarship), which enabled him to study in Heidelberg and deepen his study 
of Heidegger. He especially studied with Löwith and Gadamer. The latter would 
become his second most important teacher, next to Pareyson (NED, 38). He later 
translates Gadamer’s main work, Wahrheit und Methode, into Italian. Looking 
back (in NED, 38) on these years, Vattimo considers them to be the period of 
time when he started to develop his own philosophy. Vattimo now enters a very 
productive period of his life. New titles add to his bibliography almost every year. 
3.2.2 MATURITY:  
PROFESSOR AT TURIN
From 1964 onward, Vattimo became an adjunct professor in aesthetics at the university of Turin and a full professor (and later dean) in 1968 (Zabala 2007, 
8 and 10). More and more, he became a well-known person, also because of his 
political engagement. His Il sogetto e la maschera: Nietzsche e il problema della 
liberazione (The subject and its mask: Nietzsche and the problem of liberation) 
was, according to Zabala (2007, 11) written as ‘a politico-philosophical 
manifesto for the new democratic left’54. 
 In 1976 he was a candidate for Italian parliament, at the homosexual list of 
the Radical Party. From as early as 1972, he lived together with his companion 
Gianpiero Cavaglià, but 1976 was the year of his publically coming out. Of 
course, certainly in those days, being homosexual and being a devout catholic 
52  NED, 25: ‘”Ma che Adorno. Leggi qualcosa di più attuale, studia Nietzsche”. Bene, studierò 
Friedrich Nietzsche.’ 
The same occasion is mentioned in Magnificat, 75.
53  Magnificat, 76: ‘Fuori avevo i grandi spazi di libertà che me offriva l’alta montagna, dentro la 
convinzione di essere all’inizio di una grande avventura filosofica.’
54  Elsewhere (1992), Vattimo also mentions the lack of a philosophical foundation for left politics. 
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were impossible to combine. According to Vattimo, the dogmas of the Roman 
Catholic Church, which excluded certain groups of people, like homosexuals 
or women, are perfect examples of strong, suppressive thought. The liberation 
from dogmas, with their status of absolute truths, is precisely what Vattimo 
searches for in his philosophy.
 However, suppressive dogmas are not only to be found in churches: during 
this period – being a public figure – Vattimo became potentially interesting 
for the extremist Brigate Rosse55. In 1978 he indeed was threatened, together 
with other philosophers, like Norberto Bobbio (Zabala 2007, 11 and NED, 100 
– 103). Again he was confronted with violence, caused by dogmas, in this case 
political dogmas. Violence triggered by the idea that there is an ultimate and 
stable truth (in the first example the truth of religious dogmas, in the second 
the truth of political ones). A stable truth, also defined as metaphysics, which 
causes people to ‘convert’ others to the utopia they believe in. These attempts 
to establish some utopia, if necessary by means of violence, is what Vattimo 
calls strong thought (pensiero forte). His philosophical career from now on 
shall be devoted to the development of an alternative for strong thought, 
building on his earlier works, but now more than ever able to clearly articulate 
a synthesis56.
3.2.3  PENSIERO DEBOLE (WEAK THOUGHT): 
1983 AND ONWARD
The next decade, the eighties, is the era where the international star of Gianni Vattimo rose to great height. Although he had been a visiting 
professor in the US earlier, especially works from this decade are translated into 
English and German. It is in this period of time that he published (together with 
Pier Aldo Rovatti) the concept that made him especially well known: il pensiero 
debole (weak thought), which shall be discussed in more detail in the next 
section.
 After 1983, Vattimo shall always be the philosopher of il pensiero debole. 
His works of this decade contain a continuous reflection on the postmodern 
condition. What is it like to think and live in the era after the death of God, 
55  The Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades), founded in 1970 by a Milanese called Renato Curcio, were 
part of a larger number of extremist groups, both on the left and on the right wing of the political 
spectrum. In 1970 a coup d’etat by right wing extremists was prevented, while the left wing Red 
Brigades in 1978 succeeded in taking hostage the important politician Aldo Moro, whom they killed 
after 55 days of captivity. Because of the extremist violence, the seventies became known as the 
‘years of lead’, gli anni di piombo (Van Osta 2008, 307 – 311).
56  Azzarà (2011) distinguishes between early and later Vattimo, il primo Vattimo reads Nietzsche 
more revolutionary, while the Vattimo of il pensiero debole has developed his less violent 
interpretation of Nietzsche. 
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might be the single question summarizing Vattimo’s work of the eighties, 
always building on the earlier works. The quotation starting this section 
shows that: the cornerstone of his thought is the analysis of the thought 
of both Nietzsche and Heidegger and his teachers Pareyson and Gadamer. 
These analyses laid the foundations of his own reflections on the postmodern 
condition.
 In 1980 Le avventure della differenza57 saw the light, in 1985 La fine della 
modernità58, and in 1989 La società trasparente59. These three reflections on the 
postmodern condition, with ‘its negation of stable structures of Being’ (Zabala 
2007, 13) are important works for a clear understanding of Vattimo’s philosophy. 
His emphasis on difference, instead of unity, is an ever-present theme in these 
works. In the next section these main themes of Vattimo’s philosophy are 
elaborated more thoroughly.
 During the second half of the decade, from 1986 until 1995, Vattimo edited 
the Italian Philosophical Yearbooks. Many philosophers contributed to these 
yearbooks and in 1994 the publisher (Laterza) organized a European edition, 
preluding on the main theme of Vattimo’s philosophy in the next decade: 
religion.
3.2.4 ‘RETURN’ TO FAITH:  
CREDERE DI CREDERE
In 1994 Laterza organized a seminar on the island of Capri, where, together with Vattimo, Gadamer and Derrida (among others) were present too. The 
theme of the seminar was religion and would be the prelude of a series of 
reflections on this theme by Vattimo, both undertaken by him alone and in 
collaboration with others (e.g. Rorty 2004, Girard 2006, and Caputo 2007). 
These reflections, especially Credere di credere (1996) are a turning point 
in the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo. In the first place because of the theme, 
which appears to be a remarkable step for a philosopher so firmly rooted in the 
thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Gadamer to return to the catholic roots 
of his youth (Groot 2000). In the second place because of the style of his work, 
57  The Adventure of Difference (translation published in 1993). The depth of the Italian title was 
lost a bit, because of the use of the singular (adventure), instead of the plural (le avventure). The 
theme of diversity is strengthened in the original title by the use of le avventure.
58  The End of Modernity (1988).
59  The Transparent Society (1992).  This actually is the translation of the first edition of La società 
trasparente, with three chapters added, taken from Etica dell’interpretazione (1989, chapters 5, 9 
and 10). The sixth chapter of the second edition of the Italian original is absent in the English 
translation. The Dutch edition also lacks this sixth chapter. The sixth chapter of this translation is a 
translation of a lecture that is no part of the Italian original.
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which is very personal. Apparently, Vattimo starts to reflect more personally on 
his work. Later, in Non essere Dio (2006) and Magnificat (2011), this reflection 
even gets (auto-)biographical, while Della realtà (2012) is presented as a 
reflection on and actualization of his philosophical itinerary60.
In a later section, the content of this ‘religious turn’ shall be discussed more 
thoroughly. Vattimo emphasizes that this turn is not a re-turn in a sense that 
he embraces the religious dogmas of the catholic faith. Instead, religion is 
interpreted in a way consistent with his other work, freed from its metaphysical, 
violent, character. 
Although religion appears to be a rather new theme in the works of Vattimo, 
it is by no means inconsistent with his other works. On the contrary, the theme 
of religion is completely in line with il pensiero debole. Inconsistency could be 
traced only in later works of Vattimo, where the (engaged) politician seems 
sometimes to take over from the philosopher.  
3.2.5  RECENT VATTIMO:  
POLITICIAN AND PHILOSOPHER
‘Philosophy, for me, always should be useful, and intensely 
intertwined with existence.’ (NED, 126)
As mentioned before, Vattimo has always been a very engaged person, as is shown by his membership of the Catholic youth movement during 
the nineteen fifties and his candidature for Italian parliament two decades 
later. More recently – from 1999 until 2004 and from 2009 until 2014 – he 
was elected in the European Parliament. Next to that he wrote columns in 
newspapers like La Stampa and L’Unità. According to his own writing (The 
Responsibility of the Philosopher, 101), some colleagues considered this to be a 
blemish on his philosophical work.
 For the Turin philosopher, playing on two boards simultaneously is by no 
means contradictory. Pensiero Debole is no theoretical exercise, but full-blooded 
ethics in practice (cfr. Monaco 2006, 50 – 51). In several works, Vattimo has been 
explicitly political. His Il soggetto e la maschera was supposed to be a political 
manifesto for the left and in Etica dell’interpretazione (123) he mourns about the 
lack of philosophical foundation for left politics.
 But the works until about 2000 are always still postmodern reflections, 
60  Vattimo (2012, 10): ‘Il resultato non è un volume di divulgazione filosofica per il grande 
pubblico; ma nemmeno solo documento di un percorso teoretico che si rivolga esclusivamente 
agli addetti ai lavori o addirittura solo ai biografi – miei o del pensiero debole.’ (A document of 
a theoretical route that might just be interesting for those interested in either the story of weak 
thought or the biography of Vattimo).
89
certainly not dominated by politics. This changes in more recent years. Addio 
alla verità starts off with an analysis of the political situation of that moment, 
with the war against terrorism raging on. According to Vattimo this war is yet 
another example of the violent nature of metaphysics61. 
In Hermeneutic communism (2012) it even seems that political engagement 
overrules or at least corrects the philosophical rigidity and that for the 
first time pensiero debole is not anymore considered practically feasible: 
‘unfortunately, hermeneutic communism cannot assure peaceful existence, 
dialogue, or a tranquil life, because this ‘normal’ realm already belongs to the 
winners within framed democracies’ (HC, 138). In other words, emancipation 
does not come without a cost, because ruling powers (framed democracies) are 
complex and coherent systems, unwilling to give up their power. Something of 
a revolution seems necessary. 
In an interview with the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant (12-12-2012), as 
in the Lolle Nauta lecture the day after that, Vattimo admits to be disappointed 
with postmodernism. Democracy has not fulfilled its promise and technocrats 
(e.g. Draghi, Monti, van Rompuy) have been able to exercise their power over 
the European people, especially those of the south. Vattimo seems to have done 
away with the optimism of his earlier works. In order for society to be weak, 
strong action is necessary. 
With this statement Vattimo seems to have lost faith in his own pensiero 
debole. Although he was always aware of the stubbornness of metaphysical 
thought – as Rorty points out in his foreword to the English translation of 
Nihilism and Emancipation: ‘the springs of metaphysical authoritarianism will 
never run dry’ – he now appears to throw in the towel. Metaphysics – or at 
least the remnants or remembrance of metaphysics – is too strong still. Even 
the timespan of a century, which Nietzsche thought necessary for mankind to 
understand his Übermensch, seems to have been insufficient to overcome this 
disease, so deeply rooted in human beings. 
To remain faithful to his project Vattimo looks toward the examples of South 
America, like Bolivar, Chavez and Castro. They appear to offer alternatives 
to the doctrines of the neolibs. Or do they? Whether Vattimo has a point 
remains to be seen. The specific political choices of philosophers are not 
always representative for their philosophical genius. At least he dares to speak 
out politically. In 2014 this speaking out became a scandal of international 
proportion, when, in the heat of the israeli-palestinian conflict, Vattimo talked 
aggressively about shooting ‘Zionist bastards’. Although he later apologized 
61  Addio alla verità, 9: ‘Dio è morto, ma la notizie non è ancora arrivata a tutti.’ Not everyone has 
received the message that God is dead. Bush and Blair (and their allies) have been defending a 
clear notion of what is true.
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for this, it caused significant uproar. The English Wikipedia entry on Vattimo, 
because of this incident, has a small section dedicated to the question whether 
or not Vattimo is an anti-Semite. The incident shows how the columnist Vattimo 
sometimes uses an extreme polemic style, while the philosopher Vattimo 
is more nuanced. In the later works, when philosophy and politics become 
more intertwined, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between the 
columnist and the philosopher. This causes a sense of contradiction, which is 
mentioned on the back cover of The Responsibility of the Philosopher (2000): ‘He 
seems to embody several contradictions, at once defending and questioning 
religion and critiquing and serving the state.’ Vattimo does criticize religion and 
politics, but not solely from an outside position. He criticizes because he cares62, 
and therefore he participates as well. 
 This chapter especially focuses on Vattimo’s philosophical work. It would 
take another occasion to further elaborate the practical consequences of weak 
thought, at least in the life of the philosopher. A monography should at least pay 
more attention to the political career of Vattimo and the choices he made while 
being a member of European Parliament. Next to that, a study of his columns 
would give a more general insight into his position towards all kinds of issues 
that have been relevant during the years, although many of these columns 
address issues that require some understanding of the specific Italian societal 
and political context. 
 The quote at the beginning of this section – philosophy should always be 
useful and intertwined with existence – is illustrated in the life of Vattimo. In 
his case, philosophy becomes practical in politics and religion. In books like 
Magnificat and Non essere Dio one gets a glimpse of how philosophy further 
plays a part in this philosopher’s life. CSR has not been a part of the life of 
Vattimo, so reflections upon that subject do not exist. But the use of philosophy 
goes beyond the existence of the individual philosopher. Hence, the question 
of this study remains: can this philosophy, the philosophy of weak thought be of 
use for those who study or practice CSR?  
This section was dedicated to the life of Gianni Vattimo, especially because 
there is such a strong link between his biography and his bibliography, between 
theory and practice. Life and philosophy are strongly intertwined. However, the 
actual philosophical content has not been examined thoroughly yet. That is the 
purpose of the next section.
62  Derrida, sometimes accused of negativism, explained that ‘the texts I want to read from 
a deconstructive point of view are texts I love’ (Derrida, quoted in Jones 2004, 42). Philosophy, 
hermeneutics, always seems to be accompanied (or preceded) by involvement. Derrida even uses 
the word ‘love’ to illustrate the nature of this involvement. Similarly, there is a strong link between 
theory and practice with Vattimo. He only writes about themes when he cares.
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3.3 THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIANNI VATTIMO
‘(…) too much nostalgia for metaphysics’63
3.3.1 THE LIBERATING AND EMANCIPATORY 
FORCE OF PHILOSOPHY
Although Vattimo became famous for his concept of ‘weak thought’ (il pensiero debole), this concept is not the key to his philosophy. Weak thought 
is merely a means for a higher goal in the philosophy of the Turin professor. 
This higher goal can be summarized with the quotation that started this 
chapter: liberty and the process of liberation.
 From 1974 (Il soggetto e la maschera) onward until his more recent work 
(e.g. 2011, together with Santiago Zabala, Hermeneutic Communism) the ever-
returning themes are liberty (the subtitle of Il soggetto e la maschera is Nietzsche 
and the problem of liberation) and emancipation (e.g. Nihilism and Emancipation, 
2003)64.  In one of his most important books, The Transparent Society (originally 
published in 1989), he concludes by saying that the force of postmetaphysical 
philosophy is nothing to be afraid of, but, quite contrarily, an event that creates 
room for emancipation (The Transparent Society, 121). Earlier in the book he even 
speculates about mankind, at last65, becoming human (op. cit., 20).66
63  The full quotation can be found in the next section (3.3.2).
64  Already in his Essere, storia e linguaggio in Heidegger of 1963 the end of metaphysics is 
reflected upon, although not yet its emancipatory consequences.
65  The Italian word, used by Vattimo is finalmente. The English translation uses finally, where I 
prefer at last. 
66  Guarino (2009, 13): ‘Weak thought allows the human being to seize fully his or her own life, to 
mold and shape it in new ways, apart from predetermined structures and assertive prejudices.’
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 If liberation and emancipation are so important in the works of Gianni 
Vattimo, the question arises what are we to be freed from? If weak thought is 
the means by which liberation can be achieved, the countervailing force is easy 
to be distinguished: strong thought. Indeed, that is – according to Vattimo – the 
suppressing force for so many. Strong thought, or it’s synonym metaphysics:
‘Since the problem of metaphysics and violence still seems to me to be one of the 
central problems of philosophy (…)’ (Metaphysics and Violence 2007c, 400).
 Il soggetto e la maschera presents the work of Nietzsche as an itinerary of 
thought on the liberation from metaphysics. It interprets Nietzsche’s work as 
a process of development, struggling with metaphysics and the way man can 
be liberated from its suppressive – even violent – force. The young Nietzsche 
does not use the concept ‘metaphysics’ yet. In Birth of the Tragedy he preludes 
on metaphysics but uses the word ‘Apollinic’ instead. This concept, the Apollinic 
force – opposed to the Dionysian force – is used by Nietzsche in his Birth of the 
Tragedy, in which not only analyses the development of Greek tragedy but also 
extends this analysis to (European) culture in general.
 According to Nietzsche, classic Greek tragedy was characterized by 
equilibrium of the two forces. The Dionysian force is a remnant of the barbaric, 
orgiastic rites, while the Apollinic force is the one that strives for the sublime. 
The Apollinic force symbolizes clarity and consciousness (Safranski 2006, 56) 
and it always remains in charge: the aesthetic experience is always a conscious 
one, while the Dionysian aesthetic experience is characterized by a loss of 
conscience, by intoxication. In Greek tragedy, originally the two forces were 
complementary. However, from complementary forces they gradually became 
opposite forces. The Apollinic suppressed the Dionysian force.  
 For Nietzsche the Apollinic is linked to one name in particular: Socrates. 
In Birth of the Tragedy (chapter 12) Nietzsche explicitly replaces Apollo by 
Socrates: ‘This is the new contradiction, the Dionysian and the Socratic’. Later 
Nietzsche re-interprets these aesthetic categories into more general categories. 
Socrates represents metaphysics: in the dialogues by Plato we encounter 
Socrates as the one who inexhaustibly searches for universal truths, for ideas 
that must transcend the particular. This search for universal, eternal and even 
divine truths also characterizes Christian thought, which of course in the eyes 
of Nietzsche was to be despised thoroughly.
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The Dionysian force was the first attempt by Nietzsche to 1) analyse the 
metaphysical condition of western culture and to 2) think beyond metaphysics. 
In the early works of Nietzsche, liberation from metaphysics is searched for in 
art, especially in music and the music of Wagner appeared as the re-invention 
of the well-balanced work of art, with protagonists like Tristan and Siegfried 
representing heroes touched by the Dionysian spirit. After his disappointment 
with Wagner67, Nietzsche continued his search for liberation, finally finding a 
solution in Zarathustra.
 But still the question remains: what does this suppressive force exactly 
mean? Most profoundly, metaphysics is a unitarian thought, that searches for 
first principles and infused by a deeply felt conviction that there are such 
principles. In the philosophy of Plato, this conviction is first elaborated in the 
western world. Later, it would characterize Christianity: one truth, one God. In 
modernity, religious faith has been replaced by scientific knowledge68, although 
there is still this same metaphysical faith in one truth, be it a scientific one.
 Metaphysics is visible even in language itself: ‘Language is not just a 
system of grammatical rules, but – something that happens time and time 
again wherever a rule exists – it also implies a hierarchical organization (…) 
This same world of concepts-words is a world of dominion and oppression’ 
(Il soggetto e la maschera, 46)69. (Western) language is in itself part, mirror and 
bearer of hierarchies, so characteristic for metaphysics.
 Vattimo refers to the analysis by Nietzsche of the word ‘bonus’ (the good), 
which in different languages originally had a social meaning. In old Dutch, 
for example, ‘goed’ (good) and ‘slecht’ (bad) distinguished between noble and 
normal people. The moral categories ‘good’ and ‘bad’ still are rooted in this 
social division. In the protestant Heidelberg Catechism (16th century, question 
and answer 39), this moral content of the social classification is clearly visible: 
it demands humility towards those who are put above me, according to the will 
of God. Defying social structures is no less than a defiance of a divine structure. 
Elsewhere (Le avventure delle differenze/The Adventure of Difference (AD), 2 and 
38), Vattimo refers to Platonic hierarchies as a separation between theory and 
practice – with a normative distinction of theory above practice – considering 
Nietzsche’s thought as an attempt to reunite the two. In this context, Vattimo 
often refers to the second of the Untimely Meditations, where Nietzsche 
67  Verwindung, Nihilism and the Postmodern in Philosophy 1987, 8: ‘(...) Human, All Too Human 
marked the abandonment of hopes resting on Wagner and the performative power of art.’
68  Guarino (2009, 14): ‘Vattimo, however, regards (...) militant atheism to be as much a 
phenomenon of ‘strong thought’ as is religious fundamentalism.’
69  Original text: ‘Il linguaggio non è solo un sistema di regole grammaticali, ma – come sembra 
ovvio accada dovunque esiste una regola – è anche un’organizzazione gerarchia (...) lo stesso 
mondo dei concetti-parole è un mondo di supremazie e sottomissioni.’
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elaborates the concept of historical malady. According to Vattimo, this concept 
is ‘characterized by a split between theory and practice, involving a lack of 
adequation between doing and knowing’ (AD, 29 English translation)70. 
 A split between theory and practice, between knowing and doing, 
characterizes modern thought. For Nietzsche, this primarily holds for the way 
history is done in his own days, or, more specifically, for the idea that history 
should be a science according to the model of natural sciences. This history 
can only be one, which loses its relationship with life, because it becomes a 
mere collection of facts and figures. ‘He (Nietzsche, JdZ) saw the excessive 
historiographical awareness of the nineteenth century (which has developed 
even further in our time) as opposed to the need of life because it implied 
an inability to ‘digest’ cognitive material’ (AD, 26, English translation)71. Later, 
Heidegger recognizes this as resulting in an inability of modern man to gain a 
free attitude towards technology and science. The free digestion of cognitive 
material, thus re-establishing the connection between science and life, 
between theory and practice, between knowing and doing, is a large part of the 
project of Vattimo. He finds this freedom in his interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
Übermensch, to which I shall turn later in this chapter. 
 
According to the analysis of Nietzsche, metaphysics is interpreted as an 
evolutionary force. Because of the fear and insecurity, which characterizes the 
existence of ‘primitive’ man, the constant threat of nature, there is a need for 
metaphysics. In other words: metaphysics was born in a situation of insecurity 
and threat72. This is illustrated by two stories of biblical mythology in the first 
book of the Bible, Genesis. The first story is that of Caine, who is sent away as 
a punishment for the murder of his brother. The very idea that he has to leave 
the security of his tribe fills him with fear: ‘And Caine said unto the Lord, My 
punishment is greater than I can bear. Behold, thou hast driven me out this 
day from the face of the earth; and from thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be 
a fugitive and a vagabond in the earth; and it shall come to pass, that every 
one that findeth me shall slay me’ (Gen. 4: 13 and 14). The fear of Cain still 
resonates in the speech of Lamech, a few verses later (Gen. 4: 23). He transfers 
his fear into violence: ‘And Lamech said unto his wives, Adah and Zillah, Hear my 
voice; ye wives of Lamech, hearken unto my speech: for I have slain a man to 
my wounding, and a young man to my hurt.’ This attitude leads to a society that 
70  ‘Se la malattia storica è caratterizzata fondamentalmente dalla scissione di teoria e prassi, per 
cui non c’è adeguazione tra fare e sapere...’ (AD, 38, Italian original).
71  ‘L’esasperata consapevolezza storiografica del secolo XIX (ulteriormente sviluppata nel nostro 
secolo) contrastava con gli interessi della vita perché implicava una incapacità di ‘digestione’ del 
materiale conoscitivo (...)’ (AD, 34, Italian original).
72  Il soggetto e la maschera, 114: ‘Nata in una situazione di minaccia e di violenza, la metafisica è 
essa stessa, a sua volta, un atto violento.’
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can be characterized in a way Hobbes did: a war of all against all, rooted in fear 
and insecurity. The words of Lamech, however, seem to refer to actual violence, 
while Hobbes, in the thirteenth chapter of Leviathan argues that the threat of 
violence is sufficient to paralyze a civilisation: ‘For war, consisteth not in battle 
only, or the act of fighting; but in the tract of time, wherein the will to contend 
by battle is sufficiently known (...) so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual 
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no 
assurance to the contrary’ (Leviathan, 115). 
 The second story that illustrates this insecurity is that of the Tower of Babel 
(Gen. 11: 1 – 9) and contains a similar fear to that of Caine and is the reason for 
the construction of this tower: ‘And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a 
tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we 
be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole world.’ Especially the last part 
of this quotation is important: it contains the unifying character of metaphysics 
(let us make us a name, one name) and the reason for metaphysics, which is 
the fear of being scattered abroad. A similar line of thought can be found with 
Aristotle (Politics, I, 2), who argues that life within a collective – the polis – is 
the natural condition for humans. Those who live outside the community is 
‘forthwith a lover of war’ (1253 a 5) and he who does not need a political 
community is ‘either a bad man or above humanity’ (1253 a 25)73. Belonging to a 
political community is necessary in order to become a good human. 
 To recapitulate, a condition where nature appears hostile and threatening, a 
situation where the other seems hostile and threatening is a condition where 
metaphysics can flourish, a condition where individuals search for collectives 
for shelter. This condition is so common for human culture that it has become 
almost impossible to think beyond metaphysics. This condition is also one 
in which strong leaders can stand up and where the frightened individual 
searches for strong leaders, for those who can create and manage collectives. It 
is important to acknowledge that metaphysics, although potentially violent, is 
not always violent and that the loss of freedom is compensated by the shelter 
offered by the collective. So when metaphysics is analysed as a potentially 
violent force, this should not be interpreted as a struggle between ‘good guys’ 
and ‘bad guys’. It is a condition under which both slaves and masters seem to 
feel comfortable. For some this condition can become a burden that weighs too 
much. 
 The situation has changed. If metaphysics is a residue from a condition 
not anymore valid, metaphysics – and the ethics derived from it – becomes 
obsolete74. It is exactly the way how Vattimo interprets the ‘death of God’, from 
73  The Dutch translation of Politics translates this phrase even stronger: ‘who does not need a 
community is either a beast or a god.’ 
74  Op. cit., 113: ‘La morale (…) è eredità di una situazione dei rapporto dell’uomo con la natura e 
con il mondo che ormai (…) non è più attuale.’
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Nietzsche’s Fröhliche Wissenschaft: not as an actual death of an actual God, but 
as the end of a necessity of God (God in this case has to be read as a synonym of 
metaphysics). One could argue whether Vattimo is correct here: is it really true 
that there is no need for metaphysics anymore? If metaphysics is rooted in fear 
and insecurity, it remains to be seen whether this does not apply to our society 
anymore. Large parts of the world are all but secure, whether tormented by 
extreme poverty, by famine or by war. And could it be a sign of the perseverance 
of metaphysics that the economic crisis has increased the popularity of right 
wing political movements (e.g. Golden Dawn in Greece, PVV in the Netherlands, 
Front National in France, etc.)? In his book on Vattimo, Krämmer (2010, 89) 
summarizes the perseverance of metaphysics in the following way: ‘Der Mensch 
will etwas Festes haben, er will Halt und Stütze’ [humans desire something 
steady, they want grip and support].
Vattimo appears to acknowledge this, because he regularly writes that the 
changed situation – that there is no need for metaphysics anymore – has yet 
to be fully understood. In three chapters of The Transparent Society the word 
‘perhaps’ appears. The last chapter of the first edition of The End of Modernity 
ends with ‘... we have just begun to comprehend’. The use of words like these 
illustrate that Vattimo is aware of what may be called the embryonic state of 
the understanding of the consequences of the nihilist condition. In Della realtà 
(41) he paraphrases aphorism 343 from Fröhliche Wissenschaft to illustrate this: 
‘God is dead, but it will take a long time before the message of his death will 
be received’ (‘Dio è morto, ma deve passare encora molto tempo che l’annuncia 
della sua morte sia ricevuto’).
This section started with a quotation that there is such a thing as ‘nostalgia 
for metaphysics’. This means that the full consequences of the ‘death of God’ 
are still to be discovered. Heidegger has tried to, as did the hermeneutic 
philosophers after him. For Vattimo, hermeneutic ontology tries to do justice 
to the philosophy of Nietzsche75. Hermeneutic ontology is closely linked to the 
concept of pensiero debole (weak thought), the concept which made Vattimo 
really famous and which is crucially important in the process of liberation of 
metaphysics. So this is perhaps an ideal moment to turn toward this important 
concept.
75  Il soggetto e la maschera, 311: ‘Il mondo ridotto a interpretazione (…) configura una visione 
dell’essere che sembra da indentificare con quella sviluppata variamente nell’ontologia ermeneutica 
contemporanea di origine esistenzialistica, le cui premesse si trovano, com’è noto, nel pensiero del 
cosidetto ‘secondo Heidegger’, e sono sviluppate in maniera autonoma e originale da pensatori 
come Gadamer, Ricoeur, Pareyson.’ [The world reduced to interpretation (...) depicts a vision of being 
that seems to resemble the one developed in the variety of contemporary hermeneutics that has its 
origins in existentialism and of which the premises can be found in the later thought of Heidegger, 
and that has developed autonomously with philosophers like Gadamer, Ricoeur, Pareyson].
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3.3.2  IL PENSIERO DEBOLE:  
THE WEAKENING OF BEING
‘The Italian debates on the crisis of reason are characterised by 
too much nostalgia for metaphysics. They do not start, basically, 
from the experience of the forgetting of Being, or of the ‘death of 
God’, as above all Heidegger and Nietzsche have announced over 
our culture’ (NED, 107, which paraphrases Weak Thought, 9)76.
In 1983, together with Pier Aldo Rovatti, Vattimo edited a collection of papers, dedicated to the crisis of reason77. Although the authors were mainly concerned 
with the debate as it was held in Italy, its influence would reach far beyond the 
Italian border. The main argument was that the debate on reason did not take 
into account the full consequences of Nietzschean and Heideggerian thought. 
It remained indebted to metaphysics, while, according to Vattimo and Rovatti, 
thought should be freed from this nostalgia. 
 Rovatti and Vattimo took a concept, earlier used by Viano78 which would 
become the single phrase symbolizing Vattimo’s thought from that moment 
onward: il pensiero debole, weak thought. It proposes a kind of thought that 
moves beyond metaphysics. In the next sections weak thought shall receive 
further attention as far as it is postmetaphysical or postmodern thought. 
Here, following the 1983 texts by Rovatti and Vattimo weak thought as such is 
introduced. In the introduction of Weak Thought (9), Rovatti and Vattimo explain 
what they consider to be the essence of weak thought. Unfortunately, this 
introduction was not translated by Carravetta in his English edition of the book. 
In this section the essence of weak thought – that exists of four constitutive 
elements – is recapitulated. 
76  ‘I discorsi Italiani sulla crisi della ragione hanno troppo nostalgia per la metafisica. E non 
partano fino in fondo l’esperienza dell’ oblio dell’ Essere, o della ‘morte di Dio’, che sopratutto 
Heidegger e Nietzsche hanno annunciato alla nostra cultura.’ 
77  Weiss (2006, 33 – 35) gives an account of this crisis using two works published in the 
seventies (Cacciari (1976) and Gargani (1979), both paving the way for Vattimo and Rovatti, because 
of their explicit account of the crisis of reason. Vattimo’s own recollection on this matter can be 
found in NED (114 -115).
78  Zabala (2007, 12): ‘Vattimo has explained on several occasions that the expression ‘weak 
thought’ was drawn from an essay by Carlo Augusto Viano (‘Reason, Abundance, and Belief’, in Crisi 
delle regione [The Crisis of Reason], a famous book edited by Aldo Giorgio Gargani in 1979’ [see also 
note 4]. 
Viano (1929) is an Italian philosopher, especially known (in Italy) for his work on history of 
philosophy, which he taught at the university of Turin. When I started to study the Italian 
philosophical landscape, his books (e.g. La filosofia italiana del Novecento) and the ones written 
together with Pietro Rossi were inevitable. 
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1. Weak thought takes seriously the Nietzschean openness (la scoperta 
Nietzscheana) towards the relationship between metaphysics 
and oppression. This first element underlines the reason why the 
previous section was dedicated to liberation and emancipation. The 
conviction that a) our culture is characterized by metaphysics and 
b) that metaphysics has an oppressive potential is at the core of 
weak thought and causes a search for possibilities of liberation. The 
authors define metaphysics as ‘the persuasiveness of foundation’. In 
section 3.3.3, this foundationalist character of metaphysics will be 
further elaborated. Here, attention is paid to that other word Rovatti 
and Vattimo use: cogenza, persuasiveness, related to metaphysics. It is 
not just that metaphysics is potentially oppressive and that it could 
easily be otherwise. When the authors use the word persuasiveness, 
they emphasize the stubborn character of metaphysics, the idea 
that our culture is soaked with metaphysics. In the previous section 
some examples were given: even language, manners of speaking, 
and grammar are thoroughly metaphysical. Because metaphysics 
is omnipresent, one could believe that metaphysical structures are 
not just there, but that they are necessarily there. It was Nietzsche 
who dared to address the relationship between oppression and 
metaphysics and who dared to search for ways to escape oppression. 
Weak thought, by means of the three next elements, explores the 
consequences of Nietzschean thought.
2. Weak thought implies a turn towards a new and more friendly 
(amichevole), less metaphysical experience of Being. What does 
that mean, a more friendly experience of Being? The quotation that 
introduced this section also contained the word ‘Being’, which is an 
important philosophical concept. The way it is used here, reminds of 
the Heideggerian interpretation of Being and his critique of earlier 
conceptions of being. In Being and Time, published in 1927, Heidegger 
argues that the question of Being has been forgotten in western 
philosophy. Faithful to the phenomenological project started by 
Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938), Heidegger believed that one should 
not (just) think about beings, but about the ‘being of beings’. He 
understood that philosophers before him tried to think about Being 
as if it was some-thing (another being), like for example eternal ideas 
(Plato), substance (Aristotle), a creator God (medieval philosophy), 
spirit (Hegel) and res cogitans (Descartes)79. These examples define 
Being as something stable, unchanging, eternal and what Heidegger 
79  The examples are given by Berghs (1997) in his contribution to the first volume of Ex Libris of 
20th century philosophy.
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proposes is a more dynamic conception of Being, always connected 
to time. In such a way, Being becomes being-in or being-among. In 
the vocabulary of Vattimo: Being is interpreted as event (essere come 
evento). This epochal conception of Being is considered to be a more 
friendly conception of Being, which has to do with the first element 
of weak thought: the stable conceptions of Being are the springs from 
which metaphysical violence can flow. 
3. The third element of weak thought is that it searches for ‘thought 
that is capable of articulating itself in the half-light (nella mezza 
luce)’. Rovatti and Vattimo immediately give a clue of what they 
mean with this sentence: the half-light is again connected to a 
Heideggerian concept, Lichtung. Amoroso, in his contribution to Weak 
Thought, especially focusses on the concept of Lichtung. Lichtung 
(Waldblösse, Amoroso 1983, 139) is defined as an open place in a 
forest, a place where light can reach through the canopy of leaves. 
According to Amoroso, this implies that it is not just the light getting 
through, but also – as a matter of speaking – opening the forest to 
allow rays of light flowing in (to clear a forest, ein Wald lichten). This 
approach to light, as traces on a forest floor, sharply contradicts the 
metaphysical conception of light. ‘ As a Leitmotiv, the metaphor of 
light is present throughout Western metaphysics’ (Amoroso 2012, 
155). From Plato’s cave, to Christian thought and of course the era 
of Enlightenment, light has always been an important metaphor in 
metaphysical traditions. However, this light was a clear, abundant 
and direct light. The one who escaped the ties and was able to turn 
towards the light – in case of Plato’s parable – at first was blinded by 
it. A different use of the light metaphor, as more diffused light, a light 
that constantly changes because of the leaves moving with the wind, 
illustrates the changed – and more modest – interpretation of Being. 
At the same time, the active use of Lichtung, as in clearing a forest, 
gives room for an interpretation that emphasizes the act of liberation.
4. The final element of weak thought for the first time mentions 
hermeneutics in its meaning after the ontologic turn (cfr. section 1.2) 
more specific the way Heidegger articulates it: Being and language 
tied together, again conceiving Being as something dynamic, a 
track (traccia), a remembrance. Vattimo and Rovatti explicitly put 
themselves in the tradition of Heidegger and ‘the ontological turn’ 
in hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is not (only) about interpreting texts 
anymore, it is about Being, and that is why Vattimo uses both weak 
thought and weak ontology (pensiero debole and ontologia debole): 
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the connection of Being and language (l’identificazione di essere e 
linguaggio). Being seems to have crumbled from an independent 
‘existence’ as an eternal idea, a God or whatever universal principle to 
a (rather mysterious) ray of light, that appears through language from 
time to time. Or, as Vattimo puts it in Non essere Dio (NED, 6): being 
gives itself to us, in conversation, in language (essere si da a noi, nel 
colloquio, nel linguagio). 
The language of Vattimo and Rovatti – a language very much inspired by the 
language of Heidegger – can be extremely abstract, certainly when a concept 
like ‘Being’ is concerned. Is such an abstract philosophical jargon not too far 
astray from CSR? It is exactly the same ‘nostalgia for metaphysics’, expressed 
by Rovatti and Vattimo, that characterizes the debate on CSR. The search for 
universally applicable ethical standards, the gap between theory and practice, 
the absence of everyday life in managerial CSR tools are all examples of 
the same nostalgia for metaphysics and therefore I consider it necessary to 
thoroughly examine weak thought – with all its philosophical finesses – in 
order to find a way out of the metaphysical trap. The metaphysical trap, which 
resembles the CSR trap, mentioned in the second chapter. 
Above, Vattimo’s contribution to the 1983 book, entitled Dialectics, Difference, 
Weak Thought (Dialettica, differenza, pensiero debole) was already mentioned 
once. In this text, the concept of Il pensiero debole is elaborated further, 
especially positioning it in relation to metaphysics, now and then referring to 
pensiero debole as pensiero ultrametafisica (Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought, 
22 and 28 and The End of Modernity, 28), thus showing a nuanced view towards 
il pensiero debole, not being metaphysical but at the same time not opposed to 
metaphysics. If it were anti-metaphysical or really post-metaphysical, it would 
be something replacing the former by the latter, thus returning to metaphysics 
again. Vattimo carefully tries to avoid the metaphysical trap, in Dialectics, 
Difference, Weak Thought by using the word ultra-metaphysical. 
In his 1983 text, as in other writings, Vattimo conceptualises this nuanced 
relationship between metaphysics and weak thought by means of the 
Heideggerian notion of Verwindung. It is one of the key concepts in Vattimo’s 
later oeuvre, as it is in Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought80. Metaphysics is not 
replaced by weak thought but it belongs to its story. In later works, a similar 
argument is stated concerning the postmodern, which can only exist because 
80  As far as I could trace back, Verwindung appears, almost in passing, for the first time in The 
Adventure of Difference (126) (this is the 2001 edition, so this passage could be added later). From 
1983 onward, Vattimo really acknowledges the full possibilities of the concept for his philosophy. In 
his early works, even the ones dedicated to the thought of Heidegger (Essere, storia e linguaggio in 
Heidegger and Introduzione a Heidegger), Verwindung is not mentioned a single time (!).
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of the modern. Indeed, the term literally contains the modern, and the term 
Verwindung is used to encircle this meaning. Later in this chapter this concept 
of Verwindung shall be elaborated further (section 3.3.3.2).
Talking about metaphysics (or the end of it) means talking about the 
conception one has of truth. In metaphysics, truth is considered to be 
‘something’ stable. In other works, Vattimo reflects upon the fixed notion of 
truth as correspondence. In modern thought, one presupposes that a certain 
true interpretation corresponds with some fact in reality. In Della realtà, 
Vattimo refers to the Tarski principle (‘p’ is true only if p is the case). If one 
reads ‘Yesterday, there was a referendum in Scotland’ in a newspaper, one 
would expect this to correspond with a real referendum, taking place yesterday 
in Scotland. An expression, thus, has to correspond with a fact, taking place 
somewhere and sometime. Weak thought appreciates that modernity has too 
narrow a conception of truth. Il pensiero debole appreciates both the idea that 
there is truth in poetry as well and the (Popperian) idea that even in science the 
idea of a fixed truth is problematic81.  
What does weak ontology say about truth, is summarized as follows: firstly, 
truth does not have a metaphysical or a logical nature. It has rather a rhetoric 
nature: una natura retorica (Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought, 26). Secondly, 
one can characterize it as an openness, or a freedom of the intersubjective 
exchanges. Truth itself is weakened, thus paving the way for a new ethics to 
which we shall return in a later section. The third aspect is the notion that 
truth becomes an interpretative construct, not at any point finished, but always 
provisional. Finally, the concezione ‘retorica’ della verità (op cit., 26) means that 
being is being experienced as something transmitted. While in the introduction 
Rovatti and Vattimo primarily use the word ‘being’, Vattimo – in his own 
contribution – more often uses the word ‘truth’. 
The 1983 texts make clear a lot of what il pensiero debole means. It also leaves 
some questions unanswered, which, in other works, get more attention. One 
of those questions is the nature of ‘the end of metaphysics’ itself. The texts 
consider metaphysical thought violent, but why bother in the first place? If 
it is right, we can feel uneasy about it, but then it is just the way it is. Talking 
about overcoming metaphysics presupposes the idea that there is a possibility 
to do so, that there is a possibility to become post-metaphysical, to become 
post-modern (in The End of Modernity, modernity is used as a substitute for 
metaphysics). The next section (3.3.3) is dedicated to what it means that 
Vattimo’s thought is postmodern.
81  Krämmer emphasizes exactly this side of the ‘crisis’ of modernity by means of the ‘Ablösung 
der Newtonschen durch die modernen Physik.’ (2010, 6)
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 A concept never mentioned in the 1983 texts, but very dominant in others is 
nihilism. As we shall see, the concept of nihilism is the very consequence of the 
end of metaphysics, and in later texts, constitutive − if we may use this term – 
for hermeneutic ontology. Weak thought is closely linked to this ontology and 
hence to nihilism. It is something that can only be stated if one presupposes 
nihilism. In the next section, this concept of nihilism will get special attention, 
as will the difference between nihilism and relativism.
 A third item left unattended, are the consequences of weak thought. Vattimo 
leaves an open end to his 1983 text, preparare (…) una umanità ultrametafisica 
(Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought, 28). What does that mean, mankind 
becoming ultra metaphysical? Is this some prophecy about a mankind of 
tomorrow? Does it have something to do with the Nietzschean Übermensch, a 
concept that receives much attention in other works? How can it be related to 
Vattimo’s later turn towards religion (section 3.3.4)? How do these ideas work 
out in his later political writings (section 3.3.5)? Vattimo has a tendency to end 
his texts with open ends, visionary phrases that leave much room for further 
reflection. Krämmer (2010, 24 – 27) dedicates an entire section to the style of 
Vattimo and calls it playful and encircling, rather than precise. This can arouse 
criticism but at the same time shows his essayistic style. Vattimo constantly 
searches for suitable concepts that are at the same time consistent with his 
conception of l’oltreuomo, the one of good spirit. This concept will be elaborated 
further in section 3.3.6.
3.3.3  OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS, 
VATTIMO AS REPRESENTATIVE OF 
POSTMODERNISM
Gianni Vattimo is a representative of postmodern philosophy. Although Weiss (2006, 22) prefers to use the term postmetaphysics, Vattimo uses both 
terms (e.g. postmetaphysics in Weak Thought and postmodern in both The End 
of Modernity and The Transparent Society); they are treated as synonyms in his 
work. In fact, in the eyes of Vattimo hermeneutics, in its nihilistic appearance is 
always postmetaphysical and postmodern. As Grondin states, it is Vattimo who 
stresses the nihilist elements of Gadamer’s hermeneutics (2007, already quoted 
in the introduction). This is what distinguishes Vattimo from Habermas and 
Apel.
 In general, ‘postmodern’ can refer to a great variety of phenomena, in a wide 
array of contexts. The word has been inflationär gebraucht (used ‘inflationary’, 
Welsch 2008, 1). It successively appeared in literature, architecture, painting, 
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sociology and philosophy. According to Welsch, the ‘virus’ spread to all aspects 
of society. He mentions books on postmodern theology, postmodern travel and 
many more, and also in management sciences a still growing collection of titles 
somehow is connected to ‘postmodernism’ (e.g. Postmodernism and Organizations 
by Hassard and Parker (eds.) and Organization Theory and Postmodern Thought by 
Linstead (ed.)). ‘Postmodern’ became a fashionable adjective, and perhaps that is 
why some become annoyed when the ‘p-word’ is used nowadays (Welsch 2008, 
1). However, the inflationary use of ‘postmodern’ does not necessarily mean 
that it has become obsolete, that one should stop using it. Because the word is 
used in so many different contexts one should define accurately what is meant 
by ‘postmodern’ in this or that specific situation. Even within the philosophical 
domain there are differences in what aspects of postmodernity are emphasized, 
as Welsch (2008, chapter V) illustrates. Vattimo acknowledges this, and on many 
occasions he reflects upon what it means to be postmodern. In this section I 
shall summarize these reflections along two important lines:
1. Postmodern thought is a reflection upon a condition, a societal and 
cultural state of affairs that can be indicated with one word: nihilistic. 
2. Postmodern thought is a reflection upon modernity, postmetaphysical 
thought reflects upon metaphysics. Postmodern philosophers have 
to make clear what ‘post’ exactly means. Vattimo does this by means 
of mainly Heideggerian concepts, more specific Andenken and 
Verwindung. 
1. Nihilism: the ‘condition postmoderne’82 is a nihilistic condition
In the 1983 texts, Vattimo does not mention nihilism explicitly, but 
nevertheless nihilism is one of the main ‘foundations’ of his thought. In fact, 
weak thought cannot be fully understood without an understanding of Vattimo’s 
interpretation of nihilism83. In Della realtà (9) he refers to it as the core or 
nucleus (nocciolo) of weak thought and on many other occasions he emphasizes 
the importance of nihilism for hermeneutics. In Nihilism and Emancipation 
(2004, xxv) he calls nihilism and hermeneutics synonyms, and the title of 
the first chapter of Beyond Interpretation (Oltre l’interpretazione), called ‘The 
Nihilist Vocation of Hermeneutics’ (‘La vocazione nichilistica dell’ermeneutica’) 
emphasizes the interdependence of nihilism and hermeneutics in the 
philosophy of Gianni Vattimo. 
82  Lyotard (1979) was the first to introduce ‘postmodern’ in the philosophical debate, although 
Welsch (2008, 31), in his chapter on the genealogy of the concept, mentions earlier use of the 
word. Welsch states that Lyotard for the first time really conceptualizes postmodernism. I think 
that condition postmoderne, postmodernism as a certain state of affairs, perfectly describes what 
postmodernism really is: a societal condition. This will be the content of the third part of this section
83  Mattia (2002, 15): ‘Non si può seguire l’itinerario filosofico di Vattimo (...) se non si parte dallo 
studio della questione del nichilismo.’ [One cannot follow the philosophical journey of Vattimo (...) 
if one does not start with the study of the question of nihilism.]
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 What does this concept – nihilism – mean? For an answer to this question 
one needs to turn especially towards Vattimo’s interpretation of the work of 
Friedrich Nietzsche while in the next section the emphasis shifts more towards 
his interpretation of Heidegger. The nihilist condition will be analysed in a few 
steps:
1. Definition: with the help of two important Nietzschean texts (from 
the Nachlass and Der Fröhliche Wissenschaft), the first part of this 
section focuses on the definition of nihilism.
2. Hermeneutics and nihilism: two other quotations from Nietzsche 
(Nachlass and Twilight of the Gods) are the backbone of this part, 
elaborating the interdependence of hermeneutics and nihilism.
3. Nihilism as ‘condition’.
4. Nihilism≠relativism.
  
1. Definition: In Dialogo con Nietzsche (33) Vattimo refers to a late text by 
Nietzsche (autumn 1888) where the latter defines the different aspects of what 
nihilism implies:
1. The liberation from Christianity: the antichrist.
2. The liberation from morale: the immoralist.
3. The liberation from ‘truth’: the free spirit.
4. The liberation from nihilism84.
Liberation of values and even of nihilism itself. That is, of passive nihilism. 
In Dialogo con Nietzsche (195 – 204) a distinction is made between active 
and passive nihilism, again based upon a text by Nietzsche85. The passive 
appearance of nihilism is the recognition of a certain state of affairs in western 
(European) culture that may be called ‘nihilistic’. For Nietzsche nihilism is the 
inevitable destiny of European culture. Active nihilism is characterised by the 
capability of someone to cope with this awareness. Later in this section, I shall 
return to this active nihilism.
 The awareness of nihilism is expressed in the famous 125th aphorism in Der 
Fröhliche Wissenschaft, about the death of God: ‘How were we able to drink up 
the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we 
do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? Whither 
do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, 
sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not 
84 Nachlass VIII.3 22 [24]: 
I Die Erlösung vom Christenthum: der Antichrist.
II von der Moral: der Immoralist.
III von der ‘Wahrheit’: der freie Geist.
IV vom Nihilismus: Der Nihilismus als die nothwendige Folge von Christenthum, Moral und 
Wahrheitsbegriph der Philosophie. 
85  In Il soggetto e la maschera Vattimo uses a distiction between positive and negative nihilism.
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stray, as through infinite nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? Has 
it not become colder? Does not night come on continually, darker and darker? Shall 
we not have to light lanterns in the morning?’86
The death of God is not a decision, but an observation with grim 
consequences. It contains desperate questions of someone who does not see 
possibilities to deal with this new situation. Vattimo refers to this text regularly 
and by means of it he illustrates the demolition of (Christian) religious truths. 
This demolition as such does not necessarily imply liberation. On the contrary, 
one is confronted again with the same basic fears that were mentioned in 
section 3.3.1 and that are the very roots of metaphysics.
‘Nietzsche is not trying to say that God is dead because we have finally 
realized that ‘objectively he does not exist’ or that reality is such that he is 
excluded from it’ (Beyond Interpretation (Oltre l’interpretazione, OI), 6 (English 
translation))87. That would again be a metaphysical statement. Vattimo 
argues that Nietzsche means that God is ‘no longer necessary’88 (OI, 7, English 
translation), that it means the ‘dissolution of truth as incontrovertible and 
‘objective’ clearness’ (OI, 14)89. In The End of Modernity (21) the death of God 
is interpreted as the disappearance, the devaluation of the highest values, 
symbolized by God. Nihilism is, in this way interpreted as the awareness of a 
lack of any foundation. No highest value, or first principle. In other words (The 
End of Modernity, 21) he states that ‘it is where rhetoric completely replaces 
logic’90. Not Socrates, but the sophists prevail at last, which brings me to the 
second part of this section. 
86  ‚Wie vermöchten wir das Meer auszutrinken? Wer gab uns den Schwamm, um die ganzen 
Horizont wegzuwischen? Was taten wir, als diese Erde von ihrer Sonne losketteten? Wohin bewegt 
sie sich nun? Wohin bewegen wir uns? Fort von allen Sonnen? Stürzen wir nicht fortwährend? 
Und rückwärts, seitwärts, vorwärts, nach allen Seiten? Gibt er noch ein Oben und ein Unten? Irren 
wir nicht wie durch ein unendliches Nichts? Haucht uns nicht den leere Raum an? Ist es nicht 
kälter geworden? Kommt nicht immerfort die Nacht und mehr Nacht? Müssen nicht Lanternen am 
Vormittage angezündet werden?‘
87  ‘Nietzsche non intende dire che Dio è morto perché ci siamo finalmente accorti che 
‘oggettivamente non esiste’, che la realtà è fatta in modo da escluderlo’ (OI, 10, Italian original).
88  ‘Dio non è più necessario’ (OI, 10). In the text on European nihilism from the Nachlass VIII.1 
5 [71], this lack of necessity is made explicit. Man no longer needs the disciplinary instruments of 
religion, hence they may be weakened [Nietzsche indeed uses the word Ermäβigung! JdZ]. 
89  ‘(...) la morte di Dio, cioè (...) la dissoluzione della verità come evidenza perentoria e ‘oggetiva’’ 
(OI, 19).
90  ‘(...) la retorica sostituisce completamente la logica’ (The End of Modernity (La fine della 
modernità) It., 29).
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2. Hermeneutics and nihilism: The rhetoric turn is emphasized by another text 
Vattimo often uses, about there being no facts, just interpretations91. ‘Why, and 
in what way, should hermeneutics result in an ontology explicitly nihilistic?’ 
[Della Realtà, 25, own translation]92. This question is answered by use of the 
Nachlass fragment, mentioned above. The only consistent way of thinking about 
ontology is in this fashion: nihilistic. The same theme is worked out in the first 
part of The End of Modernity, with the title ‘nihilism as destiny’. Then it is also 
linked to another important concept, discussed also in The Transparent Society 
and Nihilism and Emancipation: emancipation. I shall return to that in section 
3.3.5. 
 Nihilism means, in Vattimo’s vocabulary, that Being is weakened. The idea 
that there are no facts, only interpretations, weakens the strength of ontology, 
not referring to Being as something, a stable entity. We continuously interpret, 
discuss, describe and that is how Being gives itself: in language93. The Turin 
philosopher clearly places his thought in the line of Heidegger and Gadamer, 
who represent what in the introduction was called ‘the hermeneutic turn’ 
in philosophy. Vattimo, more than his predecessors, addresses the nihilist 
condition of hermeneutics; this is the nature of what in 1983 was called 
hermeneutic ontology.  
 With ‘the death of God’ and ‘there are no facts, only interpretations’, we have 
two important building blocks of Vattimo’s argument. A final one may not fail. 
In Nihilism and Emancipation (p. xxv) it is stated clearly: ‘I interpret nihilism in 
the sense first given it by Nietzsche: the dissolution of any ultimate foundation, 
the understanding that is the history of philosophy, and of western culture in 
general. ‘God is dead’, and ‘the real world has become a fable’94. 
 The text on the fabling of the world clearly fascinates Vattimo95. He literally 
quotes it several times (Il soggetto e la maschera, 192; Dialogo con Nietzsche, 
47/48; Introduzione a Nietzsche, 81/82) and refers to it time and time again (e.g. 
Etica dell’interpretazione, 131, 145; The transparent society, 14 (Italian edition); 
Della realtà, 28; The End of Modernity, 38 (Italian edition); The Adventure of 
Difference, 105 (Italian edition); Addio alla verità, 20/21). The world of Platonic 
91  Nachlass, VIII.1 1[115 and 120]: ‘Der interpretativen Charakter alles Geschehens. Es 
giebt kein Ereigniss an sich. Was geschieht, ist eine Gruppe von Erscheinungen augelesen und 
zusammengefasst von einem interpretierenden Wesen‘ and ‚derselbige Text erleubt unzählige 
Auslegungen: es giebt keine ‚richtige‘ Auslegung.‘
Nachlass, VIII.1 7 [60]: ‚Gegen den Positivismus (...) würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Tatsachen giebt es 
nicht, nur Interpretationen.‘ 
92  ‘Perché, e in che senso, l’ermeneutica deve sfociare in una ontologia esplicitamente 
nichilistica?’ (Della realtà, 25). 
93  ‘Essere si dà a noi nel colloquio, nel linguaggio’ (Non essere Dio, 6, cfr. 3.3.2).
94  Götzendämmerung (99 - 100): ‚Wie die ‚wahre Welt‘ endlich zu Fabel wurde.‘
95  Krämmer (2010, 83): ‘einen, wenn nicht (...) den zentralen Text hinsichtlicht Vattimos 
Nietzsche-Interpretation.’ [one, if not the central text concerning Vattimo’s interpretation of 
Nietzsche].
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ideas, the dogmas of Christianity, the theories of science have are all unmasked 
as fables. Again this can be interpreted in a passive or reactive way, but the end 
of the fragment turns towards active nihilism, for the acknowledgement of the 
fabling of the world opens endless possibilities, room for new interpretations. 
The fragment ends dramatically: ‘INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA’. 
Zarathustra enters the stage. For Vattimo, Zarathustra represents the prophet 
of creative freedom, or better still, the prophet who re-discovers freedom, 
that already was present in language (‘language in its original form is the 
‘sfera liberamente poetante e creatrice’, Dialogo con Nietzsche, 49). Vattimo 
builds upon the idea of the development of language that we can find in Über 
Wahrheit und Lüge im auβermoralischen Sinne by Nietzsche; concepts have 
developed from metaphors into ‘really’ true: truths have become illusions96. 
In section 3.3.6 there is more attention for the interpretation of Zarathustra. 
In Dialogo con Nietzsche (200) Vattimo asks whether this active nihilism is not 
again a return to metaphysics. Is this person, liberated from metaphysics not 
again metaphysical, like the Nazis interpreted the Übermensch? I shall also 
return to this question later.
 In The Transparent Society (14) and Beyond Interpretation (131, 145), the 
fabling of the real world is related to mass media. Especially these media 
offer endless opportunities for expression, for creation of ‘fables’. For Vattimo, 
these technologies are interpreted in a very optimistic way, as a possibility for 
emancipation. This moves beyond the somewhat pessimist view of technology 
Heidegger proclaimed. In what Vattimo calls accomplished nihilism, even 
technology has become a fable and even offers ‘our only possibility for freedom’ 
(The End of Modernity, 29)97. 
3. Nihilism as ‘condition’: Following Lyotard, one is allowed to say that also 
Vattimo considers postmodernism to be a certain (societal) state of affairs.  
If we are to believe the back cover of the English translation of La società 
trasparente Lyotard called this work ‘a major contribution to the debate on the 
postmodern condition’. It is in this work that we shall search for some specific 
elements of this contribution… 
 In the very first section of The Transparent Society (ST, 7), Vattimo makes 
clear what he thinks is distinctive of postmodernity: it is the society dominated 
96  Über Wahrheit und Lüge (611): ‚Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, 
Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch 
und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem Gebrauch einem 
Volke fest, kanonisch und Verbindlich dünken: die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man 
vergessen hat, daβ sie welche sind, Metaphern, die ihr abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden 
sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen, in Betracht 
kommen.‘
97  Accomplished nihilism, in the italian original ‘nichilismo compiuto’ is ‘la nostra unica 
possibilità di libertà’ (The End of Modernity, 38).
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by mass media. The nihilist condition always is a technological condition. 
Postmodernism is also a philosophy of technology and science. It reflects on 
what it is like to live in a society, dominated by technology and science. It is 
the situation Heidegger describes as Ge-Stell. This, in terms of Vattimo means 
a society dominated, not anymore by mechanical technology (like it was in 
the days of Heidegger and Adorno), but by information and communication 
technology. 
Vattimo considers the development of mass media to be a precondition 
for the dissolution of the ‘grands recits’ (ST, 12). Here, he moves away from 
the pessimist views of, for example, Horkheimer and Adorno, with their idea 
of a further totalisation of society by means of mass media. Horkheimer and 
Adorno fear something of a 1984 scenario. On the contrary, Vattimo develops 
an optimistic analysis of the ‘transparent society’, with mass media as a means, 
or – better still – the means by which different and small narratives can get 
a platform. The possibilities for small narratives to articulate themselves 
make society more chaotic, but it is exactly in this chaos that our hopes for 
emancipation lie (ST, 11)98. 
 The nihilist condition offers possibilities for emancipation, for freedom. 
It shows that Vattimo does not want to finish with passive nihilism. His 
philosophy breathes optimism and hope for a future, less dominated by strong 
thought. This immediately shows a difficulty in the conception of a nihilist 
condition: even accomplished nihilism is not accomplished in a definitive way. 
The condition is not something that comes instead of a modern condition. As 
Vattimo shows in later works, like Addio alla verità, strong thought is very much 
alive and kicking. The nihilist condition rather appears to be a possibility in a 
still very metaphysical world. A possibility waiting to be discovered.
4. Nihilism ≠ relativism: What is especially interesting in Oltre l’interpretazione, 
La societa trasparente and Della Realtà is the following question, a question 
that has been asked several times earlier in this enquiry: if there is no such 
thing as a real world, if there are no facts, if God is dead, is not everything 
permitted? For many authors, both in the field of CSR as in philosophy in 
general think that there is a necessary connection between nihilism and 
relativism. Especially the advocates of Nuovo realismo (New Realism) argue that 
nihilism is relativist thought and therefore in itself contradictory. Ferraris (2012, 
XI) argues that postmodern thought that only searches to deconstruct without 
reconstruction is irresponsible and thus adds a moral dimension to the critique 
of postmodernism.  
 Even in Vattimo’s own reading of l’oltreuomo one could suspect the 
connection between nihilism and relativism: l’oltreuomo with his capacity to 
98  ‘che proprio in questo relativo ‘caos’ risiedono le nostre speranze di emancipazione’ (ST, 11).
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create values of his own, freed from religious dogmas, freed from morale, and 
finally also from truth. Anything goes? Does this idea from Feyerabend apply to 
nihilism as well?
 Dostoyevsky’s question, ‘if God is dead, then everything is permitted’ is the 
simplest of logical constructions, a modus ponens (if A, then B). In Della realtà 
(30) Vattimo calls this an argument ad hominem, although I would prefer to call 
it a false dilemma: there seems to exist no other conclusion after assuring that 
A is the case.
 In La società trasparente (112) Vattimo writes: ‘it is not true that in the 
world of interpretations, liberated from all foundationalism ‘anything goes’, 
according to the motto of Feyerabend (...) But if not ‘anything goes’, why?’99; 
and in La fine della modernità (29) he writes that ‘for Nietzsche also values 
have not disappeared tout court: only the highest values (...) have vanished.’100 
Strangely enough Vattimo does not give a straightforward answer, but reflects 
upon the consequences of economic realism compared to the ‘estheticization’ 
(estitizzazione) of the world. In later works he again reflects upon this, especially 
during the economic crisis, where democratic values are sometimes put aside 
for technocratic ones and economic institutions seem to have taken over 
politics (e.g. the IMF, national and European central banks, not democratically 
elected persons like Mario Monti and Herman van Rompuy). In Addio alla verità 
he also mentions the war against terrorism. Nihilism – hermeneutics – seems 
to provide with a more friendly (in section 3.3.2 the word amichevole was used) 
alternative for metaphysics.
 Vattimo thus confronts the grim (but never proven right) logic of 
Dostoyevsky with the (fully accepted) logic of realism, with its a-moral 
economic laws and the countless victims of the wars fought to impose western 
democratic values upon others, that is, if there are sufficient reasons to do 
so (oil, terrorist threat), with the main superpower still not accepting the 
international court of law in The Hague. 
 In Etica dell’interpretazione (136) Vattimo again addresses the problem of the 
possibility of hermeneutic, nihilist ethics. This time he sums up two things: 1) 
an ethics of good (virtues) and 2) a Nietzschean fragment on European nihilism 
of the Nachlass, where the virtue of moderateness is introduced101. Here we 
99  The original text: ‘Non è vero che nel mondo delle interpretazioni liberate da ogni fondazione 
realistico ‘tutto va’, secondo il motto di Feyerabend (...) Ma se non ‘tutto va’, perché?’
100  ‘Anche per Nietzsche non sono spariti i valori tout court, ma i valori supremi’ (The End of 
Modernity, 29). Mattia (2002, 28) writes about an ‘apertura di una nuova eticità’, when he treats this 
passage, an openness for new ethics. Like on the pages before, focus is on possibilities rather than 
on problems.
101  Nachlass VIII.1 5 [71]: ‚Welche werden sich die Stärksten dabei erwissen? Die Mäβigsten, 
die welche keine extremen Glaubenssätze nöthig haben (...) die welche vom Menschen mit einer 
bedeuntenden Ermäβigung seines Werthes denken können, ohne dadurch klein und schwach zu 
werden.‘
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meet the real oltreuomo, freed from nihilism itself. The concept of moderateness 
returns a few times in the works of Vattimo and will be discussed in the section 
on the postmodern subject.
 Still Vattimo refuses to give a straightforward answer to the question why 
not everything is allowed after the death of God. Umberto Eco addressed 
the problem of ‘nihilism, not relativism’ in more general terms during the 
Maimonides lecture, given at the 23rd World Congress of Philosophy in Athens, 
august 2013. He illustrated why the argument of the New Realists, mentioned 
above, is not valid: although nihilism opens the possibility of all kinds of 
opinions, it does not say that all opinions are of equal quality. 
 Eco turns around the argument of the New Realists, that also nihilists use 
modern technology like planes and medicine: being a nihilist does not mean 
that one is stupid. Vattimo does never deny technology and modernism. He even 
is very explicit about that, because that would imply a metaphysical position 
again, against technology. He fully accepts modernity, but claims that this is 
not the whole story. To explain this, Vattimo time and time again refers to the 
Heideggerian concept of Verwindung, which will be the subject of a separate 
section hereafter.
 Guarino (2009) pays explicit attention to the ‘accusation’ of relativism and 
also argues that Vattimo may not be mistaken for a relativist: ‘Rationality does 
not become paralyzed by the loss of Cartesian foundations’ (2009, 34). He 
acknowledges immediately that ‘Vattimo’s attempt to offer criteria for adequacy 
in resolving interpretative conflict is a thin area of his thought’ (2009, 34), which 
cannot be strange, because the very idea of weak thought is very cautious as far 
as claiming to be right is concerned.
 Vattimo observes a world where no ultimate foundation for truth exists. In my 
own town I can go to a variety of Roman Catholic or protestant churches, choose 
from two mosques and even a Buddhist temple. I can also choose not to go at all, 
without being burned at the stake. None of the examples can claim objectively to 
tell ‘the’ truth. Even science cannot do such a thing, certainly if we take Popper’s 
concept of falsification or Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions seriously. This 
state of affairs is passive nihilism. The person capable of creatively coping with 
this situation of insecurity, capable of active nihilism, is the oltreuomo Vattimo 
speaks of. In section 3.3.6, this Vattimian interpretation of Nietzsche’s Übermensch 
will receive special attention. First, however, the second part of this section 
follows, on postmodern philosophy as reflection on modern thought.
2. Postmodern thought as reflection on modernity
Postmodern thought perceived as a constructive philosophy that tries to cope 
with the nihilist condition is just one side of the medal. Post-modern thought 
also implies a reflection upon, perhaps even a continuation of what it means to 
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be modern: what does it mean, modern thought? And what is wrong with it? On 
several occasions, Vattimo explicitly performs such analyses and in this section, 
this reactive aspect of postmodernity towards modernity is elaborated, as well 
as the not-metaphysical attitude towards modernity. 
1. How does Vattimo perceive modernity? 
Postmodernism, or postmetaphysics, is by its very definition tightly linked 
to modernism (metaphysics) itself. The postmodern can only exist because 
of the modern and is a reflection upon the modern. In the works of Vattimo 
this reflection is often manifest. In section 3.3.2, the word ultrametafisica was 
quoted. That word shows how Vattimo experiments with concepts. He uses all 
kinds of words to indicate metaphysics (modernity, humanism, Enlightenment) 
and he uses different words to explore his relation towards metaphysics 
(the title of The End of Modernity hints at an epochal approach, while ultra-
metaphysics, as does the concept of Verwindung, shows his more ambiguous 
attitude towards modernism). Anyway, to elaborate his own postmodern 
position, Vattimo often reflects on what he considers to be modern thought. 
Weiss (2006, 23) summarizes this reflection using four elements, four critical 
reflections on metaphysics:
1. Metaphysics as fundamentalism;
2. Metaphysics as belief in progress;
3. Metaphysics as totalitarianism;
4. Metaphysics as objectification.
1) Modernism, according to Vattimo has an inclination to Truth. In The 
Adventure of Difference (AD), one is confronted with what Vattimo sees 
as the ultimate consequences of Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thought: 
the liberation from or even destruction of Platonic hierarchies (AD, 
3)102. What Platonism tried to do is summarized in ‘the reduction 
of everything to a single principle’ (AD, 2)103. This belief in a single 
principle, a foundation, ‘immediately creates hierarchies and ascesis’ 
(AD, 2)104. 
  Nietzsche invented the concepts of the death of God and the 
Übermensch to give voice to his conviction that Platonism separated 
102  The Italian original speaks about ‘la liberazione del pensiero per la molteplicità attraverso 
un rovesciamento delle gerarchie platoniche, in cui si prende finalmente atto che Dio è morto?‘ (AD, 
7) [the liberation of thinking for multiplicity through a destruction of Platonic hierarchies, which 
finally brings the realization that God is dead].
103  The Italian original (AD, 6): ‘la riduzione di tutto a un unico principio’.
104  The Italian original says ‘il quale impone immediatemente gerarchie e ascesi’, which is 
actually stronger that the English translation. Imporre means to impose, to force upon, rather than 
create. The Italian text even more emphasises the violent character of the Platonic hierarchies.
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theory from practice (AD, 2) and proposed a way to reunite them. 
In this passage of AD we encounter the consequence of platonic 
thought: the separation of theory and practice. The reductive force 
of platonic hierarchies (reduction to single principles) creates 
abstractions that act like a wedge in human existence. Abstractions 
are by definition inadequate to do right to the plurality of everyday 
experience.
  Although God is dead, modernism did not get rid of the belief 
in absolute truth. On the contrary, modernism replaced religious 
metaphysics by scientific metaphysics, which Jaspers calls 
Wissenschaftliches Aberglaube (for example in 1962). One example of 
this foundationalism is the way the West imposes democratic values 
on other cultures. This happens using undemocratic methods and is 
accompanied by a lot of violence (e.g. AV, 19105). Another example is 
the absolute value of the economic system. In general, the capitalist 
system as such seems to have an almost religious status, as Walter 
Benjamin argues in Capitalism as Religion and calls capitalism ‘the 
religion of modernity’ (Benjamin, quoted in Agamben 2015, 78). More 
specific – and that is what Vattimo aims at (cfr. section 3.2.5) – is 
the financial system as it developed in the European Union that 
has gained such an absolute status. Even though economists do not 
agree on what is best to save an economy in trouble, the rules of the 
game that are imposed upon economies in crisis seem beyond doubt. 
The construction – the monetary union with (contingent) rules once 
agreed upon – has become strong thought, a rigid foundation.
2)  Belief in progress is another essential characteristic of modernism. 
In The Transparent Society (7 – 8) Vattimo argues that being modern 
is normative for modernism. The new, the novel, is supposed to 
be better than the existing. Of course, Vattimo is not unique with 
this idea. Hans Jonas, for example, strongly criticizes this strive for 
progression, more specific the optimism of technicians, and founds 
his future oriented ethics upon this criticism. They both refer to 
Ernst Bloch’s philosophy to indicate the utopian character of modern 
thought106.
  Progress, certainly when it has a normative character, is again 
typically metaphysical. The death of God did not make people cease 
105  Addio alla verità contains several references to the ‘war against terrorism’; at this specific 
place it says: ‘la guerra anglo-americana contro l’Iraq in nome della “vera” democrazia.’  The 
brackets are original, and refer to the one principle.
106  Ernst Bloch (1885 – 1977) definately is not anti-utopian. His Geist der Utopie (Spirit of Utopia, 
first published in 1918) is a reflection upon the grim reality of World-War I. Immediately in the 
preface of the book, the author desperately stretches out for a new future: ‘incipit vita nova’.
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to believe in some kind of paradise that might be found not so much 
in heaven as here on earth, or perhaps even on another planet. In 
the chapter on CSR, a few examples were mentioned as well: the 
imperative character of sustainability literature and the idea that we 
can design ourselves away from ecological disaster and the positive 
role corporations can play in the transition towards a sustainable 
economy.
  The progress modernity believes in is both a progress in 
technology as it is in thought. Talking about ‘primitive’ societies and 
advanced ones is typical for this modernist way of thinking. When 
people say that Islamic countries need an enlightenment, like ‘we’ 
have had, it also reflects an idea of progress from an inferior toward a 
superior civilisation. 
  Postmodern thought reflects on this ideal of progress. Why do we 
consider one society to be more advanced than others? When we try 
to preserve certain characteristics and traditions, are we not revaluing 
the ‘primitive’? For example, consider the attention linguistics has for 
dialects and regional languages and the attempts that are made to 
preserve them. Years ago, education focussed on banning such local 
differences and educate students the ‘proper’ language. Identities of 
local communities are not necessarily considered to be an indication 
of a lack of civilization anymore.
3) The totalitarian character of metaphysics was already (partly) 
subject of section 3.3.1, where metaphysics was introduced as a 
force of suppression. Weiss (2006, 27) refers to Adorno when he 
analyses the totalitarian aspect of metaphysics. Vattimo regularly 
refers to Adorno and Horkheimer, more in particular to their fear 
of ‘total organization’107.  Modern society, according to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, has a tendency towards control, and they fear society will 
develop into an Orwellian society, with Big-Brother-like systems that 
will control every aspect of the lives of its members.
  The will to control – Herrschaftsdenken – is an aspect of 
metaphysics that is especially interesting for management scholars 
and practitioners, and CSR scholars and practitioners. Is not ‘being 
in control’ an important aspect of management? Is this aspect of 
metaphysics an implicit criticism of management? Is there something 
wrong with ‘control’? If postmodern thought were anti-metaphysical, 
the answer to these questions would be simple: being in control is a 
107  Organizazzione totale: e.g. Il soggetto e la maschera (e.g. 53 and 369), The Transparent Society 
(59), and Addio alla verità (65, 149).
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threat to freedom. The totalitarian aspect of metaphysics would be 
simply threatening. However, such simplicity would not do justice to 
the nuances of postmodern thought.
  Postmodern thought appreciates society in its complexity: 
scientific and economic developments have brought wealth and 
wellbeing to many (at least in the developed countries). At the same 
time millions were killed during the twentieth century in the name of 
ideologies. In large parts of the world people are still suffering from 
poverty and live under appalling conditions (at least partly) due to 
the dark side of capitalism. 
  The two sides of metaphysics – a productive side that has brought 
wealth and great scientific achievements and a destructive side of 
the possibility to crush individuals by the millions – cause a sense 
of ambiguity. It is this ambiguity that characterizes postmodern 
thought. It dares to be critical towards one-sided enthusiasm about 
science and economics. The ‘religious’ belief in science and free-
market economy gives room for the totalitarian aspect of metaphysics 
to manifest. If no one criticizes the tendency towards total control, 
total control can actually develop. Vattimo tries to think a philosophy 
that offers both awareness of and an escape from this totalitarian 
tendency.
4)  The tendency of metaphysics towards objectification is, according 
to Weiss, the tendency of understanding everything as a Seiendes. 
So everything is made an object, even being itself. Weiss relates this 
to the Will to power, interpreted in a Heideggerian way: the urge 
to rule nature, instead of being ruled by nature. In section 3.3.1 the 
origins of metaphysics were supposedly found in early human history, 
characterised by uncertainty and fear. As a means for survival in a 
hostile environment metaphysics developed, out of a spirit of revenge 
(Nietzsche) towards the hostility of nature.
  An illustration of how Heidegger perceives objectification was 
already introduced in section 1.1, in the example of the river Rhine, 
elaborated in The Question Concerning Technology. He uses the 
concept Bestand to analyse what has happened with the river. The 
river Rhine has become a source of energy, a part of a logistical 
network, an part of tourist industry. The river has become stock 
(standing-reserve), but according to Heidegger, this concept – of 
stock – has a more profound meaning than the narrow meaning that 
it has in economics. When nature becomes stock (standing-reserve), 
it means that it becomes domesticated, that it is deprived of its 
mythical hostility. 
115
  Objectification, conceived as in the example of the river Rhine, 
is not just an innocent use of natural resources. It is the ultimate 
submission of nature by mankind. It is an attempt to demystify nature 
in order to domesticate it. When domesticated, the risks of nature 
become manageable. 
  When nature becomes manageable, it becomes tradable as well. 
May this aspect of metaphysics be linked to the question whether all 
things are potentially subject to transaction? If – again referring to 
Benjamin – capitalism is the religion of modernity, is objectivation 
of nature not a necessary precondition to make this religion work? 
Objectification of everything implies that things can be measured, can 
be quantified and that means that things can be traded. In the recent 
encyclical, Laudato si, Pope Francis addresses the problem (section 30) 
of water scarcity: may we leave the worlds water supplies to the free 
market, or (as Francis argues) is access to water a basic human right, 
with practical consequences not yet elaborated in the encyclical. 
Postmodernism consists of (critical) reflections upon modernism. Vattimo is 
no exception to that, and on many occasions he critically analyses modernism. 
Weiss summarizes these analyses in four elements, which were subject of this 
section. These elements are numbered, but that does not indicate a certain 
order or causal relationship. The four aspects are more like facets, which could 
easily be described in a different order. 
 At this moment I would like to return to the second chapter for a moment 
and, instead of general examples make a connection between the analysis of 
metaphysics and section 2.4.2, the section where Frederick and Friedman were 
discussed. Frederick’s critique of CSR1 illustrates in what way the tool-oriented 
approach of CSR is intrinsically metaphysical. Friedman’s argument especially 
illustrates the utopian character of his economic doctrine.
 The criticism of CSR1 and the characteristics of CSR2 contain all four 
elements of metaphysics. When Frederick states that the content of CSR is 
vague and that the moral underpinnings of CSR are neither clear nor agreed 
upon, he in fact laments the lack of a foundation. The concept of CSR is not 
clear and the lack of agreement hints at a lack of one truth in CSR. There 
apparently is a need for one CSR. Empirical research into business-and-society 
issues makes is possible to objectify CSR and it creates the preconditions 
for progress, for ‘problems to be solved’. The need for operational tools, 
techniques and organizational structures illustrates the totalitarian desire for 
control. However, does this make CSR potentially violent? Are the examples 
of (fundamentalist) religions not of a completely different nature? These 
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questions will be fully elaborated in the next chapter. The purpose of these 
paragraphs is to illustrate the four aspects of metaphysics along an example 
taken from the former chapter.
 In the same section Friedman was discussed as well. Especially his opinions 
about the free society are interesting in the light of this section. The idea (or 
belief) that competition is a necessary precondition for a free society is without 
doubt a sign of strong thought. Especially interesting is the change of scale: 
free competition is an economic concept, while freedom seems to apply to 
society as a whole. Competition is not just convenient for the economic sphere, 
it is believed to be a necessity for a free society108. 
Friedman’s economical doctrine is strong thought for another reason. 
It is not just a belief, a personal preference of how society should be 
organized. It is also a thought that excludes other opinions. The phrase, 
quoted in section 2.4.2, that CSR is a ‘fundamentally subversive doctrine’ 
suggests a dilemma: it is either competition or a market where CSR 
has its function. Friedman believes in one truth and cannot imagine an 
alternative. 
To recapitulate, Vattimo as a postmodern philosopher is critical about 
modernism and acknowledges four forces that have ambiguous consequences. 
Modern thought tends to underestimate the negative, threatening sides of 
these forces. Vattimo does not only analyse the grim side of modernism, he 
also thinks that modernity has reached a moment of crisis. This idea of crisis is 
subject of the next section.
2. The crisis of modernity? 
Weak thought started with a passage on the crisis of rationality (in Italy). Also 
in The End of Modernity a full chapter is dedicated to this crisis: the crisis 
of humanism. Vattimo uses humanism where he elsewhere uses modernity 
or Enlightenment. He always means the same: thought that has overcome 
religious metaphysics, but which in itself remains metaphysical. When we 
say that God is dead, this does not mean that religious truths diminish, but 
all foundationalism. In humanism this foundation is the subject, or rather, the 
subject-object.
 The ‘crisis’ reveals itself in two ways, the first of which is a more or less 
positive one, starting with Nietzsche. In his thought, we cannot only find 
criticism, but also a constructive, new way of thinking. After proclaiming the 
death of God, Nietzsche develops his prophecy of Zarathustra, the new man, 
108  The use of words like ‘necessity’ does not always imply strong thought: it is rather the belief 
in necessity that is criticized here. The belief that certain economic laws have 1) the same status as 
laws of physics, and 2) that they apply at society as a whole. 
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the Übermensch. This Übermensch is a constructive attempt to develop thought, 
which is fit for a future Nietzsche foresaw. To this concept of the Übermensch, I 
shall return in section 3.3.6.
 The second way the ‘crisis’ reveals itself is by modernity itself, when it 
reaches its very borders and is confronted by its own limitations, so brilliantly 
articulated by, for example, Adorno and Horkheimer. The experience of 
the violent character of modernity and its tendency for totalisation and 
dehumanisation, also analysed by Heidegger in his philosophy of technology, 
creates a need for new thought. But, just as modernity, or humanism, after 
promising emancipation from religious metaphysics, replaced this by the new 
metaphysics of science and technology, the alternatives of, for example, critical 
(Marxist) theory were metaphysical alternatives, themselves again violent. It is 
just a switch from the Grand Inquisitor to Big brother.
 New thought, if it remains faithful to platonic ontology, presupposing Being 
as a stable and unifying ‘something’, remains violent and within the realm 
of metaphysics. If we want to escape this violent thought, we must turn to 
Nietzsche and Heidegger. Vattimo repeats this time and time again. It remains 
to be seen whether Heidegger really provides us with a solution. He analyses 
the current state of affairs as something inescapable and, in the end, sighs 
that ‘only a God can save us’. Vattimo seems to be more positive about the 
possibilities when he at several occasions writes about hope: in The Transparent 
Society (11) about hope for emancipation by means of the transparent society, 
with its possibilities to escape totalisation109. In The End of Modernity (38) he 
talks about possibilities of liberty by means of ‘accomplished nihilism’. The way 
Vattimo thinks about hope and possibilities makes him a positive philosopher. 
His thoughts about emancipation and liberation are elaborated elsewhere. 
 Postmodern thought or nihilist hermeneutics offers an alternative for the 
violence of metaphysics, although this is not easy: the examples of Addio alla 
verità and Hermeneutic Communism show how strong violent thought is rooted 
in our culture. Recent developments in Ukraine also show how strong the 
false dilemma is a part of our tradition (one is either pro-Russian or pro-EU). 
Vattimo’s disappointment with postmodernity shows how even one of the most 
enthusiastic advocates became a critic of his own thought.  
109  Monaco (2006, 41): ‘’dobbiamo volgerci, per il filosofo torinese, ad un cambiamento radicale 
della tecnologia: la possibilità di un oltrepassamento della metafisica è nel passagio dalla 
tecnologia del motore alla tecnologia dell’informazione e della communicazione’ [we have to 
direct, according to the turin philosopher, towards a radical change of (our view of) technology: 
the possibility of overcoming metaphysics is through the change from engine technology towards 
information and communication technology.’]
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3. A non-metaphysical attitude towards metaphysics: Verwindung. 
Although before 1983 Vattimo had already often reflected upon the end of 
metaphysics110, with il pensiero debole he seems to have found a solution for 
one of the key problems that keeps recurring throughout his work: how can 
one maintain a nihilist attitude towards metaphysics? In 1983, on at least 
two occasions, Vattimo presents the solution: the Heideggerian concept of 
Verwindung111. After this, Verwindung keeps popping up in his works regularly112 
and it proves to be a crucial element of il pensiero debole. Welsch, in the chapter 
on postmodern philosophy, even explicitly designates Verwindung to be the 
distinguishing characteristic of Vattimo’s thought (Welsch, 2008, 136). 
 A similar development, possibly connected with the introduction 
Verwindung, is the way Vattimo translates Übermensch: Stefano Azzarà, who in 
Un Nietzsche Italiano elaborates the ‘weakening’ of Vattimo own thought (from 
a revolutionary interpretation of Nietzsche in Il soggetto e la maschera, towards 
weak thought in his later works) shows that Vattimo in his earlier works uses 
superuomo and only later starts to use oltreuomo. From ‘super’ to ‘oltre’, from 
Überwindung to Verwindung: the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo itself represents 
a continuous development.
 Heidegger rarely uses the word Verwindung and certainly does not 
conceptualise it113. In Verwindung: Nihilism and the Postmodern in Philosophy, 
Vattimo mentions three occasions where one can find Verwindung (Holzwege, 
Identität und Differenz and Vorträge und Aufsätze). Indeed it is a word that 
Heidegger uses only a few times and he uses it, if at all, always rather casually. 
When Heidegger conceptualises a certain word, he reflects upon the word in his 
evocative style; with Verwindung he does no such thing at all. Only in the hands 
of Vattimo Verwindung becomes a concept, although this does not happen 
overnight.
 When Heidegger uses Verwindung, he does so in the same context as 
Vattimo: in passages about the liberation of metaphysics (Wer war Nietzsches 
Zarathustra, which follows another lecture: Überwindung der Metaphysik; both 
110  Especially Essere, storia e linguaggio in Heidegger (1963) and Il soggetto e la maschera contain 
thorough elaborations of the end of modernity.
111  At first there is the contribution to Weak Thought, but in September of the same year Vattimo 
presents a paper at a conference, that in 1987 is published in English as ‘Verwindung: Nihilism 
and the Postmodern in Philosophy’. It later became the last chapter of The End of Modernity. In The 
Adventure of Difference (126), three years earlier, the concept appears for the first time in Vattimo’s 
writings, as far as I have been able to establish, but very briefly; the more thorough reflections are 
to be found from 1983 onward.
112  E.g.: The End of Modernity, 60 and from 172 onward; the contributions to the yearbooks 
(Filosofia ’86, IX, 94; Filosofia ’87, 206 – 212, 220 – 222; Filosofia ’88, 228, 229, 241; Filosofia ’93, 
250); Addio alla verità, 127, 128; Della realtà, 113 ff.
113  Krämmer (2010, 140) verifies this as well: ‘Statt Überwindung der Metaphysik spricht 
Heidegger vereinzelt von Verwindung.’ [Heidegger rarely (vereinzelt) mentions Verwindung].
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texts deal with the material Vattimo is so fascinated by) and passages about 
technology (Identität und Differenz). In the text on Zarathustra Heidegger 
certainly uses a vocabulary that is consistent with the interpretation of Vattimo 
(e.g. Sehnsucht (yearning, nostalgia)). 
 Although Vattimo does not violate the thought of Heidegger, it might be 
justified to say that as far as the concept of Verwindung is concerned, this is a 
genuinely Vattimian concept, inspired by Heidegger, who mentions the word 
only a few times in his collected works. That the concept is not important in 
the work of Heidegger is illustrated by the fact that it is not mentioned at all 
in the studies that are dedicated to the thought of Heidegger (Essere, storia e 
linguaggio in Heidegger and Introduzione a Heidegger). In these earlier works on 
Heidegger Vattimo also discusses the end of metaphysics, but apparently he 
has not yet discovered the concept of Verwindung then. The attitude towards 
metaphysics is described by means of a vocabulary that he ceases to use in his 
later works (e.g. Schritt Zurück). 
 Verwindung never appears on its own; it is always connected to other 
concepts, with special attention to Andenken and Ge-Stell. Already in Il pensiero 
debole (20 – 22), these words appear briefly, but in other works they are more 
profoundly elaborated114. Understanding especially Verwindung is crucial for a 
right understanding of Vattimo’s philosophy.
 In the previous sections, metaphysics has been analysed as a continuous 
strive for progress. A next step is almost by definition superior to a former. 
Nietzsche’s thought, according to Vattimo (1984) is a constant attempt to 
overcome this ‘illness’ (historical malady, as Nietzsche calls it in the second of 
the Untimely Meditations), although this ‘overcoming’ can be a dangerous word. 
Was it not Nietzsche, who said that ranking is our great problem (Menschliches, 
allzu Menschliches, preface 7115) and when we are on a ladder, the top rung is 
the next problem? If hermeneutics is a next rung on a ladder or just another 
ladder, it is no different from metaphysical thought. In The End of Modernity 
the death of God is defined as the end of the era of overcoming116, or, in other 
words and in the same sentence, the end of the era of Being, thought under the 
sign of novum. So one has to abandon the idea of a next rung.
 In the analysis in the tenth chapter of The End of Modernity (and in Etica 
dell’interpretazione, 20) Vattimo briefly refers to another part of Menschliches, 
114  The End of Modernity, chapter X; Etica dell’interpretazione, chapter 1; Oltre l’interpretazione, 
chapter V; Nihilism and Emancipation, 27 – 28;   
115  ‘Gesetzt, dass es das Problem der Rangordnung ist, von dem wir sagen dürfen, dass es unser 
Problem ist (...) Hier – ein neues Problem! Hier eine lange Leiter, auf deren Sprossen wir selbst 
gesessen und gestiegen sind (...) Hier ein Höher, ein Tiefer, ein Unter-uns, Eine ungeheuere lange 
Ordnung, eine Rangordnung, die wir sehen: hier – unser Problem.’
116  ‘la fine dell’epoca del superamento, cioè dell’epoca dell’essere pensato sotto il segno del 
novum’. 
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allzu Menschliches: the last aphorism (638) of the first part that mentions 
the ‘philosophy of the morning’. In Nietzsche: An Introduction (section II.3) he 
further elaborates the philosophy of the morning. The title of aphorism 638 
is ‘the wanderer’, who wanders not ‘as a traveller to a final destination, for this 
destination does not exist.’ The wanderer has a keen eye for the world around 
him. In a similar aphorism – about the future human (Der Fröhliche Wissenschaft, 
337) it says: ‘feeling the whole past history of mankind to be his own history 
(...) burdening one’s soul with all of this – the oldest, the newest, losses, hopes, 
conquests, and the victories of humanity; if one could finally contain all this 
in one soul and crowd it in one feeling – this would surely have to produce a 
happiness that man has not yet known: the happiness of a god full of power 
and love, full of tears, and full of laughter’ (aphorism 337, quoted in Nietzsche: 
An Introduction, 79/80). In both aphorisms (638 and 337), Nietzsche plays with 
the contrast of a (preceding) day and night with the (joyful) morning. The 
wanderer travels through the days and night, even through some bad mornings, 
until finally ‘as recompense, there will come the joyful mornings of other days 
and climes, when he shall see, even before the light has broken, the Muses 
come dancing by him in the mist of the mountains, when afterwards, if he 
relaxes quietly beneath the trees in the equanimity of his soul at morning, good 
and bright things will be thrown down to him from their tops and leafy hiding-
places, the gifts of all those free spirits who are at home in mountain, wood 
and solitude and who, like him, are, in their now joyful, now thoughtful way, 
wanderers and philosophers. Born out of the mysteries of dawn, they ponder 
on how, between the tenth and the twelfth stroke of the clock, the day could 
present a face so pure, so light-filled, so cheerful and transfigured: - they seek 
the philosophy of the morning.’ 
The morning is a reward for the burden of the preceding day and night, 
relaxation after the long journey. A joy – a divine feeling – that Nietzsche in 
Der Fröhliche Wissenschaft (337) calls ‘humanity’. The tone of these aphorisms 
is highly metaphorical – which Vattimo acknowledges in Nietzsche: An 
Introduction – and perhaps that is one of the reasons he calls this philosophy of 
the morning a ‘philosophy of proximity’ (The End of Modernity, 177) For Vattimo 
these texts are important building blocks for his concept of Verwindung. The 
idea of a wanderer who wanders without a final destination, but eventually – 
and temporarily – finds this place to repose appeals to him and matches with 
his concept of Verwindung. The tone of the aphorisms also breathes interest 
in the world around, in the history of past and present, which preludes at the 
concept that will be discussed in section3.3.4: carità. Finally, Vattimo seems 
to be fascinated by the positive tone of the aphorisms, the happiness of the 
philosopher, who has nothing of ‘snarling or sullenness – those familiar tedious 
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qualities of old dogs and men who have long been kept on the leash’ (aphorism 
34, Menschliches, alzu Menschliches)117.    
In short, a postmetaphysical position is not an Überwindung of metaphysics. 
Metaphysics has not become Vergangen (Etica dell’interpretazione, 18), or – as 
Vattimo puts it in The Adventure of Difference (126) – one does not in fact step 
beyond metaphysics118, but one realizes a deepening of metaphysics (Monaco 
2006, 98). It is a peaceful ‘going on’, instead of a violent ‘doing away with’ or 
surpass. This non-epochal aspect of postmodernity has also been emphasized 
by Welsch (2008, 1): although ‘post-modern’ seems to hint at an era that follows 
the modern era, it should be interpreted in a much more nuanced way. 
 Verwindung is a condition of remembrance (Andenken), just as much 
melancholically as it is a feeling of liberation. Modernism is, in such an 
interpretation, part of postmodernism, not its counter-part. What is being 
remembered? It is the world of the Ge-Stell, the world of technology, which 
is the final appearance of metaphysics, but as Vattimo interprets Heidegger, 
also the opportunity to escape it119. ‘Thought has no other ‘object’ than the 
errances of metaphysics recalled to memory in an attitude that is neither that 
of criticism which surpasses nor that of mere acceptance’ (Verwindung: Nihilism 
and the Postmodern in Philosophy, 13).
  By asking attention for the world of science and technology (Ge-Stell), 
Heidegger encloses this area in hermeneutics. With earlier philosophers 
hermeneutics was connected specifically to Geisteswissenschaften. With 
Heidegger one also turns towards the entire cultural heritage: ‘Metaphysics 
is not only transmitted to us in the contents of the Geisteswissenschaften, 
in the humanistic heritage of our culture; it is ‘realized’ in the Gestell, the 
scientifico-technological organization of the modern world. Hermeneutics, as 
verwindend-andenkend thought, must also interpret the ‘messages’ of science 
and technology, and even the messages of the mass media system (...)’ (op. cit., 
15). 
 Vattimo builds upon the work of Heidegger by adding modern ICT to the 
Gestell. The messages of technology and sciences are thus the messages of all 
technology, especially while, according to the Turin philosopher, it is exactly 
in the chaos of modern media that lay the hopes of emancipation, our hopes 
of liberation. Rorty, in his preface to the English translation of Nichilismo ed 
interpretazione (xvii, 14) puts it like this: unlike Adorno and Heidegger, he 
117  L’uomo capace della filosofia del mattino è l’uomo di buon temperamento, che non ha in 
sé nulla ‘del tono ringhioso e dell’accanimento: le note caratteristiche dei cani e degli uomini 
invecchiati… alla catena’’ (La fine della modernità, 178).
118  ‘Non si può davvero oltrepassare’.
119  One may refer to the sentence taken from Die Frage nach der Technik: ‘Wo aber Gefahr ist, 
wächst Das Rettende auch.’ 
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[Vattimo] is able to escape ‘the modern vision of technology dominated by the 
model of the motor and mechanical energy’. For Adorno and Heidegger ‘modern 
technology could do nothing except bring about a society subordinated to a 
central power dispatching commands to a purely passive periphery.’
 Vattimo overcomes this view, because he interprets technology in such 
a way that ‘it ceases to be mechanical and becomes electronic: information 
and communication technology’ (op. cit., 15). It is through this technological 
shift that the unifying character of technology (in its modern manifestation) 
is broken. Through ICT diversity is able to develop. In both The Transparent 
Society and Nihilism and Emancipation this is explicitly articulated, as well as 
the (positive) possibilities this situation (cfr. the section ‘postmodernism as 
condition’) implies. Here again it is clear that postmodern philosophy is also 
philosophy of technology, or – better still – reflection upon a societal condition 
that is thoroughly technological. 
 The development of ICT and mass media (The Transparent Society) creates 
chances of emancipation, because of the chaos it causes. Instead of the ‘Big-
Brother-like’ dominion of one unifying force, there is the limitless opportunity 
for the individual to express one’s self. This cacophony of expressions is the 
realm where no ultimate dictator rules.
 The disturbing role (from a metaphysical perspective) of ICT causes the 
fulfilment of Nietzsche’s ‘prophecy’, often quoted by Vattimo, of the real world 
turning into fable. In The End of Modernity this is presented not just as an 
opportunity, but our only chance for freedom (op. cit., 37). Vattimo cannot 
resign with an idea of oppression by some ultimate ruler and never ceases to 
call for weak thought, thus – again according to Rorty – ‘aiming for a future, 
better than the past’, however never defining how this future ‘ought to’ look like. 
Vattimo often ends his papers with an open end. The reader always has room 
for interpretation and to create his or her own ‘fable’ (or – more Heideggerian – 
‘Sage’).
 So in ICT, the Gestell on the one hand completes metaphysics, but on the 
other hand it offers the escape of it, without throwing it away completely. 
It becomes remembrance, Andenken, of that what is transmitted through the 
whole of the cultural heritage. But for Vattimo, Andenken does not say enough, 
and that is why he further elaborates il pensiero debole by adding Verwindung 
to it, to indicate a certain intimacy with this culture. He creates this intimacy, 
referring to the meaning of ein Krankheit Verwinden120. While remembrance as 
such keeps open a possibility of a separation between subject and object (me 
and the transmitted ‘messages’ by cultural heritage), Verwindung overcomes this 
120  The End of Modernity (48): Verwindung – un termine che si può tradurre con il rimettersi (nei 
vari sensi: rimettersi da una malattia, rimettersi a qualcuno, rimettersi qualcosa come consegnarsi 
un messagio)’ [recover from an illness, to resign oneself from something, or to accept (another’s 
judgement)].
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separation by introducing the very corporal metaphor of an illness: although I 
crashed with my bicycle during a holiday in the Ardennes more than 25 years 
ago, the scars intimately relate me to this moment. The concept of Verwindung 
attaches me to the heritage, involves me in it.
 So, the attention for tradition comes together with a free orientation 
towards the future. Being liberated from the ties of metaphysics causes the 
future to open up as an infinite number of possible futures. When, for example, 
the metaphysics of economics weakens, it becomes possible for me to see the 
future in other terms than those that come with the paradigm. When the laws 
(!) of the free market economy dissolve, so do the futures that are predicted or 
even prescribed by those laws.
 Vattimo escapes the metaphysical trap by means of the Heideggerian 
concepts of Andenken and Verwindung of the Gestell. If post-metaphysics would 
be ‘now for something completely different’, it would remain metaphysical. By 
means of Verwindung metaphysics is enclosed in il pensiero debole, and Vattimo 
calls it an ‘event whose consequences we have just begun to comprehend.’
This section was dedicated to the main concepts that shape Vattimo’s thought: 
il pensiero debole as postmetaphysical, nihilist thought. In the next sections 
three remaining themes are elaborated:
1. The remarkable ‘religious turn’, which shall appear crucial for the 
solution of the theory-practice gap and delivers an important concept 
for an understanding of ‘responsibility’.
2. Images of society: from The Transparent Society to the later works like 
Ecce comu and Hermeneutic Communism. 
3. The postmodern ‘subject’: l’oltreuomo and his ethics.
3.3.4  THE RELIGIOUS TURN:  
CARITÀ
In the section on the life of Gianni Vattimo I already described his increased attention for religion, starting from the second half of the nineties. In this 
section I shall focus on this part of Vattimo’s work, not just because it is 
interesting to have a complete picture of his philosophy, but for two other 
reasons as well:
1. It illustrates the concept of Verwindung, described before. Vattimo does 
not just turn towards tradition – in his case his own Roman Catholic 
background – but creates a new narrative from it. It is an example of 
how a liberated attitude towards one’s tradition might look like. 
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2. Religion, in this interpretation, contains some ethical reflections as 
well that may be of importance for the specific purpose of this study. 
These reflections can be summarized in one word: carità. This carità 
also makes clear how Vattimo at last finds a solution for the problem 
he has tried to solve from Essere, storia e linguaggio onward: how can 
one think, together with the crumbling of Platonic hierarchies, the 
neutralisation of the distinction between theory and practice? 
In earlier reflections on the end of modernity, Vattimo was mainly concerned 
with the way one could find a liberated attitude towards the final manifestation 
of metaphysics: the world dominated by modern science and the products of 
science, technology. This world was called the world of Gestell, and the attitude 
towards this was reflected upon with concepts like Andenken and (from the 
eighties onward) Verwindung. 
However, as I showed in the last section, hermeneutics is not only concerned 
with this final stage of metaphysics. With Heidegger, hermeneutics is freed from 
a one-sided occupation with Geisteswissenschaften, and we should not make the 
mistake to solely focus on science and technology now. Hermeneutics involves 
the interpretation of one’s entire cultural heritage. In Vattimo’s case this means 
a return to his Roman Catholic roots. 
A return to religious roots is not merely a resumption of a weekly (or even 
daily, as the young Vattimo did) walk to morning mass. The rediscovery of faith 
is not a return to the dogmatic truths of religion. It is a postmetaphysical faith, 
characterized by an ebbing away of veritas in favour of caritas. Dogmatic faith 
(pensiero forte) is ‘replaced’ by a more friendly form of Christianity (Credere di 
Credere (CdC), 51)121, more ‘like the one Christ preached us’122: ‘Henceforth I call 
you not servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have 
called you friends; for all the things that I have heard of my Father I have made 
known unto you.’ 
 This weakened, friendlier, re-interpreted form of Catholicism is based upon 
the idea that Jesus does the same: he constantly re-interprets his own tradition, 
the Torah and the prophets. A clear example of this interpretative action is 
Matthew 5: 21 – 48 where it sounds, time and time again: ‘Ye have heard that it 
was said to them of old time (…) but I say unto you’ (CdC, 44)123. Vattimo relates 
this to the other text and the idea that – as friends of Christ, who received 
the Spirit – have this same capacity and authority to do just as Jesus did, be 
121  ‘Non dunque un cristianesimo facile, ma semmai amichevole, proprio come Cristo stesso ce lo 
ha predicato’ (Not an easy version of Christian faith, but a more friendly one).
122  Gianni Vattimo quotes (in CdC 14, 44, 51) John 15: 15 several times: ‘Non vi chiamo più servi 
ma amici.’
123  ‘Udiste che fu detto ... ma io vi dico...’
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aware of our historicity, constantly interpreting within our own existence (‘the 
personal interpretation of the Scripture is the first imperative that the Holy 
Scripture itself commands’ (CdC, 57)124.
 This faith can emerge when modernity has been weakened: it is not 
anymore faith or science, with science believed to replace faith step by 
step. ‘Modernity thought that the religious was merely a residue, waiting 
to be declared by science as well’ and that science would ‘emancipate man 
completely from all forms of transcending authority’ (CdC, 17/18)125. Karl Jaspers 
(1962, 430) calls this belief in scientific progress wissenschaftliches Aberglaube 
(scientific superstition). This concept used by Jaspers shows very well how 
he treats it as a belief and also has a metaphysical character126. Faith, in a 
postmetaphysical interpretation, has its own place next to science. A place more 
closely connected to existence than science can achieve at the moment.
 The idea of a postmetaphysical interpretation of faith does not place 
Christianity against modernism, but places modernism within Christianity. 
Secularisation is being thought of as the destiny of Christian faith, which 
creates a possibility to overcome the idea that secularisation is the opposite 
of religion. The way Vattimo thinks this inclusion of secularisation in Christian 
religion can be made clear by means of two concepts: kenosis and sacrifice. 
Kenosis: what if God was one of us? 
Philippians 2: 5 Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ 
Jesus: 6 Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to 
be equal with God: 7 But made himself of no reputation, and took 
upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of 
men: 8 And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, 
and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. 9 
Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name 
which is above every name: 10 That at the name of Jesus every knee 
should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under 
the earth; 11 And that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ 
is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.
124  ‘L’interpretazione personale della Scrittura è il primo imperativo che la Scrittura stessa ci 
propone.’
125  ‘forme di esperienza ‘residuale’ destinate a consumarsi via via che si imponeva la forme di 
vita ‘moderna’ (...) ‘piena emancipazione dell’uomo da ogni autorità trascendente.’
126  It might be an interesting study to perform a comparison of the Philosophische Glaube of 
Jaspers and the interpretation of faith by Vattimo. Pareyson is considered to be the philosopher 
who introduced Jaspers in Italian philosophy, and it would be interesting to investigate how much 
Jaspers thought (in)directly has influenced Vattimo.
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The first of the concepts that specifically characterize Vattimo’s analysis 
of (Christian) secularized faith is kenosis. According to the Theologisches 
Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament (661/662) and the Exegetisches Wörterbuch 
zum Neuen Testament (696/697), this word appears five times in the New 
Testament and once in the Septuagint (Jer. 15: 9). Only once the word is used 
related to Christ: Philippians (2: 7): ‘But [Christ] made himself of no reputation, 
and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of 
men.’ The meaning of kenosis is weakened a bit in the King James translation. 
Both German dictionaries to the New Testament translate kenosis as ‘leer 
machen’, ‘entledigen’, ‘ernichten’, which in English would mean to empty, or even 
annihilate, which corresponds with commentaries by for example Beare (1969), 
O’Brien (1991) and Reumann (2008): Christ emptied himself, or annihilated 
himself, he reduced himself to nothing. 
 Although the word kenosis only appears once related to Christ does 
not mean that is a marginal concept in theology. On the contrary, it is an 
important concept in Christology and it has brought about much discussion. 
The Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament mentions a ‘dogmatic 
kenosis discussion’. This discussion is in fact more than one discussion. One 
dispute is about the question whether kenosis points at the incarnation 
of Christ or at the crucifixion. The other discussion is among the majority 
of theologians who think that kenosis in the first place is connected to the 
incarnation (without losing sight upon the whole salvation history). They argue 
about the real meaning of the concept, about what it really means that Christ 
‘emptied himself’. Theologians who take this literally discuss which divine 
‘attributes’ Christ lost (e.g. Fairweather in Beare 1969), while others stress the 
metaphorical character of the word (e.g. O’Brien) and that kenosis is part of a 
hymn that covers the verses 6 to 11 of Phil. 2. 
 Vattimo takes this Paulinian concept and re-interprets it in such a way 
that it becomes part of a process of dissolution of the holiness of the divine. 
Because of the incarnation God loses his distance towards mankind and 
weakens himself. In Beyond Christianity (Dopo la cristianità) he further elaborates 
this theme and relates it to hermeneutics; the incarnation, as we can find in the 
Gospels has strong interpretative tendencies: as a prophet, Christ constantly 
interprets the old texts in his own context and he demands his disciples to 
do the same as we have already seen when John 15: 15 was quoted: because 
Christ calls his disciples friends instead of servants, he places them on the 
same level as himself, which is affirmed at Pentecost.  
 With the feast of Pentecost, the incarnation enters a new stage: in the Old 
Testament God was the completely different, only a concealed presence (in a 
cloud and column of fire during the Exodus and later concealed in the Holy of 
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Holies; and there is Ex. 33: 30: ‘no one may see me [God, JdZ] and live’). In Christ 
God weakens himself and becomes Immanuel, God with us, while at Pentecost 
God becomes God within us. Every person, touched by this mystery receives the 
interpretative authority of Christ himself. Thus, the salvation history does not 
end with the ascension, but continues with Pentecost. 
 Of course, everyone does not embrace this interpretation of salvation as 
a preparatory step towards secularization. Vattimo is criticized for isolating 
kenosis from its context. Guarino (2009, 153) points at the entirety of the hymn, 
which is a poetic play between kaulos and kyrios, slave and lord. Kenosis is a 
part of the downward cycle of salvation – from incarnation to crucifixion – 
while the second half of the hymn sings about the glorified Christ. Meganck 
(2005, 148 – 149) accuses Vattimo not only of isolating kenosis from its context 
in scripture (and thus from the traditional story of salvation), but also of 
isolating it from the theological discourse: kenosis only gets a secular meaning 
after it has entered philosophy. However, the aim of Vattimo probably is not to 
be a theologian among theologians. Guardino (2009, 99) rightly argues that for 
Vattimo, these texts have nothing to do with a historical event or an ‘objective’ 
truth, but only have value as a metaphor127.
The reading of history as a continuous salvation is taken from Gioacchino da 
Fiore (12th century AD), who interprets history in a Trinitarian fashion128. Vattimo 
seems to be inspired by the ideas of da Fiore, in which, again the distinction 
of servants, children and friends lightens. History, in this way, is seen in three 
eras, of the Father, the Son and the Spirit. ‘The first era has gone in slavery; the 
second is characterized by childlike service; the third by freedom. The first is 
characterized by fear, the second by faith, the third by charity’ (Dopo la cristianità, 
33129). This era of charity takes us to the most important element of this part of 
Vattimo’s philosophy: carità. The principle of charity can only be achieved when 
religion loses its violent character. 
127  Guarino also uses ‘cipher’ here, which again makes one remember Jaspers. In his philosophy 
‘ciphers’ play an important role: ciphers are strong symbols, that Jaspers nominates to clarify 
existance (Existenzerhellung). It takes too far to further elaborate this at this moment. In De Zwart 
(2009) a section is dedicated to the ciphers.
128  Latré (2013, 16) shows that Löwith (one of Vattimo’s teachers) first asked attention for the 
medieval Calabrese monk. 
129  ‘Il primo è trascorso nella schiavitù, il secondo è caratterizzato da una servitù filiale, il terzo 
si svolgerà all’insegna della libertà. Il primo è segnato dal timore, il secondo dalla fede, il terzo 
dalla carità.’
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Sacrifice and secularisation. According to Vattimo, two authors have been 
important in his return to religion: Sergio Quinzio130 and René Girard, although 
he interprets them again in a Heideggerian fashion. Especially René Girard, 
with his reflections on the sacrifice, provides Vattimo with an important 
concept, although not always in a way Girard agrees with. This is illustrated in 
the dialogues, collected in Verità o fede debole (2006, 2008). These dialogues 
both show the main arguments of the two authors as they give insight in the 
differences between them. 
 According to Girard, mythology is captured in the ‘illusion of the scapegoat’. 
In times of crises the masses search for a victim to sacrifice. The masses 
become convinced that the scapegoat really is a guilty one, and deserves to be 
punished. Biblical authors (for example, Isaiah 53131 and the evangelists) break 
through this illusion and point at the innocence of the victim. Not the victim, 
but the masses are being accused. Jewish-Christian tradition is presented as 
a radical breach with any other tradition, because the rite of sacrifice is being 
unmasked as the blind passion of a mob against an innocent victim132.
 ‘When one becomes aware of this, then the veil of ignorance is taken 
away that underlies the mythical scheme (…) For me, with this new insight of 
Christianity, all victories of the modern begin’ (Girard 2006, 26). Vattimo takes 
over this idea that there is no discrepancy between modernity and Christianity. 
Modernity – and postmodernity – is the consequence of what in the above was 
called kenosis. Christianity sows the seed of secularization itself133.
 Vattimo continues from here (further then Girard likes, according to the 
dialogues): the church’s dogmas, in their absoluteness (like medical ethical 
issues and the Rome’s position towards women and homosexuals) can be seen 
as residues of the mythical scheme, the violence of the religious mob against 
the innocent victim, while ‘Secularization is (…) a way in which kenosis, that 
started with the incarnation of Christ (…) achieves itself, and carries on its work 
in order to learn mankind to overcome the violent nature of the sacred and of 
societal life itself’ (Credere di credere, 42134). The dogmas of the church show 
130  In 1994, Altarocca interviewed Quinzio and Vattimo together (La Stampa, 20-3-1994); the 
differences of opinion between the theologian and the philosopher become clear (at some point 
Vattimo is being accused of Marcionism), but it also shows a Vattimo, searching for fede debole, with 
already a central place for carità.
131  E.g. Is. 53: 5: ‘But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: 
the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed.’ 
132  Girard interprets the renunciation of Christ by Peter in the same way: Peter becomes part of 
the mob that accuses Jesus and without hesitation denies that he knows him.
133  Vattimo is not alone in this point of view. Apart from Girard, one can also find reflection upon 
secularization with Taylor, Agamben and many others. An interestning study on this subject is Latré 
and Vanheeswijck (eds., 2013), that offers an overview of ten contemporary philosophers as far as 
their contribution to the secularity debate is concerned.
134  ‘la secularizzazione (...) è invece un modo in cui la kenosis, cominciata con l’incarnazione 
di Cristo (...) continua a realizzarsi in termini sempre più netti, proseguendo l’opera di educazione 
dell’uomo al superamento della originaria essenza violenta del sacro e della stessa vita sociale.’
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that mankind has not yet finished this learning process. As shown elsewhere 
in this chapter, secularisation – as in ‘not going to church anymore’ – by no 
means implies that mankind has become capable of weak thought. Vattimian 
secularisation is not limited to (Roman Catholic) churches but includes other 
institutions, indeed our culture as a whole, as well.
Carità and the unification of theory and practice. The ultimate consequence 
of this interpretation of Christian religion – overcoming the violent nature of 
the sacred and of societal life itself – is charity (carità). Without the ultimate 
foundation, a way opens for a weakened faith, a weakened conception of truth, 
with a new interpretation of John 8: 32: ‘And ye shall know the truth, and the 
truth shall make you free.’ This truth is ‘not the objective truth of science, nor of 
theology (…) The only truth revealed to us by the Holy Scripture, is the truth of 
love, of caritas’ (Rorty and Vattimo 2004, 56).
 This notion of truth as caritas implies the dissolution of the separation 
between theory and practice, mentioned before. In carità, the Platonic 
hierarchies dissolve. Elsewhere (Credere di credere, 81135), Vattimo says 
that ‘carità cannot be exercised in abstraction, but has to applied in actual 
circumstances.’ And (Credere di credere, 60136): ‘exactly because it is all about 
caritas, this ‘ultimate’ significance is never final, and it is never as definitive as 
the metaphysical principle that cannot be surpassed (…) it is conscious of the 
violence that is inherent of any last word, any ultimate principle that silences 
every question.’
 Vattimo seems to have found the solution for the problems he was unable 
to solve earlier. The vague answer to the question in The Transparent Society 
why nihilism would not necessarily lead to an ethical ‘anything goes’ seems 
to become clear now with the old Christian concept of carità. This concept, 
together with the idea that it can never be abstracted from actual situations, 
that it enfolds itself in a certain practice, is closely related to the concept of 
responsibility. Certainly the parables that are mainly concerned with carità, 
are always connected with the ability to respond (e.g. the Good Samaritan 
and the story of the rich man and Lazarus; both stories are about recognition 
of suffering and the answer to the suffering). In Mark 7: 24 – 30 even Christ 
appears to develop his ability to respond. Although at first he seems reluctant 
to help the Syrophenician woman, her perseverance makes him change his 
mind.
135  ‘La carità non può esercitarsi astrattamente, ma deve applicarsi alle situazione concrete.’
136  ‘Questo senso ‘ultimo’, però, proprio per il fatto di essere la caritas, non è mai davvero ultimo, 
non ha la perentorietà del principio metafisico oltre il quale non si va e di fronte al quale cessa 
ogni domandare.’
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But what kind of a God, what kind of a religion does this leave us with? Can 
one really think religion in a non-metaphysical way? Several authors137 have 
criticized weakened faith in an attempt to save religion from nihilism. Meganck 
(2005, 172 – 174), for example, accuses Vattimo of being metaphysical 
because of the severity with which he insists on the weakening of faith. De-
secularisation seems impossible. The use of a vocabulary that contains concepts 
like ‘nihilism as destiny’ can easily be misunderstood as if Vattimo interprets 
history in a Hegelian fashion, although the idea of a progressive history towards 
some goal is something Vattimo criticizes in La fine della modernità. Destiny 
therefore has to be understood otherwise.
 What Meganck undervalues is the personal character of Vattimo’s works. 
Credere di credere is written as a personal confession. Although Vattimo enters 
the public debate with it, and in this debate enthusiastically tries to ‘convert’ 
others to his opinions (which he also does with in the later political works), 
it remains in the end a personal confession, and an example of an attitude 
towards a personal history. 
 Vattimo interprets the tradition of which he himself is a part of and 
arrives at (provisional) conclusions that articulate his own attitude towards 
this tradition. When I follow Vattimo, it should not be in the conclusions he 
formulates, but in the interpretative path he follows. In my case, it would be a 
reconsideration of my protestant tradition, not a denial of it, but a Verwindung, 
an attitude freed from the metaphysical bonds and at the same time possibly 
respectful towards it. This attitude will be addressed again in the penultimate 
section of this chapter, which contains a further elaboration of the concept of 
the Übermensch.
3.3.5 VISIONS OF A  
POSTMODERN SOCIETY
In the previous sections, the societal level was already addressed: the postmodern, the nihilist condition, is a cultural condition, a condition of 
society. In this section, I want to further elaborate some of the ideas Vattimo 
explores as far as (postmodern) society is concerned. In the works of Vattimo, 
we encounter this societal analysis at different levels: first, there is the 
philosophical level, especially present in The Transparent Society. The analysis 
137  E.g. Guardino, Meganck; Krämmer (2010) argues that many scholars misunderstand Vattimo 
because they fail to acknowledge his essayist style, that often leaves the reader with open ends. 
If one expects absolute clarity, one shall not be satisfied by the works of Vattimo. He encircles, 
rather than pinpoints. Vattimo often uses different words to indicate more or less the same (e.g. 
Enlightenment, modernism, metaphysics). ‘Was fehlt, ist die systematische Einführung’, which can be 
criticized, but at the same time it may be acknowledged to be consistent with his philosophy.
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in this work is entirely focused on the postmodern condition and what that 
means. The second level is more political. Vattimo uses his philosophical ideas 
to express his critique of the current political situation. In this section, I shall 
use this distinction in two levels and thereafter make some remarks on the 
analysis by Vattimo, which I consider important for the remainder of this study.
The philosophical analysis of society: The Transparent Society (ST). How does 
a postmodern society look like, according to Vattimo? To avoid being all too 
utopian, thus metaphysical, Vattimo almost never becomes concrete, except 
in his later works (Nihilism & Emancipation, Ecce comu, Addio alla verità and 
Hermeneutic communism). In ST, with a title suggesting that this will shed 
light on the current state of affairs of society he still remains philosophical. It 
thoroughly elaborates the idea of the postmodern society being dominated by 
mass media (the society of the Gestell). 
 Key concept in ST is transparency or rather the lack of it. Indeed, a world 
dominated by mass media is characterized by a lack of transparency, by chaos 
caused by the limitless production of opinions by mass media (ST, 11). In the 
previous sections, it was mentioned several times that postmodern philosophy 
is always at the same time a philosophy of technology. In case of Vattimo this 
is information and communication technology. The Gestell is not a world of 
mechanical technology – as it was with Heidegger – but also and foremost of 
information and communication technology. 
 Vattimo uses transparency in a way different from the ‘modern’ way it is 
normally used. This modern way is first and foremost a ‘managerial’ way, a 
way of getting and keeping control over information. Vattimo often uses the 
concept organizzazione totale (cfr. section 3.3.3, where the totalitarian aspect of 
metaphysics was discussed) to indicate this modern character of information 
technology. In the chapter on CSR, this managerial view of information has also 
been illustrated: the CSR toolkit, aimed at being in control over what happens 
within the organization. 
This modern interpretation of transparency, which Vattimo – in the sixth 
chapter of (the second edition of) ST, that is not part of both the English 
and Dutch translations – especially connects to the Frankfurt School, is an 
apocalyptic interpretation where mass media are still associated with the Nazi 
regime, and the propaganda machine of Goebbels (ST, 103). Mass media – seen 
from this perspective – articulate one vision, one truth. In this context Vattimo 
also mentions the educational ideal of the modern era: Bildung. In the era of 
humanism, Bildung was associated with the modern ideal of emancipation, of 
developing an objective vision of the world and of history138. 
138  ‘Conquistando una visione ‘oggettiva’ del mondo e della storia’ (ST, 102).
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Recently, the apocalyptic view of information and communication 
technology has been fed by a number of events. WikiLeaks and the NSA 
practices, unveiled to us by whistle-blowers like Edward Snowden, show 
how the US government sometimes seems to strive for total control over 
information. Other governments, like the Chinese and North Korean, try 
desperately to maintain control over the Internet use of their citizens. Similarly, 
large ICT companies – like Google and Facebook – are accused regularly of 
gaining too much power over information139.
Vattimo does not share the pessimistic view of information and 
communication technology. On the contrary, he points at another aspect of this 
technology: the diminishing of information monopolies. Although governments 
and companies strive for control over information, it rather seems that there 
is an explosion of opinions to be found on the Internet. Journalists fear for 
their jobs, especially photographers, because twitter provides the pictures of 
an event in real time. The ‘googlisation’ of society means that everyone has the 
opportunity to express him or herself. The development of ICT has caused an 
informational chaos, but ‘it is exactly in this relative chaos that our hopes for 
emancipation lie’ (ST, 11).
 Through these ‘hopes for emancipation’, Vattimo reveals his optimism. 
Emancipation is there for him or her who has the capacity to cope with the 
chaos without ‘neurosis’ (ST 41). Society, dominated by mass media gives an 
opportunity to develop our own relationship with the tradition we come 
from and new traditions that we meet. In ST (17), Vattimo uses the analogy 
of the dialect to explain what he means. Local communities have limitless 
opportunities to develop and articulate themselves. Transparency in this 
interpretation is a chaotic abundance of information as well as an abundance of 
producers of information. 
 In ST, Vattimo uses several metaphors to further explore his reflections 
upon transparency. In the third chapter this metaphor is the myth. One 
of the ideals of modernity, of the Enlightenment, was demythologization 
(Entmythologisierung) by means of scientific progress. This chapter, Myth 
Rediscovered, is a plea for a renewed attention for the myth and proposes a 
revaluation, because ‘there is no longer apodictic evidence, in which thinkers 
of the metaphysical age sought a fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum (ST, 
61; cfr. section 3.3.3 about the foundationalist aspect of metaphysics).’ The 
second metaphor is ‘oscillation’, a force that moves something to and fro, causes 
139  On a rare occasion, in La vita dell’altro, Vattimo expresses suspicion towards the corporate 
world and the way corporations strive for an information monopoly (also in Addio alla verità, 53). 
In this specific case it was about the human genome, related to (corporate) intellectual ownership. 
Suspicion towards the self-regulating capacities of the free market, does not automatically make 
him a critic of the corporate world in general.
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something to tremble. This metaphor indicates at a continuously destabilizing 
force, in case of the fourth chapter (Art and Oscillation) especially at the force of 
art. Vattimo uses aspects from the aesthetics of Heidegger (Stoss) and Benjamin 
(Shock), which indeed focus upon the effect of a work of art: a work of art has 
the potential to destabilize ones conception of the world, of truth. The third 
metaphor that is briefly discussed here, is that of heterotopia (chapter five: From 
Utopia to Heterotopia), although that idea has already been reflected upon in 
earlier sections. It accentuates the plurality of visions of society, the plurality of 
truths. 
The metaphors lighten up different aspects of transparency as chaos, of the 
‘googlisation’ of society. One has the opportunity to freely explore and create 
myths, to create one’s own visions of the future, to develop an existence that is 
inspired by aesthetics rather than by economics. 
However, thus Vattimo, the recent dominance of economics over aesthetics 
in mass media could be a threat to emancipation, and cause a nostalgia for all 
kinds of ‘limited but secure horizons, like the family, local community, ethnic, 
religion’ (ST, 117). At the final pages of ST, Vattimo seem to acknowledge the 
‘nostalgia for metaphysics’ once more. This brings us from the abstract idea of 
transparency to the more concrete – and political – works of the later Vattimo, 
where he presents a more practical program for left politics, based on ontologia 
debole. In these books Vattimo draws attention to the violence of what he 
would call ‘framed democracies’.
The political vision of society. In section 3.2, I presented a certain order in the 
biography of Vattimo, based on the focus of his philosophy during an era. After 
the turn of the millennium the focus shifted from religion to politics. The main 
production of this phase consists of four titles: Nihilism & Emancipation (NE), 
Ecce comu (EC), Addio alla verità (AV) and Hermeneutic Communism (HC, written 
together with Santiago Zabala). NE and AV are the most moderately toned, 
while EC and HC show a more militant character (as far as EC is concerned, this 
could be explained by the fact that it is composed of a number of columns). All 
four books show a worried and disappointed Vattimo. They show a politically 
engaged philosopher who observes a global political arena that appears to be 
overwhelmingly dominated by strong thought.
 The themes that seem to bother him most are:
·	 The attempts of the Roman Catholic Church to prevent the 
development of legislation on issues like marriage (e.g. between 
homosexual couples), research on embryos, euthanasia (NE, xxvii, 
AV, chapter 3). This is predominantly an issue that concerns Vattimo 
as an Italian. The next issues are more crucial, especially for the 
development of a new (communist) variety of left politics.
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·	 The role of the US of America (and their allies) in international 
politics. Vattimo in this case fears an ‘international police state 
‘legitimated’ by (putentive) human rights, or what the empire defines 
as such’ (NE, xxvii). The same theme appears in all four works (e.g. AV, 
introduction, EC, 72 and the second chapter of HC).
·	 The dominance of capitalism in the world’s economy and politics. 
·	 The development of the European Union, from a source of hope for 
peace to a technocratic institution (cfr. 3.2.5).
Amidst the metaphysical violence, Vattimo tries to develop a political thought 
that might offer an alternative. The first outline appears in NE (98 – 101) and 
starts from the idea that no longer the emphasis should be on equality. The 
focus should shift towards the reduction of violence, where a focus on equality 
could end up with violence again. Violence is interpreted, again very broadly, as 
the forces that prohibit the question ‘why’ (NE, 98). This reduction of all violence 
is the basis of what follows next:
1. A necessary new relationship with nature (cfr. Magnificat and Il 
soggetto e la maschera, 345).
2. An end to the worship of competition at all levels of society.
3. An effective force to reduce consumerism.
4. It might make the left less conservative on issues traditionally linked 
with the (violent) fight against capitalist powers.
What is interesting in the further elaboration of this brief program is the 
attention for the concept of consensus as an important principle. Not merely 
the ‘majority rules’ (106), but also a respectful attitude towards ‘conscious 
objection’.
Is it the abject lack of respect for ‘conscious objection’ by ‘framed democracy’ 
and its advocates that caused the more militant tone of EC and HC140? Framed 
democracy, the declaration of the (final) victory over its competitors (by 
Fukuyama and Kagan) is the main subject of HC. Framed democracy, or its 
synonym, metaphysical democracy, which is considered to be the ‘most rational 
form of government’ (Fukuyama, quoted in HC, 37), has ‘triumphed over history’. 
The idea of a most rational form indicates a certain kind of rationality and 
its superiority over other kinds of government. This rationality is scientific 
– modern – rationality. Although Zabala and Vattimo criticize the political 
thought by Fukuyama and Kagan, they start with a critique of the philosophy 
that delivers the rational foundation for framed democracy, analytic philosophy 
and more in particular the ideas of John Searle.  
140  HC builds upon the ideas of EC. In EC Vattimo explores his ideas of a re-found communism. 
Most of the ideas in HC are prepared in EC, but in HC they are further elaborated. 
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 Searle represents a thought that could not be further away from what 
was presented in this chapter, and what could not be a better illustration of 
metaphysical thought. Metaphysical realism – as Zabala and Vattimo call it – is 
a strong belief in scientific progress. Searle is an advocate of ‘sane philosophy’, 
a philosophy that ‘must cooperate with empirical science and even should have 
a general wissenschaftliche approach. Such an approach can be achieved by 
submitting itself to such irrefutable facts as these ‘stated by the atomic theory 
of matter and the evolutionary theory of biology’ (HC, 30).
 With the irrefutable facts as building blocks, a social and institutional 
construction can be created, and liberal (capitalist) democracy seems to be 
the framework for such a construction. Within that victorious system, we only 
need to search for perfection. Change of interpretation, in this conception, 
has to be explained as a learning process, that inevitably will lead to better 
knowledge and – in the end – a better understanding of the most efficient 
way to organize (global) society. Nihilist hermeneutics for Searle would be 
unacceptable. Zabala and Vattimo refer to a comment by Searle on Derrida, 
where Searle articulates what, according to him, will be the consequence of 
Derrida’s ‘iterability argument’: loss of control141. Philosophy should be aimed at 
certainty, based upon basic facts. Philosophy in this conception dissolves into 
science and loses it critical potential. As Zabala and Vattimo argue, the return of 
some contemporary philosophers to realism, does not only show an ‘expression 
of fear (and therefore its demand for security)’, but also a ‘conservative nature it 
exposes through its desire for global unification’ (HC, 27).
  All the ingredients are there – foundationalism, belief in progress, 
totalitarianism and objectification – to turn this metaphysical democratic 
ideal into a potentially violent one. In philosophy, this violence means the 
marginalization of other philosophical positions (HC, 35). In politics, this 
violence has led to ‘armed capitalism’ (the title of chapter 2 of HC), the 
willingness to defend democracy at very high costs and with military force. 
But is this really a defence of democracy? Which demos are we talking about? 
The millions of poor living in the slums of the large cities? Ironically, – and 
tragically at the same time – framed democracy treat the poor as a threat to the 
stability of the empire of capitalism, rather than as a relevant group with rights 
of their own (HC, 64 – 71). 
  
141  Iterability is the capacity of signs, texts, or words to be repeated in new situations, hence, 
grafted onto new contexts. A ‘context is never saturated’, because, as Derrida argued, every ‘sign, 
linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the usual sense of this opposition), as a small 
or large unity, can be cited, put between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given 
context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not 
suppose that the mark is valid outsie its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts 
without any center of absolute anchoring’ (HC, 43, quoting ‘Signature, Event, Context’, a text by 
Derrida from 1971).
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 The above briefly summarizes the argument of the first part of HC. More 
important is the second part, where HC is explained more in detail. This 
second part consists of several chapters. The first three outline the basis of 
hermeneutic communism and the third really digs deeper in the concept itself. 
In the first chapter, Vattimo and Zabala describe the anarchic character of 
hermeneutics by means of three important persons: ‘Martin Luther for fifteenth-
century religion, Sigmund Freud for nineteenth-century psychology, and Thomas 
Kuhn for twentieth-century science’ (HC, 80/81). They have in common that they 
illustrate the nonconformist character of hermeneutics and they are prepared 
to think a completely different way. This is an interesting view of hermeneutics, 
certainly when we compare it with the criticism on hermeneutics that it (or 
rather, Gadamer) was conservative, because of the importance it attributes to 
tradition (cfr. section 1.2).  
 With the ‘right to interpret differently’ (HC, 86), illustrated by the examples 
of Luther, Freud and Kuhn, the authors show how different hermeneutic 
communism must be interpreted from traditional (political) communism, that 
never showed much respect for different opinions. What Vattimo and Zabala 
try to provide us with is an alternative for (metaphysical) neoliberal capitalism, 
with its tendency to oppress people and reduce them to objects, resources for 
labour or consumption, waiting to be exploited.  
Both in EC and HC (and to a lesser extent in AV), much attention is paid to some 
examples of countries that have tried to follow their own course, defying the 
framed democratic forces that try to rule the world: Venezuela under Hugo 
Chavez, Bolivia under Evo Morales and Cuba under Fidel Castro142. How do 
Zabala and Vattimo see the Latin American ‘examples’? The last chapter of 
the book gives some insight in this. They start with explaining the differences 
between hermeneutic communism and ‘modern’ communism, the metaphysical 
version known to us. Vattimo and Zabala consider this version of communism 
to be characteristic for the era: ‘if we hold the end of metaphysics accountable 
for the wars and violence of the twentieth century, we should also recognize 
that the experiences of Soviet communism were an aspect of this epochal 
phenomenon. (HC, 111).
 Hermeneutic communism can be considered to be the ‘spirit’ of communism, 
‘a specter that haunts us, a voice that calls from the events that we live in’ (HC, 
110. This passage paraphrases the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, 
first published in 1848). What spirit is it in this case? Perhaps a bit surprisingly, 
the two authors link this communist spirit to the Gospel, thus to the idea of 
142  It is perhaps not surprising that one of the most interesting examples of what might be a 
weakened organization – Semco, an initiative of Ricardo Semler – is also Latin American (Brasilian).
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carità that was discussed earlier: ‘For where two or three are gathered together 
in my name, there I am in the midst of them’ (Matthew 18: 20). After all, ‘in my 
name’ means in the name of justice, fraternity, and the solidarity of the weak’ 
(HC, 111)143. So the spirit of hermeneutic communism, according to Zabala and 
Vattimo, is the spirit of justice, fraternity and solidarity of the weak. Where 
Christian faith has lost its metaphysical character and weak thought has 
disarmed communism, their positive potential can be combined.  
 The spirit of communism, with its inclination to discuss the self-evidence or 
even the natural right of private property, is a ‘weakened communism’. There is 
no absolute truth in the communist dream of a classless society (as there is no 
truth in the idea that markets work perfectly). As Zabala and Vattimo put it, the 
idea of classlessness should be interpreted as a world without dominion. Not as 
a certain point where we should move to, but as a value, worth striving for. ‘The 
messianic power of the utopia is also a critical and indispensable limit; it is 
only when the revolution is considered completed (or, which is the same, when 
Being is identified with being as a present fact) that it becomes a despotic 
power, hegemony, and violence against any disclosure toward a different future’ 
(HC, 117).
 Zabala and Vattimo consider the European democracies, that have quite 
some socialist elements in them, to be an example of recent past where great 
achievements were made concerning the position of the weak. The apparent 
recent turn towards neoliberal principles put an end to these versions of mild 
capitalism. 
 Elsewhere in the world, to be more precise in Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, 
different sounds can be heard. Politicians dare to discuss the logic of neoliberal 
capitalism. Whatever one thinks of these movements, ‘their simple presence in 
the international scale is an important element for a diverse and more open 
international climate’ (HC 119). In a section, Vattimo and Zabala discuss the 
criticism on these political movements and note that this criticism is very much 
rooted in the proclivity of framed democracy to discard any other sound as 
‘antidemocratic’ or ‘threatening’.
 In this section, Vattimo’s analyses of (post)modern society were summarized. 
The analysis of The Transparent Society was a positive one, with an eye for 
the emancipatory opportunities offered by the chaos of information and 
communication technology. Is this chaos also a possibility for individuals 
towards corporations? Is this chaos a possibility for critical observers of 
corporate practices? Or is it a possibility for corporate members to express 
143  In EC, Vattimo uses the term ‘cattocommunista’ or ‘cristocommunista’ to illustrate the 
interdependence of hermeneutic communism and his interpretation of Christian faith. ‘Io non credo 
a un possibile futuro della religione che non sia anche il futuro del communismo.’ (EC, 5). Religion 
has no future if it does not also refinds the weakened form of communism. Does Vattimo consider 
capitalist ideology incompatible with the concept of carità?
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themselves and somehow weaken the possible violent potential of the 
(modern) concept of organization?
 The analysis of NE, EC, AV and HC is less positive and looks more like the 
pessimist views of the representatives of the Frankfurt School. What can 
the connection be with my thesis? Is the concept of the corporation – which 
is an important part of the capitalist system – a suspicious concept? Or is 
the situation even worse? Corporations are no democracies at all. They are 
constructions that do not have to function according to democratic principles. 
Nevertheless, the people who (re)create a corporation can freely dicide 
upon its construction. Although corporations play an important role in the 
capitalist system, they are not necessarily of the same violent nature as framed 
democracy. Perhaps it could even be the other wat around: did not Milton 
Friedman call CSR a subversive doctrine, a threat to the free society? Can CSR 
be a means in the process of weakening framed democracy?
 Vattimo suggests an alternative from the modern strive for total 
organization. That is the realm of modern man, man so far. Time has come for 
the Übermensch to arise, he or she who is capable of constructing his or her 
alternative interpretation of the world, ‘instead of submitting to the official 
truths’ (HC, 137). This is not only necessary in order to be free as a citizen, but 
also because it might be our only escape from the road to self-destruction 
(cfr. HC, 121). These remarks lead – at last – to the section on the Übermensch, 
l’oltreuomo, of whom I have spoken often already. 
3.3.6  THE POSTMODERN ‘SUBJECT’:  
VATTIMO’S INTERPRETATION  
OF THE ÜBERMENSCH
The previous sections already showed ideas about the Übermensch, which are consistent with the content of Il sogetto e la maschera (SM), written 
so many years earlier. It is this Übermensch, in whom ‘the three fundamental 
aspects of the idea of eternal return live’ (283) and in what concept a rebirth of 
the Dionysian is announced (cfr. 3.3.1 for a more thorough elaboration of the 
Dionysian and the Apollinian). These three elements are: overthrowing the rigid 
structure of time, liberation of the past as an authority, and the liberation from 
the symbolic (that is, the dominating force of the symbol in metaphysics). 
 SM fulfils a key role in understanding Vattimo’s interpretation of the 
Übermensch. The entire analysis he performs of Nietzsche’s thought will not be 
summarized here, but I shall especially turn to the last chapters of this work to 
find the constituents of his thought on liberated man. The notion of Verwindung 
is not yet explicitly present in this work, so the emphasis on the Dionysian 
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could lead someone to believe that Vattimo puts the Dionysian opposite of 
the Appolinian. Reading carefully, this is not the case, because Vattimo already 
preludes to Verwindung (346 – 347): ‘Nietzsche is not nostalgic about the pre-
technological world (…) it is in the heart of this world [dominated by science 
and technology, JdZ] that he situates his Dionysian man (…) His Oltreuomo is the 
one who has become aware of the possibilities of the developments of science 
and technology; what this man conducts is a scientific and technological 
existence, just like his invention of new ways of looking at nature beyond the 
metaphysical visions and his continuous invention of new ways to deal with 
and submit nature with technology.’144 
 New ways of looking at nature... Elsewhere (SM, 330) Vattimo speaks about 
a different way of looking towards our relationship with nature, ‘a free dialogue 
with nature’ and (SM, 345) a new situation of ‘partnership with nature’. This is 
compatible with his later works145, where he also now and then emphasizes 
the necessity to re-invent our relationship with nature, in order to escape from 
certain disaster146. 
 Thus, Vattimo considers hermeneutic ontology (pensiero debole) not only 
to be a philosophy of technology. Hermeneutic ontology is also a philosophy 
of nature. This of course because traditional technology is a force aimed to 
control nature. In weak thought, this metaphysical structure diminishes, which 
implies that the more or less hostile relationship between mankind and nature 
diminishes as well.
 Although this theme, the relationship between mankind and nature is by no 
means a dominant theme in the works of Gianni Vattimo, it regularly emerges, 
from so early a date as 1974 (this is, if it also was present in the first edition). 
The liberation of the three items mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
implies liberation from hierarchy tout court, from the ‘structures of the 
rationalized world’ (SM 284). This liberated individual is the ‘one of good 
temperament’ (The End of Modernity, 178), whom we already met in the section 
about Verwindung. There the free spirit (in SM (284) Vattimo calls him or her 
144  ‘Nietzsche non è (...) un nostalgico del mondo pre-tecnico (...) È anzi nel cuore di questo 
nouvo mondo che si installa il suo uomo dionisiaco (...) Il suo oltreuomo è quollo che è stato reso 
obiettivamente possibile dallo sviluppo della scienza e della tecnica; e un’esistenza scientifica e 
tecnica è quella che tale uomo cunduce, nel suo nuovo modo di concoscere la natura al di fuori di 
visioni metafisiche globalizzanti, nel suo su inventare continuamente nuove forme in cui sfidare e 
sottmettere la natura con le macchine.’
145  Although embryonic, one can read these insights in earlier works as well: as far back as Il 
concetto di fare in Aristotele, Vattimo dedicates a section to the translation of the Greek παρα φυσιν 
as ‘contra natura’, a violent attitude towards nature (Il concetto di fare in Aristotele, 12), which can, 
according to the Turin Philosopher, also be translated in a less violent fashion.  
146  Magnificat (17) and Addio alla Verità (72). In the former it it stated in the following manner: 
‘Credo che l’Umanità debba trovare la strada per costruire o ricostruire un rapporto amichevole con 
la natura’: mankind should discover a more friendly relationship with nature.
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a comedian (commediante)) was opposed to ‘old dogs and men who have long 
kept on the leash’.
 This leash was the symbolic language of the past, the metaphysics 
necessary to cope with a hostile and insecure environment. The Übermensch 
does not anymore need these ensuring and controlling devices of the past. He 
or she is freed from these symbols, but at the same time also freed by symbols, 
being able to create freely his own world of symbols and significance147. This 
liberation (as I mentioned in the section dedicated to Verwindung) of the ties of 
the symbolic language of the past, simultaneously causes a liberated attitude 
towards the future: instead of a future, prescribed by some metaphysical 
system, an infinite number of futures opens up.
 The creativity of the Oltreuomo is of great importance in Vattimo’s 
interpretation, following Nietzsche’s example of Zarathustra, with his use 
of allegoric and prophetic language. This language, never attempting to 
correspond – unlike modern language – to a specific something, is waiting 
to be discovered in everyday life, time and time again. It is a language, unlike 
Platonic-scientific thought, never striving for accurateness or correspondence. 
Allegoric and prophetic truth is one that ‘needs events in order to understand 
them from face to face’ (SM, 289). Allegoric and prophetic is also the truth of 
Holy Scripture, if it is not spoiled by Platonic (fundamentalist) structures with 
their tendency to convert allegory and prophecy into absolute truths. Through 
this unbreakable link between text and event, the separation of theory and 
practice is being undone. In later works Vattimo will conceptualise the reunion 
of theory and practice, of knowing and doing, by means of carità, as was shown 
in an earlier section. 
 On the other hand, this liberation means a loss of certainty. The Oltreuomo 
creates his own values, his own commandments148. Again we meet the 
Übermensch in a situation, so exquisitely described by Nietzsche in his famous 
125th aphorism of FW, where the frightening consequences of the death of 
God are reflected upon (the full quotation can be found in section 3.3.3.1). 
The Übermensch has lost all reference points (SM, 292). This is by no means 
a positive experience. This is illustrated by the ‘nostalgia’ for metaphysics, 
about which Vattimo writes in 1983149. This nostalgia makes clear that the 
Übermensch is not a self-evident concept, ready to put into practice by everyone. 
147  In (among others) Dialogo con Nietzsche (15 ff.) Vattimo confronts this creativity with 
Nietzsche’s concept of malattia storica, a slave-like dependence of history.
148  This should not be mistaken by the Kantian idea of self-legislation, which still looks for a 
universal moral principle, while the creative oltreuomo acknowledges the nihilist condition.
149  Cfr. Section 3.3.1, where I wondered whether (economic) crises could intensify the ‘nostalgia 
for metaphysics’.  In the previous section 3.3.5, the example of framed democracy illustrated that in 
some philosophical schools (realism), nostalgia seems an understatement. Philosophers like Searle 
simply will not accept a postmetaphysical position. 
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It is still faithful to the subtitle of Zarathustra: a book for everyone and nobody. 
For everyone, living in postmetaphysical society weak thought is ‘available’. 
For nobody, for it is not easy and quite frightening to be put on one’s self, not 
anymore encapsulated in the safe structures of metaphysics.  
 The concept of the Übermensch has been understood by some in a new 
metaphysical way. Especially the Nazis have made him a strong and violent 
species (‘the blond beast’). How does Vattimo interpret this Übermensch without 
stepping into the metaphysical trap?
 On the one hand there is the aesthetic nature of Übermensch, in Vattimo’s 
writings. It is a creative conception of man, not in the first place a moral one. 
The playful one of good temperament lacks the drive to dominate others. 
 On the other hand, and I think most important, Vattimo finds the crucial 
Nietzschean text in the Nachlass, in the Lenzer Heide fragment on European 
nihilism, written in the autumn of 1887150. In this fragment Nietzsche 
introduces the idea of ‘moderateness’ which Vattimo quotes at several 
occasions151: not the violent will prevail, but ‘the more moderate, those who 
have no need for extreme principles of faith (...) those who know how to think, 
about the softening of their values without becoming small or weak.’152
 It is a distance to extreme principles that makes the will to power show 
itself as a will to interpret, to the creation of symbols and metaphors (Della 
realtà, 40), and makes the Übermensch show himself again as an artist. 
Vattimo points at this and marks it as a return to the young Nietzsche, and a 
partial return to Schopenhauer (both Etica dell’interpretazione and Dialogo con 
Nietzsche).
Vattimo links the capacity of moderateness to another fragment of 
Nietzsche where Nietzsche redefines hybris, as ‘our attitude towards nature, 
our violation (rape) of nature by means of machines and engineers (...) we 
experiment with ourselves, as we would not permit ourselves to do with 
animals’ (Dialogo con Nietzsche, 203)153. Again something we can later recognise 
with Heidegger, especially in his Question Concerning Technology. 
150  I already discussed and quoted this fragment: note 90.
151  Etica dell’interpretazione (128 – 129), Della Realtà (40) and Dialogo con Nietzsche (201 – 202).
152  Etica dell’interpretazione (129): ‘i più moderati, quelli che non hanno bisogno di principi di 
fede estremi (...) quelli che sanno pensare, riguardo all’uomo, con una notevole riduzione del suo 
valore, senza deventare perciò piccoli e deboli.’
153  Taken from the Genaelogie der Moral (III, 9): ‚Hybris ist heute unsre ganze Stellung zur Natur, 
unsre Natur-Vergewaltigung mit hilfe der Maschinen und der so unbedenklichen Techniker - und 
Ingenieur-Erfindsamkeit (...) Hybris ist unsre Stellung zu uns, - denn wir experimentiren mit uns, 
wie wir uns mit keine Thiere erlauben würden.‘ [la nostra posizione rispetto alla natura, la nostra 
violenzione della natura con l’aiuto delle macchine en della tanto spensierata inventiva dei 
tecnici e degli ingegneri (...) hybris è la nostra posizione di fronte a noi stessi, giacché eseguiamo 
espserimenti su di noi quali non si permetteremmo su nessun animale].
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The ethics of l’oltreuomo according to Vattimo is an ethics of responsibility, as 
appears from several fragments, especially in Dialogo con Nietzsche (DN): ‘the 
thought of the eternal return (...) appeals to responsibility and the assumption 
of responsibility. The true world has become a fable: this means that there is 
no guarantee that one should do or say this or that, that all responsibility falls 
back at us’ (DN, 58 – 59)154. 
 Also in DN, Vattimo speaks of a task, an assignment that Nietzsche has 
suggested to us: if there are no supreme values left, it is our task to formulate 
and proclaim them155. Although this task appears to be given to all people – as 
the fragments suggest – elsewhere (DN, 101 – 102) the target group is much 
smaller: the addressee now is the philosopher, distinct from others – scientists 
– because he or she does not describe156, but prescribes. The philosopher is 
the prophet, the legislator, the visionary who shows a direction157. Does not he 
or she now resemble the philosopher king of Plato? The key difference with 
the metaphysical legislator should be that this legislator does not forcefully 
impose values upon others, but again moderately, modestly takes his or her 
responsibility. Vattimo manages to think l’oltreuomo without falling into the 
metaphysical trap. He tries to do justice to what we already encountered many 
times as the nihilist condition.
154  ‘Il pensiero dell’eterno ritorno è cosi piutosto un appello alla responsabilità e alla assunzione 
di responsabilità. Il mondo vero è diventato favola: ciò significa che non c’è nessuna garanzia di ciò 
che facciamo o diciamo, che tutta la responsabilità ricade su di noi.’
155  DN (58): ‘l’uomo nuovo che Nietzsche progetta e a cui vuol preparare la via con il suo 
pensiero è l’uomo capace di assumersi in pieno le proprie responsabilità.’ [the new man that 
Nietzsche invents and for whom he wants to pave the way with his thought, is the one capable of 
fully accepting his responsibility].
And: ‘La fondazione e la promulgazione di tavoli di valore è un compito che Nietzsche propone a 
tutti gli uomini.’ [the founding and enactment of tables of values is an assignment that Nietzsche 
proposes at all people’] (repeated in DN, 101 – 102).
156  This can also be found with Heidegger (2000, 133): science does not (or even cannot) think.
157  There is ‘a distinzione radicale del filosofo dai ‘lavoratori intellettuali’ (...) il filosofo è invece 
un Gesetzgeber: è colui che dice non le cose sono, ma come devono (sollen) essere, che determina il 
wohin e il wozu dell’uomo’. [a radical distinction of the philosopher from the ‘intellectual labourer’ 
(...) the philosopher, however, is a legislator: it is he who does not say how things are, but how they 
should be, he who determines the where and why of man.’]
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3.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE LIFE AND WORK  
OF GIANNI VATTIMO
The career of Gianni Vattimo covers more than half a century; his first book appeared in 1961 and his last title (until this moment) was issued in 2012. That is, if one does not count the articles and blogs that appeared 
since. Possibly, now his political career in the European Parliament has ended 
and if he stays in good health, the bibliography of the Turin philosopher might 
still increase. At the end of this chapter, I would like to make some remarks to 
conclude the chapter, and at the same time prepare for the next.
 Considering Vattimo’s philosophical production (the columns were no 
part of this study), one can divide his output in certain ways. I have chosen to 
distinguish between a number of eras, that all show a certain focus:
1. Development and the monographic works: Il concetto da fare in 
Aristotele, Essere, storia e linguaggio in Heidegger, Schleiermacher, 
filosofo dell’interpretazione, Il soggetto e la maschera, Nietzsche: an 
Introduction, Introduzione a Heidegger and Dialogo con Nietzsche. His 
translations – especially the translation of Wahrheit und Methode by 
Gadamer – are a part of this era as well.
2. Synthesis: in this phase Vattimo articulates a really own sound in 
the philosophical debate (Weak Thought, Beyond Interpretation, Etica 
dell’interpretazione, The Transparent Society, The End of Modernity, the 
yearbooks and later Della realtà).
3. Religious turn (Credere di credere, Beyond Christianity and the 
dialogues with Rorty, Girard and Caputo).
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4. Political works (Nihilism & Emancipation, Ecce comu, Addio alla verità, 
The Responsibility of the Philosopher and Hermeneutic Communism).
5. (Auto-)biographical works (Non essere Dio and Magnificat).
This chapter has been too brief to do justice to the whole of the thought of 
Gianni Vattimo. A thorough study of his philosophical journey remains a task 
for future research. Conducted in Dutch it would be the first study that covers 
the whole of Vattimo’s thought, and a valuable correction of the existing 
studies – like Meganck (2005) – that focus mainly on what I have called the 
‘religious turn’. Dutch readers until this day have no access to the thought of 
this interesting and prominent philosopher. In English, there are several works 
available that are fit for the task, like the translation of the liber amicorum of 
2007 (Weakening Philosophy). In German, there are Weiss and Krämmer who 
have written studies dedicated to the life and work of Vattimo.
 In order to make the step to the next chapter, I propose a summary 
of Vattimo’s main arguments along the line of the classical questions of 
philosophy by Kant (2004, 642): what can I know (epistemology)? What may I 
hope? What should I do?
What can I know? The question concerning epistemology: An important part 
of this chapter is about abstract concepts like Being or Truth, or rather the 
demolition of those concepts written with capital first letters, theoretically 
exploring the consequences of Nietzsche and Heidegger for contemporary 
thought: the postmodern condition is a nihilist condition. 
In a world characterized by insecurity and hostility, order and discipline 
seem to be necessary. Metaphysics, in other words, is needed to overcome the 
hostility of the environment. This creates the hierarchical (platonic) structures 
we became so used to until this day, as it creates the separation between 
theory and practice; creating order in an insecure environment implies that 
one makes abstractions, that one creates concepts that objectify the ‘real world’. 
When these concepts are canonised, become absolute truths, or when the 
model of reality is confused with reality itself, metaphysics becomes violent: 
the individual has to bow for the totalising concept. It is then that Caiaphas can 
say that it is ‘expedient that one man should die for the people’ (John 18: 14b). 
However, these hierarchical structures may not be necessary anymore in 
our times: ‘God is dead’, no metaphysical order (whether provided by religion 
or by science, technology or economics) is needed. But metaphysics is still 
omnipresent in our culture, even in our language. Our culture is saturated with 
metaphysics. Therefore it is by no means easy to overcome the structures, 
so immanent to all of our existence. There still is a strong nostalgia for 
metaphysics, visible in today’s society: the concept of the nation state, for 
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example, appears to gain strength instead of the opposite. The recently helt 
Scottish referendum showed how latent feelings of nationalism become ever 
stronger during the campaign. ‘Yes’ and ‘no’ become stronger and stronger 
and can draw a furrow in society. In even more extreme examples like the 
Islamic State the concept becomes extremely violent and individuals submit 
themselves completely to it or are submitted by extreme force. Nationalism 
may look charming during sports events but in politics it becomes violent. 
Closer to what this thesis is all about is the metaphysical belief in the ‘laws’ 
of the market. The ‘invisible hand’ might very well be a mythological concept 
in the name of which individual people are completely calculated away. In the 
name of economic growth and the utilitarian idea that economic growth on a 
macro scale provides the largest benefit for the largest number, the individual 
is completely neglected. On the corporate level the situation is not different: 
for the corporation’s sake, people are routinely sacrificed: they are sacked, 
exploited, reduced to a resource. Or, as Pope Francis (2015, 117) recently stated, 
humans have become expendable. 
In modern thought, there still is a belief in truth with a capital T. We know 
laws that correspond with reality, even in economics. If the laws say that it 
is expedient to sacrifice one individual for the people, so be it. In democracy 
the same goes: if the immigration laws tell me that an individual must 
leave the country, I can hide behind this manmade construction and even 
ask understanding because I just obey the law. I sincerely expect the poor 
immigrant to understand that it is just to do so, because a law exists. I quoted 
Genesis 11 before: ‘let us make us a name’. Modern thought creates ‘names’ and 
believes these names to be ‘true’. Individuals are sacrificed because of manmade 
‘names’. These names are examples of pensiero forte, strong thought.
With the concept of il pensiero debole (weak thought), Gianni Vattimo 
has articulated a philosophy that offers an alternative to the violence of 
metaphysics, of strong thought. Weak thought leans on an ontology that is 
nihilistic. It considers Being not to be some fixed structure, a ‘something’, but 
rather a continuous ‘becoming’. Relieved from the capital ‘B’, being becomes an 
event. This is a dynamic ontology, without the foundations of a metaphysical 
thought, but unstable and modest. This ontology is hermeneutic too: being 
offers itself in interpretation, in the limitless possibilities of symbols. Being 
lights up where people create their interpretations of existence, of the world, 
of art, science, of life. In Non essere Dio it is stated that ‘being gives itself in 
dialogue’. Weak thought has a rhetorical and interpretative nature.
This does not mean that mankind should stop ‘making names’. It merely 
invites me to keep in mind that constructs are and remain constructs, 
interpretations that can change meaning and that it might be a bit silly to think 
that constructs become absolute. A construct remains a construct and can be 
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revised, replaced whenever one desires. This can be difficult in interpersonal 
cases, and certainly when the borders of a country are at stake, as in the Crimea 
and the eastern part of Ukraine. But even borders between countries are 
constructs, coincidentally shaped, but very strong indeed. Only weakened ideas 
about borders made it possible that there is no more war about Strasbourg, 
Trieste or Gdansk (at the moment). 
Hermeneutic ontology teaches us that the simple answer to the question 
‘what can I know’ is ‘nothing’. At least, not for sure and not at the moment. 
That does not mean that ‘anything goes’ and ‘when God is dead, everything is 
allowed’, but it makes one more modest about one’s opinions and traditions. 
The other might have a point worth the while as well. Weak thought opens the 
way to dialogue, in which every participant may be convinced that his or her 
opinion is of a higher quality than that of the other. It also opens the way for 
respecting minorities with a different set of (nonviolent) values. As Vattimo puts 
it in Nihilism & Emancipation (quoted in section 3.3.5), this could imply four 
things: a new relationship with nature, an end to the worship of competition 
at all levels of society, an effective force to reduce consumerism and it might 
make (in the case of Vattimo) the left less conservative on traditional left 
issues.
Does a weakened conception of truth mean that people should not be 
sacked anymore? Should Europe simply open its gates to immigrants? Should 
we not care anymore when one country violates international law? I do not 
think that is the case. That would imply that the alternative for reorganization 
of a company is the negation of reorganization. It is a characteristic of strong 
thought to think in either – or schemes. The false dilemma – the suggestion of 
a dichotomy – is the typical sophism of strong thought. The either – or scheme 
turns a dialogue into a discussion and closes the way for a genuine search 
for possible truths. The modest openness towards dialogue resembles that 
of philosophical faith (Jaspers, 1962, 110): ‘dieser philosophischer Glaube (...) 
wird nicht Autorität, nicht Dogma, bleibt angewiesen auf Kommunikation unter 
Menschen, die notwendig mit einander reden, aber nicht notwendig mit einander 
beten müssen.’158 
What may I hope? The question concerning faith: In the works of Vattimo, one 
can find different sources of hope. The first source of hope is in the postmodern 
condition of society while the second is in the discovery of weakened faith, the 
religious turn, and with it the concept of carità. 
158  ‘Philosophical faith does not rest upon authority or dogma, but it rests upon communication 
between people, who have the obligation to talk (reden) with one another, but no obligation to pray 
(beten) together.’ The beauty of the phrase is lost in translation, therefore I only translated it in this 
note.
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 Although the nihilist condition can be a source of insecurity, for Vattimo 
it offers endless possibilities: ‘Wo das Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch’159. 
In modernity, metaphysics reaches its peak, not in organizazzione totale, but 
in chaos, caused by information and communication technology. And it is 
in this chaos, using the words of The Transparent Society, ‘that our hopes for 
emancipation lie’. After the publication, in the eighties of the last century, of The 
Transparent Society the development of ICT has been even more in a direction 
that fits Vattimo’s analysis.
 Are we out of danger now? I do certainly not think so. A residue of modern 
thought so far has been neglected. Vattimo has interpreted the world of Gestell 
in a broader way as Heidegger and Adorno did. He did not reduce technology to 
mechanical technology, but included ICT as well. However, one domain has been 
neglected until now: the organization. Although Vattimo often refers to the 
modern tendency to organizazzione totale, that I consistently have taken over 
untranslated, he never reflects upon the modern invention of organization and 
management. 
 In the introduction, I already preluded on this: organizations are modern 
bits of technology with a strong tendency to metaphysics. It is through 
organizations that modern man creates ‘names’, entities for the purpose of 
which sacrifices are made; humans are being reduced to means, they are 
objectified. People like Mintzberg (2009, quoted in Losonsz, 2011) seem to 
affirm the modernity of organizations and management: six reasons why 
management is necessary. ‘(1) the manager has to ensure that his organization 
serves its basic purpose, (2) the manager must design and maintain the stability 
of his organization’s operations, (3) the manager must take charge of his 
organization’s strategy-making system, and therin adapt his organization in 
a controlled way to its changing environment, (4) the manager must ensure 
that his organization serves the needs of those persons, who control it, (5) the 
manager must serve as the key informational link between his organization 
and its environment and (6) as formal authority, the manager is responsible for 
the operating of his organization’s status system’ [italics by JdZ]. In words of 
this thesis: six reasons why it is necessary to maintain platonic hierarchies, to 
maintain the separation between theory and practice? 
 In the next chapter I shall further elaborate this idea of the corporation as 
a residue of metaphysics, but now I return to the question of hope, ‘our hopes’, 
as Vattimo puts it. Who is this ‘our’? Is Vattimo becoming metaphysical again, 
like some critics like to argue? Does he create a collective here, waiting to be 
emancipated? Do we all have to (!) become oltreuomini, able to cope with the 
postmodern condition? 
159  Hölderlin, quoted in Heidegger (2007).
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 As mentioned before, the nihilist condition for many people is again a 
condition of insecurity and fear. For many (orthodox religious) people, nihilism 
is unthinkable or unacceptable. A weakened faith is not debole, but diabolic, 
literally ‘from the devil’. Religious tautologies immunize faith against weak 
thought (It is wrong to doubt ‘faith as I know it’. Weak thought doubts ‘faith as I 
know it’. Therefore, weak thought is wrong).
 In politics, strong thought also seems to be omnipresent. But who wants 
Vattimo’s emancipation? Should people be forced towards such emancipation? 
Is the philosopher again becoming the person who is liberated from Plato’s 
cave? Not only a liberated person, but also a hopelessly arrogant nerd who 
thinks he knows better because he has seen some light. And again, does that 
not make the thought of enlightenment metaphysical again? Are we not 
hopelessly trapped in metaphysics? 
 Weak thought is hermeneutic thought. It might be no more than an 
assignment, a task to continuously re-interpret interpretations that have a 
tendency to become fixed. I become aware of myself as being intrinsically 
metaphysical, that is, I have a tendency to canonize concepts, but as I become 
aware of that, of Im Gefängnis von Gefängnis zu wissen (Jaspers, 1962, 136), 
the process of emancipation begins. But this might not be a process leading 
towards a certain goal, of being Oltreuomo. It might be exactly what Heidegger 
means with Verwindung, a remembrance of a disease: painful and itchy scars 
remain.
The second source of hope is weakened faith. In the religious turn one 
encounters a personal example of what weak thought is able to accomplish: 
a thorough re-interpretation of a tradition. The personal struggle, leading to 
doubtful Credere di credere as an answer to the question whether he still was 
a believer, is an example of Verwindung and Andenken. There is freedom at 
the one hand and on the other there is by no means a complete rejection of 
tradition.
 Critics of Vattimo argue that this leads to a new metaphysical position, in 
the sense that others should become weak believers as well. I think this critique 
misses an important point. Vattimo, of course, expresses an opinion and tries 
to convince his audience that strong thought is potentially, even intrinsically 
violent. Is it metaphysical because of that? Meganck, for example thinks 
it is, but – as I already mentioned in section 3.3.4 – I there argued that he 
undervalues two important aspects in Vattimo’s works. 
 The first aspect was the nature of Vattimo’s hermeneutics itself. He time and 
time again asks attention for a more metaphorical manner of speaking (even 
though his style can be polemic and ‘strong’ from time to time). Interpretation 
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often implies a meandering around concepts, a constant probing of language, 
aware that exactness is an impossible goal to reach. This experimental use of 
language fits the interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch.
 The second important aspect of the religious turn that is undervalued by 
critics is the narrative character of Credere di credere: it is a confession, written 
in the first person. The personal style is crucial for a correct understanding 
of Credere di credere and the other religious works and it is consistent with 
the nature of hermeneutics. Vattimo writes from his own perspective, and he 
cannot do otherwise. He brings into play his own tradition and starts to re-
interpret that. At a certain point (Ecce comu, 4) he writes about the Lutheran 
sola scriptura, and his reluctance to accept this Lutheran tradition. Quite right, 
because he is not a Lutheran and writes from within his own perspective. He 
has to deal with his own tradition, and it is from this tradition that he starts and 
towards which he develops new attitudes. It is also from this tradition that he 
sometimes turns towards other traditions like Lutheranism and Islam. It is not 
the entire content of Vattimo’s thought I should embrace (as if I should in the 
first place) because I could never replicate this. It is the itinerary of his thought 
that might inspire me to turn towards my own tradition and re-interpret that. 
One can only start to re-interpret one’s own tradition if one starts from where 
one comes from.
 That the process of weakening might be more important than the actual 
content of what is weakened, does not mean that this content, as far as 
weakened faith is concerned, is not interesting, especially the move from veritas 
towards caritas. Responsibility does not anymore imply the contemplation and 
defence of Truth, but the practice of truth in carità. This brings me at the third 
question.
What should I do? L’oltreuomo and his or her ethics: Vattimo uses the concept of 
the Über-mensch or Oltre-uomo to depict his vision of the liberated man. In the 
course of the twentieth century, this concept has become contaminated because 
of the Nazi association. Although Nietzsche cannot be held responsible for the 
abuse of his invention160, it is not self-evident to link the Übermensch to the 
concept of carità, to the concept of responsibility as Vattimo does.  
Who or what is Vattimo’s oltreuomo (beyond-man)? The pain of 
postmetaphysical experience does not make him turn away in disgust, unable 
to cope with the darkness of the ‘postmodern condition’. On the contrary, he is 
one of good temperament, taking the chaos of the transparent society with a 
smile, creating his own places in it, re-creating his own places, his own symbols, 
160  Jaspers, in his study on Nietzsche, first published in 1935, already warned for wrong 
Nietzsche interpretations. In the preface of the 1946 and 1949 editions, he explicitly repeats that 
his first edition was (at least partly) meant to refute the Nazi interpretation.  
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his own narratives, his own values. Not suppressed, neither suppressing. This 
continuous re-invention of symbols means that the oltreuomo has an inclination 
to experiment. The good temperament implies a playful, open temperament, 
also from an ethical point of view. From an ethics of imperatives, he moves 
towards an ethics of goods.
In Il soggetto e la maschera Vattimo especially draws attention to the 
language of the oltreuomo, represented by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. This 
liberated one uses not the accurate language of science, an accurateness that 
pinpoints, rather that encircles, with all metaphysical and possibly violent 
consequences. Zarathustra uses allegoric and prophetical language, never to be 
fully understood. The reader is forced into interpretation, without any certainty 
of ever getting it right.
The philosophy of Gianni Vattimo is intrinsically ethical, although it not often 
explicitly addresses ethics. Hermeneutics tries to overcome the separation 
between theory and practice. In this sense it is always ethical, that is, connected 
with existence. A title like The Responsibility of the Philosopher cannot be 
more evident. It again underlines that nihilism does not necessarily implies a 
condition without any obligations. 
Weak thought – the philosophy of l’oltreuomo – from several perspectives can be 
perceived as a call:
1. A call for modesty: the possibility that one’s opinions might be wrong 
implies a more modest position towards ones opinions.
2. A call for readiness: if one becomes more modest about one’s opinion, 
individuals could benefit from an open exchange of opinions. An 
open attitude towards others, a readiness towards the exchange 
of opinions – towards dialogue – is an implicit necessity of weak 
thought.
3. A call for responsibility: if thought can be metaphysical, if thought 
can be violent, the awareness of this violent potential implies a 
certain responsibility of the oltreuomo. A dialogue becomes almost 
impossible if participants in advance already dig their trenches.
Is the thought of Vattimo also a call to become an oltreuomo? A call to become 
the modest, moderate one who is not a slave of his or her tradition. Such a call 
is never an order of course, because that would be a metaphysical position 
again. This emphasis on interpretation of tradition appears to imply yet another 
call: a call for Bildung. A free attitude towards one’s tradition starts with 
knowledge of this tradition. Philosophers like Nietzsche, Heidegger and Vattimo 
have in common that they are well educated and have a profound knowledge 
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of the traditions of which they are part. Is it this knowledge that gives them the 
opportunity to develop a free attitude? In The Transparent Society (102), Vattimo 
mentioned Bildung as a modern educational ideal. Would he object to a kind of 
Bildung, that is weakened as well? 
 A final remark: is the philosophy of Vattimo also a call for left politics? Is 
it possible to see the philosophy of Vattimo apart from his political opinions? 
I think it is, although in the works of Vattimo his philosophy and political 
opinions are sometimes intertwined. Vattimo argues that weak thought in 
our era might imply that we reconsider some traditional political opinions. 
In his case, it means a possible reconsideration of left political positions. 
The traditional political division between left and right is still a residue of 
metaphysics. The one side characterised by a belief in free market economics 
and the other by a deeply felt distrust towards free market economics. Weak 
thought, although articulated by a philosopher with left political opinions, calls 
both sides to reconsider their positions161, as far as it are strong positions. 
161  Paradoxically, the concept of the Übermensch, as one freed from metaphysics could also 
mean a completely altered approach toward labour relationships, more fit with traditional right 
wing politics.
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 CHAPTER 4 
A HERMENEUTIC  
APPROACH TO  
CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY
The mise en place is ready. All the ingredients are there for the second phase of the hermeneutic analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility. After the first phase – the analysis of the debate on CSR – the second phase followed with 
the hermeneutic philosophy of Vattimo. Now I again return to CSR, and want to 
open a perspective on what I would like to refer to as a weakened CSR.
4.1  INTRODUCTION  TO THE CHAPTER
What does it mean, a nihilist hermeneutic approach to CSR? What does such an approach consist of? Vattimo’s philosophy is, for an important part, reflection upon metaphysics, upon the nostalgia for metaphysics. 
Section 4.2 analyses the corporation and CSR as ‘residues of modern thought’. 
This section shows how the corporation and CSR are examples of the nostalgia 
for metaphysics. The next section explores how weak thought can affect the 
corporation and CSR. Can there be such a thing as a weakened corporation or 
weakened CSR?
Both sections 4.2 and 4.3 are still mainly concerned with the concept couple 
‘corporation – CSR’. The reason for that is that the couple was considered to 
be the main problem ‘at first sight’. The corporation is treated as a moral actor 
and CSR – in its toolkit approach – mainly deals with the corporate level. The 
weakening of the corporation and CSR creates the space needed for section 4.4, 
where the oltreuomo is introduced within the context of CSR. Is this concept 
suitable to bridge the gap between theory and practice? Vattimo has elaborated 
the Nietzschean concept of the Übermensch in a way that is very different 
from the Nazi interpretation. Surprisingly, his postmetaphysical reflections led 
Vattimo back to the Christian concept of carità. A part of section 4.4 explores 
some possibilities of the concepts of l’oltreuomo and carità for CSR.
 Until now, the concepts of the corporation and CSR were discussed from the 
perspective of weak thought, and one could conclude that I propose a radical 
change in Management studies as a whole. Or is it possible to start from 
certain theories and adapt from there gradually? In section 4.5 some examples 
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are presented of management theories that are still modern, but might have 
some ingredients that can be considered weakish. This section is by no means 
attempting to be exhaustive, but offers a first indication of how the weakening 
of the corporation could be put into practice.
The penultimate section of this chapter is dedicated to the interpretative 
character of CSR and, following to its threefold manifestation, is the section 
that finally returns to the main question of his thesis, whether there is a 
possibility of a nihilistic hermeneutic perspective on CSR. The last section of 
this chapter turns towards the management curriculum, towards the place 
where management education and research takes place and which was the 
context within which this study was written.
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4.2 THE CORPORATION  AND CSR AS RESIDUES  
OF MODERN THOUGHT
Is it strange to consider the corporation and CSR to be metaphysics? Is CSR a form of ‘too much nostalgia for metaphysics’? In the introduction, I already connected the organization with technology as meant in Heidegger’s Question 
Concerning Technology. Organizations are manmade ‘tools’ to organize people 
and capital goods in such a way that a productive organ emerges from the 
imagination of the designer(s). So the organization may be considered modern. 
Does this modern character of organizations also make them metaphysical (and 
violent) in the sense Vattimo interprets it?
 Metaphysics is rooted in fear and the desire for dominion. In Hermeneutic 
Communism (37) Zabala and Vattimo state: ‘metaphysics is an aspect and a 
consequence of dominion, not its cause.’ In chapter three, I referred to two short 
passages from Genesis to illustrate the existential fear. The tower of Babel 
shows the fear of being scattered abroad. Having to deal with life on one’s own 
appears to be a terrifying prospect. ‘Names’, ‘collectives’, ‘wholes’ are created 
where the scared individual can find refuge. An organization can be perceived 
as such a collective and within it people seek for a common language (cfr. 
section 3.3.1, where language was analysed as an oppressive force as well), 
a common name, a common vision162, a shared vision163 and all individual 
interests must be aligned with this common language. 
162  Liker, in The Toyota Way, argues that in Lean management the long-term vision must always 
be at the centre of any decision-making and everyone, both employees in the own company as in 
the whole of the supply chain, must be fully aware of this grand vision. Womack, Roos and Jones 
(2007) argue along the same lines.
163  This even is he central ‘S’ (shared values) in the classic 7-S model by Peters, Waterman and 
Phillips (1980). In the original model the central ‘S’ was called ‘superordinated goals’.
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 Normally, this is not really a problem. In everyday life it seems quite alright 
to belong to a corporation ‘community’, as long as it is worthwhile. It delivers 
the means for a more or less comfortable life. But what if the corporation one 
has worked for so long and has provided shelter in an unsecure world goes 
bankrupt, or, in a less extreme scenario, has to reorganize? 
 People sometimes are prepared to climb the barricades if a government 
cuts purchasing power a few per cent. When an organization reorganizes and 
devastates the purchasing power of its employees, it is often taken for granted. 
Just remind the examples of companies that encouraged their employees to 
invest their pensions in shares of the company164. Pensions evaporated when 
business went wrong. People make themselves a name and are prepared to 
make huge sacrifices to benefit the group. This indeed resembles violence in 
the way Vattimo conceptualises it. 
 The way the goals of corporations sometimes crush the interests of people, 
when casualties are accepted in mines or textile factories in developing 
countries, are other examples of the violent potential of corporations. In pursuit 
of wealth, collateral damage seems to be taken for granted. These examples 
verify the hypothesis that corporations are modern, metaphysical, strong 
thought exactly in the way Vattimo analyses it. They have a violent potential. 
That corporations have such a potential does not mean that they are always 
and necessarily violent. Corporations have the potential to be violent and this 
potential now and then manifests in actual situations. 
 Frederick never analyses corporations in terms like the aforementioned, 
but he acknowledges that corporations are presupposed in the CSR debate. 
By replacing Corporation by Cosmos in his concept of CSR4, he decentres the 
corporation. In this chapter, I propose a possibility to weaken the concept of 
corporation. Decentring the corporation might not be enough: the corporation 
can be as violent as ever, also when it is not anymore at the centre of attention. 
To disarm the corporation, the concept itself must be weakened.
 The weakening of the corporation implies a fundamental change in the way 
we look at them, because organizations are intrinsically metaphysical. They are 
mainly concerned with structure and hierarchy. The explicit separation of theory 
and practice (of thinking and doing) proposed by Taylor (Scientific Management) 
a century ago has survived ever since. 
So if the corporation is modern and metaphysical, what about CSR? In its 
manifestation as a debate, CSR appears to have become increasingly strong 
thought. Where Bowen (1953) explicitly preferred asking questions to spelling 
out of answers, and Johnson (1971) used the metaphor of the Renaissance man, 
164  E.g. Enron in the US, and in the Netherlands the employees of DAF company lost much of 
their savings, invested in the company.
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later authors became more interested in the answers. Especially sustainability 
scholars have a tendency to be prescriptive. The back cover of Elkington’s 
landmark Cannibals With Forks (1997) even uses the strong ‘imperative’.
 But is this thought that wants to convince people to change their habits 
into more sustainable ones, metaphysical in the way Vattimo interprets it, that 
is violent? Many authors on CSR are convinced that they offer opinions that are 
worthwhile reading and offer perspectives towards a better world. However, this 
also was the case with the Brigate rosse and it is still the case with all kinds of 
fundamentalism. Strong thought does not have to be violent at every moment, 
it has violent potential. In the case of CSR, the violence lies in the ‘metaphysical 
trap’ that wants to prescribe what one should do. The authors apparently do not 
‘trust’ the reader and spell out the answers. The responsibility of the reader is 
reduced to the implementation of the path prescribed.
 On the other hand, the supposedly radical scholars never fully appreciate 
the consequences of sustainability as far as the management curriculum is 
concerned. As I argued in section 2.4.3, maintaining DCF (discounted cash flow) 
methods as the basis of the finance curriculum is, by definition, contradictory to 
Brundtland principles165. The former starts from the premises that future value 
is less valuable than present value, while the latter stresses that the opposite is 
true166. One of the key instruments corporations use in decision making, internal 
rate of return or net present value calculations, is hence beyond criticism in 
sustainability literature. Balancing the three p’s at some point always involves 
a choice between the p’s because planet and profit start from contradictory 
premises. This means that some basic economic presuppositions remain 
unquestioned. It means that, ultimately, capitalism itself is never questioned. 
 CSR has another characteristic of metaphysics: especially in its appearance 
as a ‘toolkit’, CSR creates the ‘Platonic hierarchies’ Vattimo writes about. The 
(theoretical) tools are abstractions and not necessarily connected to everyday 
life of practitioners, who are supposed to apply them in their work. People 
are sometimes forced to pledge an oath and promise their loyalty to the 
corporation’s (or a sector’s167) values. The tools do interfere with everyday life, 
although they are useless when everyday life situations appear.
165  Elkington uses the word paradigm, but not in the meaning Kuhn gives it. In this example 
one may very well speak of incommensurability of paradigms: planet and profit are built upon 
intrinsically contradictory presuppositions. 
166  The general formula for present value even shows an exponential relationship: the value of 
a future cash flow decreases exponentially.
167  In the Netherlands, the ‘banker’s oath’ was introduced in order to create awareness with 
banking professionals of the moral implications of their profession and to restore the trust in the 
Dutch banking sector. 
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To recapitulate, one encounters both the corporation and CSR as metaphysical 
‘wholes’, abstractions from everyday life that have universal claims. Hierarchies 
are supposed to be necessary, and responsibility is conceptualised in universal 
terms. An alternative does not exist, because that would supposedly imply 
relativism. Are we trapped in the false dilemma of universalism – relativism and 
the separation between theory and practice at the same time? This study claims 
that there is a way out of both these traps, by means of nihilism, by means of 
weak thought. Can the violent potential of both the corporation and CSR indeed 
be weakened? 
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4.3  WEAKENING CSR:  TOWARDS A NIHILISTIC 
CORPORATION
In a society where the real world has turned into a fable, the corporation itself appears as one. Ladd (1984) even speaks of corporate ‘mythology’. The corporation is a fable, treated by many as an artificial person. It is definitely 
not a person, but a construction, an imaginary friend that one treats as if it is 
real.
 Still, this imaginary friend of ours – or an enemy, when we wait for half an 
hour on the telephone trying to speak to a real person of the corporation’s call 
centre – seems very real: it pays me, I can buy things from it. The corporation is 
an example of the creative force ex nihilo of mankind. 
 The creation we call corporation or organization became increasingly more 
important during the twentieth century, with great impact on the actual lives 
of people. Case studies like that of Nestlé, supposedly acquiring fresh water 
reserves wherever possible, and of companies in the field of genetics patenting 
genetic structures of agricultural products, show that corporations have 
obtained powers that might interfere with world food supplies. 
 In pessimistic views, one could fear the power of the large corporations. 
Their impact on society has become immense. With technology, not only 
mechanical technology and ICT, but also with the invention of the corporation, 
mankind has opened a Pandora’s Box. Mankind has not started to fully 
understand the consequences of its inventions and perhaps it should be more 
critical about the products of its creative capacities. 
In the chapter dedicated to Vattimo, we met him as an optimistic philosopher. 
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The idea of the corporation as another threatening piece of technology does 
not necessarily mean the end of the story. In What Would Google Do, Jeff Jarvis 
writes about his experiences with blogging about Dell Company. The success 
of his blog campaign forced a major company on ‘its knees’. Is his story an 
example of what Vattimo describes as the emancipatory possibilities of ICT? 
One individual – provided that this individual is capable to use ICT possibilities 
– expressing his or her opinion, with unforeseen results. 
 Besides the rather grim view of the corporation as a power base, the concept 
of the corporation also provides individuals with a means to express oneself, 
to establish one’s own creation. The corporation could, perceived in this way, 
also be part of the process of life becoming more aesthetic. This illustrates the 
ambiguous character of the corporation. The individual uses the corporation for 
its needs and identity with the risk of being crushed by it at some moment.
  
Seen from the perspective of the corporation, society is something fluid as 
well. Jarvis’ story, as well as the stories of Facebook and Twitter, who have 
developed from zero to multibillion companies in unbelievably short periods of 
time, shows how the environments of corporations are continuously changing. 
Society, for corporations, has also become more like a fable, in which only 
the most creative can be successful. The attention paid to creativity in recent 
(popular) management and educational literature168 underlines the idea that 
not the one who knows his facts will be successful, but the one who has the 
most creative interpretations.
  This perspective – of the corporation – of course neglects the idea of the 
corporation as a fable, at least for a moment. The fable is part of our reality, and 
I continue to dream although I am aware of the fact that I am dreaming. This is 
consistent with the concept Vattimo uses often, the concept of Verwindung. The 
modern is not denied but accepted. I can accept the idea that the corporation is 
technology, a manmade construct, together with the idea that it does interfere 
with my actual life.
 The interference of a corporation with everyday life can, however, be very 
threatening. As a residue of modern thought, the corporation has a tendency to 
become an independent entity, a ‘whole’ with interests overruling the interests 
of individuals and with individuals becoming dependant of it. In the story of 
the tower of Babel, the name of the project is well-known and remembered, but 
the individuals who worked on it and those who died, while working, remain 
anonymous.
168  E.g. Daniel Pink (2008: a Whole New Mind) and with him countless TED talks on the 
importance of creativity as one of the so-called 21st century skills. Cfr. also the research into the 
concequenses of these skills for education, internationally by OECD (2015), in the Netherlands by 
Allen and Van der Velden (2011). 
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   Should the concept of the corporation therefore be weakened? Should CSR 
be weakened? Or should CSR be used as a means to weaken the corporation? 
In the tool-oriented approach to CSR, the toolkit is fitted for use within the 
corporation. CSR appears as technology as well and thus does not provide 
us with an opportunity to weaken the corporation, but rather strengthens its 
metaphysical potential.
 Weakening CSR could leave one with a strange feeling: are the issues 
addressed by many CSR scholars not worthwhile striving for? Was the threat 
of totalitarianism during the fifties not real? Were not emancipation and 
consumerism relevant ideals during the sixties? Is not sustainability an issue 
worthwhile fighting for? Should sustainability not be imperative?
 One could mistake my plea for nihilism for relativism. Weakening CSR would 
give climate sceptics a possibility to escape their responsibility if it would lead 
to a simple ‘anything goes’. Faithful to the idea of Verwindung, I do not reject the 
(modern) toolkit approach of CSR, nor do I deny the corporation as a very strong 
fable. CSR lacks an interpretative dimension that could bridge the gap between 
theory and practice and would place CSR in the midst of everyday life of 
corporate representatives. The Taylorian separation of thinking and doing that 
also legitimises a toolkit approach towards CSR could be overcome by means 
of weak thought. In a society that claims to have developed into a knowledge 
economy, with knowledge workers at the core, the separation of thinking and 
doing has become obsolete.
In this study, and certainly in this section, the corporation and CSR are often 
treated as a couple, both of them being metaphysical. This might appear 
‘fuzzy’ to some readers: the title of this study only mentions CSR and so it 
seems to lose focus. As the debate developed, this interdependence became 
ever stronger, not just because the very concept of CSR presupposes the 
‘C’. It became a question of ‘how, not why’ and scholars stopped asking 
uncomfortable questions about the basic premises that are beneath the 
surface. The technology of the corporation was never questioned, as was the 
capitalist ideology. No one seemed to ask anymore whether there could be 
some other means by which society can be organized. Reflecting upon CSR 
almost immediately implies reflection upon the concept of the corporation and 
upon the society it communicates with.
 The self-evident character of the corporation and the capitalist system 
have made them metaphysical in almost the same way religious ideologies 
are. The corporation is beyond discussion and it has been given an important 
role, even in societal issues. CSR scholars (myself included) have claimed that 
corporations play an important role in society and that reflection upon their 
responsibility is very important. However, this comes with a risk: if one time and 
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time again stresses the importance of corporations and gives ‘them’ a role in 
dealing with societal issues, then one is actually increasing their metaphysical 
strength. 
 Perhaps, one should return to Friedman again, to his argument that societal 
issues ought to be discussed in the public domain and corporations must 
behave according to the decisions that are made in the public domain. If the 
balance between the public domain and corporations is lost, individuals and 
groups of individuals that run the corporation have opportunities to use the 
corporation as a cover for their activities. The movie The Smartest Guys in the 
Room169 shows how disastrous the consequences can be when we put too much 
trust in corporations or the free market.
 Like markets, corporations as such are not immoral. They are amoral. Again, 
Friedman has a point when he argues that not corporations, but individuals 
are moral actors. The morality of a corporation depends of the individuals 
representing them. That explains why the toolkit approach of CSR has been 
not only popular, but even necessary: if a corporation is amoral, one should 
construct it in such a way that the individual representatives are (at least) 
stimulated to behave responsibly. 
 At the same time, when corporations become too successful, people tend to 
‘glorify’ them. Again, Enron is a nice example, but the same can be said about 
the banks that became global players before the financial crisis. As long as 
they grew, as their profits grew, they were hailed as champions as if they were 
soccer teams. When they fell of their plinth, they were almost demonised. Are 
these examples of corporate irresponsibility or of societal irresponsibility? 
Can I blame the banker for not behaving according to the caricature that I 
constructed myself? When I glorify a champion of industry I should not be 
disappointed when he does not behave according to my representation. 
 Weakening CSR also means a weakening of societies’ expectations of 
corporations and their representatives. If society or the public domain loses 
its critical strength, one must not blame corporations if things go wrong. 
Responsibility is not only a corporate matter. This would imply stepping 
into the trap of the separation fallacy again. Corporations cannot be treated 
as independent entities. They are part of society as are the representatives 
working within its boundaries. 
 CSR is not just about the corporation interpreting its environment. It is also 
about the corporation being interpreted continuously. The ability to respond 
is not just a matter of the corporation. It is a matter of society as well and its 
often-irrational expectations of those in charge.
169  A documentary (2005), directed by Alex Gibney about the rise and fall of Enron.
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In the paragraphs above, the corporation seems to be a problem: it is 
metaphysical. This, however, is inconsistent with the idea that it actually is a 
concept, incapable of being something with a mind of its own. It is a fable, an 
interpretation by others. Only if I treat the corporation as a power base, it can 
be such. Only if I allow the corporation to be a person it can manifest itself as 
such.
 Of course, if I am alone in my opinion that a corporation is not a person, and 
everyone else does accept the corporation as a reality, it becomes a reality. It is 
as with the emperor’s clothes: as long as the child does not ask questions, the 
fable continues to be real.  
 Only individuals can weaken a corporation and that is by no means easy. 
A strange paradox arises: if the corporation is weakened, the safe haven 
weakens as well. I lose the security that the dream offers me. The dream that 
this corporation will never cease to exist and it will never cease to provide 
the means necessary to pay my mortgage. When I stop dreaming, I lose the 
certainties, perhaps even (a part of) my identity, as far as that is shaped by the 
dream I am a part of. Who is the one capable of such an exercise?
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4.4  L’OLTREUOMO  AND CSR
The oltreuomo is the concept Vattimo uses to indicate the one capable of dealing with the nihilist condition, the one capable of a free attitude towards metaphysics but at the same time avoiding new metaphysical 
positions170. Is he or she the one that can overcome the separation of theory 
and practice? How do the concepts of l’oltreuomo, the corporation and CSR 
relate to one another? (How) Can this oltreuomo be part of corporate life? What 
does it mean that the oltreuomo recognises both the CSR debate and corporate 
output as fables, as interpretations, as open-ended traditions with limitless 
possibilities of new interpretations? Is it possible to (re)connect the debate, 
corporate output and everyday life?
Can the oltreuomo still be an employee? Does the weakening of the corporation 
and of CSR imply that one should abandon the corporation? Personally, I do not 
think this is the case, and I again refer to Verwindung to illustrate this. A radical 
break-up with the corporation could result in a new metaphysical position 
again, as would a radical anti-capitalist position. Hermeneutics, not in the least 
the nihilist variety, appreciates tradition and from there one can search for new 
possibilities, for infinite possible futures (cfr. 3.3.3). 
 The tradition or traditions one is part of are never ‘holy’. CSR is not and 
the corporation is not. It can be open to new possibilities and it is up to the 
170  I deliberately use oltreuomo, instead of Übermensch, because the interpretation by Vattimo 
does not exactly correspond with Nietzsche’s concept. Although always respectful, Vattimo has 
created a concept that has become Vattimian, like he has done with Verwindung.
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interpreter to explore these possibilities. This could imply an open attitude 
towards situations one is in and towards future options. For individuals with 
an ‘inclination’ to metaphysics (cfr. the ‘persuasiveness of foundation’), this 
can very well be a difficult, if not impossible task. Is this a problem? Again the 
metaphysical trap lurks. If I consider people with such an inclination, with a 
nostalgia for metaphysics indeed nostalgic, am I not myself again entering 
a metaphysical position, with a violent potential? The postmetaphysical 
philosopher becomes a kind of an evangelist, with the purpose to ‘convert’ other 
people to postmetaphysics. Are the political writings of Vattimo an example of 
this metaphysical trap? 
 Postmetaphysics could indeed imply a new metaphysical position. 
Vattimo sometimes uses another term, ultrametaphysics, to indicate his ‘non-
metaphysical postmetaphisical’ position. ‘Ultra’ indicates a position still very 
much connected to metaphysics, an awareness of this connection and modesty 
in its pretences to be different. Might perhaps the awareness of the tendency 
of concepts to become absolute enough to become ultrametaphysical? For 
practical purposes and for as long it is convenient the fables can be taken for 
granted as real. 
 Instead of a victim of strong concepts, l’oltreuomo becomes someone who 
uses the concept of corporation in the ‘aesthetization’ of his or her existence. 
Thus, the corporation becomes what it should be: an instrument – a toy – in the 
hands of l’oltreuomo.  
Can the oltreuomo be an employer or a manager, Il capo debole? In times 
where strong and visionary leadership is called for, the weak leader or weak 
manager seems rather a silly concept to suggest. Or is it? It might depend 
upon the members of the organization whether there is room for weak 
management. In organizations accustomed to strong thought, weak thought can 
be impossible to adopt. Again, the manager or owner of a company who wants 
to take seriously this strange weak thought does not only think for himself, 
he or she bears responsibility for others as well and if they do not accept this 
experimental and interpretative practice, it can be difficult to work out ways to 
live according to these principles. 
 Which principles are the principles of weak thought, if there are any 
(principles is a word that sounds suspiciously contradictory to weak thought). 
For Vattimo the ultimate principle appears to be carità (charity). Does carità 
close the gap between theory and practice? Does not carità again introduce a 
universal into CSR? Is not carità the new imperative that brings one closer to 
Kantian deontology than one would like to admit? 
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 Carità, in the way Vattimo conceptualizes it, places ethics where it belongs, 
which is in everyday life, with its countless everyday life situations. Everyday 
life, with its countless situations that can be interpreted limitlessly. Answers 
to these limitless interpretative possibilities are likewise infinite and my 
interpretation of today might differ from the one I produce tomorrow. 
Responsibility is drawn into everyday life and out of the dream that there is one 
right answer. The ability to respond can only exist in everyday life situations 
and carità is an appeal not to turn away from everyday life by means of safe 
abstractions: abstractions like the corporation, in the name of which individuals 
can become nameless sacrifices. And perhaps also vice versa: abstractions like 
the corporation, in the name of which individuals can look at themselves as 
victims?
 However, although never intended to be a new universal, carità can easily 
be interpreted as one if it becomes a ‘thing’, a principle. As an invitation it 
retains its weakness. This implies that responsibility is placed there where 
it belongs: with(in) the moral actor. But what happens if a moral actor is 
someone who refuses to reflect? What happens if a moral actor is not capable 
of moral reflection? What happens when a moral actor is indifferent to his or 
her tradition or that of others? Perhaps the attitude towards such individuals 
should be the task of politics, or of a dialogue within the group of people that 
together shape the weakened corporation. 
For Gianni Vattimo, carità is a principle that surfaces from his own tradition. It 
fits within his personal itinerary. The oltreuomo might be someone who does 
not exactly copy the ideas of Gianni Vattimo, but reflects upon his or her own 
tradition and interprets and re-interprets that. Again, such an interpretation of 
carità suggests profound knowledge of the traditions one is part of. Vattimo 
never entered the field of Management studies or Business administration, 
which is a part of my own ‘tradition’. Can, in the tradition where I come from, the 
one of Business administration, examples of organizational practices be found 
that correspond with this interpretative freedom? In the next section I shall 
look at some possible examples that came to mind during this study.
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4.5  EXAMPLES OF WEAK CORPORATIONS OR  
WEAK PRACTICES?
Is all thought about the corporation and CSR strong, metaphysical thought? If traces of metaphysics can be found in CSR (section 4.2), perhaps traces of weak thought can be found as well. I think there are some interesting 
examples of theories and companies that have at least some of the ingredients 
of weak thought. Whether they really are, remains to be seen, but I have chosen 
to mention some. Three examples are about possible weakness in corporate 
thought and in the last paragraphs I again return to CSR.
Lean thinking: the first example is a theoretical concept, currently very 
popular, at least in some industries. In my work at Avans University of Applied 
Science, School for Built Environment, many students graduate in this field, 
implementing (elements of) Lean management within companies, and 
Elkington (1997, 106 and 203 – 204) presents it as one of the concepts that 
can be helpful in our attempts to create a more sustainable world. The idea of 
waste reduction is a key concept of lean thinking (Liker 2004, chapter 3), which 
of course appeals to the sustainability authors. 
 The origins of ‘the Toyota Production System’ are to be found in social 
issues, rather than the search for profit171. If we are to believe the story of lean 
production, the other name of the Toyota production system, it belongs to the 
DNA of the Toyota Company to balance the companies’ interests with those of 
171  Profit is presented as a means, rather than as a goal of a corporation. Long-term philosophy 
always overrules short-term profitability. Liker presents this focus on long-term philosophy as the 
first of the business principles of The Toyota Way.
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employees and society. The company should strive for the benefits of society 
as a whole, of the members of the supply chain and – finally – of the company 
itself (Liker 2004, 80 ff).
 One of the characteristics of Lean production is the go to gemba principle, 
or the idea that 1) the actual place where the work is being done is of great 
importance and 2) the individual worker has creative capacities to improve 
working procedures. This is a radical breach with the Taylorian idea that hands 
and brains should be separated (in 1913 he explicitly argues that workers 
were not capable of applying the principles of scientific management and that 
managerial and operational tasks should be separated). Lean thinking tries to 
re-integrate management and production work (theory and practice), although 
it does not undo hierarchy within the firm.
 One of the ideals of The Toyota Way is the conviction that individuals are 
able to think beyond their personal interests. The collective is always more 
important than interests of individual participants. This emphasis on the 
collective suggests that Lean thinking is again very metaphysical, although one 
should take into account that this way of thinking can be linked to the Japanese 
culture, which highly values the collective172. The concept of Lean production 
appears to be strong thought, as far as the attention for the collective is 
concerned.
 Another strong characteristic of Lean management is the absolute status it 
has been given by its advocates. There seems to be no alternative that equals 
Lean thought and it seems to have no drawbacks at all. Womack and Jones (The 
Machine that Changed the World 2007) use a large part of their book to prove 
the supremacy of Lean production over other production systems. Not a single 
critical remark can be heard.  
 However, Lean thinking does have some ‘weak’ traits: there is no fixed truth. 
Continuous improvement presupposes that there is no ultimate process within 
the firm. One always can improve processes and products. Although this also 
has some modern (utopian) characteristics – the belief in continuous progress 
– it is also an example of a hermeneutical practice. A situation is never a given, 
but rather a starting point for improvement. 
 The conviction that a current situation may not be given absolute value, 
gives Lean production at least some characteristics that may be called weak. 
At the same time the almost absolute value that is attributed to the collective 
makes it a metaphysical suspect again. In another theory other ingredients can 
be found that might contain a more weakened approach to the corporation.
172  Hofstede (2001), ranks Japan about halfway the scale of the individualism-index, with Anglo-
American countries at the top of the scale, followed by European countries. Hofstede explicitly 
mentions the ‘collectivist characteristics’ of Japanese culture.
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Sociocracy: another possibly ‘weakish’ theoretical concept, especially coined by 
scholars like Endeburg in the Netherlands, is the sociocratic organization, based 
upon the principle of decision making by consent (instead of consensus), and 
which is called (by its advocates) a step beyond democracy. In the following 
paragraphs the basic ingredients of sociocracy are described, based upon 
Endeburg (Sociocratie, 2002).
 The key ingredient of the sociocratic method is the procedure followed in 
decision-making: decision making by means of consent. All the participants at 
a meeting express whether they have an objection against a certain proposal. 
This principle of ‘no objection’ means that there can never be a (democratic) 
terror of a majority. There is not only a right to interpret differently (as in 
Hermeneutic Communism, 86) but rather an obligation of the collective to take 
seriously any interpretation that is sincerely different. 
 Consent and the way this is shaped in the sociocratic method, transparent 
decision-making at all levels, implies a certain responsibility of the participants 
in the process: one cannot just say ‘I object’, but one has to indicate why this 
is the case. There is a responsibility at the part of the participant in so far 
that one actively takes part in the decision-making process. In this respect 
sociocracy equals Lean thinking that also explicitly attributes responsibilities to 
all members of a corporation (and its subcontractors).
 The other key element of sociocracy is the bottom up construction of 
organizations, through circles. Every circle is a team, with an own responsibility, 
and each circle is represented in a higher circle (through the third ingredient 
– double loop representation – each circle is represented by two members 
in a near higher circle). The existence of higher circles appreciates the 
Mintzbergian conviction that something like management is necessary for an 
organization. The way these circles are constructed is very different from the 
way organizations are designed traditionally.
 Is this sociocratic method again a form of metaphysics in disguise? Is it 
another ‘perfect’ way of running an organization? It certainly appreciates some 
of the criticism of strong thought and takes into account the sincere objections 
within a group. The weak always has a voice.
 Although Semmler does not use the sociocratic vocabulary in his work, 
the Brazilian company Semco fits within this section very well173. Semmlers 
approach to the corporation shows many similarities with sociocratic principles. 
It seems that, in order to find interesting experiments in both politics and 
business, we must turn to the South American continent: Vattimo does so in his 
political works and Semmler also seems to offer interesting points of view on 
the way one can do business.
173  Although Turning the Tables, by Ricardo Semmler will not be appreciated as a scientificly 
valid source, it offers a – although one-sided – narrative of an alternative way of thinking about the 
corporation.
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The 80-20 rule: the third example is a principle, rather than a coherent theory 
of organization. Although in recent years it has regained fame because of 
Google, it was adopted almost a century ago by 3M174. It simply means that, 
instead of trying to control employees, it gives them a certain freedom (one 
day a week) to do ‘whatever they want’. It is said (Jarvis 2009) that many of the 
innovations marketed by Google can be directly traced back to projects initiated 
in this free space. 
 The 20% rule supposes that innovation – creativity – cannot be fully 
managed. It provides free space in which individuals can prosper. It remains 
a managerial tool insofar that space has to be created at some point. The 
example in itself does not presuppose weak thought. Companies can adopt 
this principle and be violently metaphysical at the same time175. It is again an 
example of weaky things that can be found in a corporate reality that is not at 
all weak.
All examples have in common that they show an appreciation for the individual 
members of the corporation. Lean management undoes the separation of 
thinking and doing, that is characteristic since Scientific Management. The 
sociocratic organization is being run by its members and Google offers 
professionals free space to be creative. However, the concept of the corporation 
in all three examples is still quite strong. The ‘whole’ remains untouched. 
Presumably, the greatest challenge of weak thought will be the dismantlement 
of the concept of the corporation. 
Can traces of ‘weakness’ be found in CSR as well? In the second chapter of this 
thesis some examples came to the surface. Personal reflection mainly occupied 
Bowen while Johnson was concerned with the complexity of managerial work. 
Bowen is highly suspicious towards prescriptive ethics and leaves morality with 
the professional. 
Milton Friedman, a representative of rather strong economic thought, states 
that CSR is too strong a concept. He argues that the public domain should 
be the place where debates on morality should take place. CSR attributes 
too many tasks to the corporation and makes it stronger than is absolutely 
necessary. Corporations should simply obey the law and the law should be the 
reflection of public opinion on certain issues. On the other hand, CSR scholars 
during the years have addressed many issues. Is the debate on CSR not a part 
174  It was during the first year of my studies in Business Administration that I first encountered 
this principle in Griffin and Ebert (1989) and Robbins (1990). The latter mentions that from the 
1920s onward, researchers at 3M had 15% of their time to spend on whatever project they wanted. 
175  Jarvis (2009) explicitly mentions that Google researchers are expected to be innovative; 
having no successful project at all does have implication on the long run.
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of the public domain? The CSR debate has been a forum to discuss all kinds of 
issues during the years. 
 One of the authors who most explicitly tried to ‘weaken’ CSR is Bill 
Frederick, who in the end – when he arrives at CSR4 – attempts to open up the 
debate by decentring the corporation and by asking attention for the personal 
motives of the professional. Because he wants to stick to the acronym of CSR 
he calls this personal dimension religion. Others take up this issue in the 
debate on business and spirituality. 
The examples in this section are not meant to give an exhaustive list of 
examples. Neither are they thoroughly elaborated yet. This thesis wanted to 
do such a thing with CSR and the examples show that there are many other 
places within the field of Management studies that can be approached likewise. 
This section is an invitation to examine one’s own tradition and create new 
directions from where one finds oneself.
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4.6  CORPORATIONS AND CSR AS INTERPRETATIVE PRACTICES
In the previous sections, 1) the metaphysical character of the corporation and CSR was explicated, 2) some consequences of weak thought for both the corporation, CSR and 3) l’oltreuomo were encircled and 4) some examples 
were given of how a certain degree of weakness already might exist. In this 
section, finally, the hypothesis is elaborated that CSR is an interpretative 
practice. How can this interpretative practice benefit from hermeneutic 
philosophy? Again, the distinction is used, that was introduced in the 
introduction that CSR appears as 1) a debate, 2) planned corporate output and 
3) unplanned behaviour of corporate representatives.
CSR as a debate: CSR has developed from a reflection by some who were 
considered to be wise men (David was a Harvard dean and Bowen was invited 
to reflect upon responsibility of the businessman) into a real debate. The 
debate has been a continuous re-interpretation of the concept of responsibility 
of (or within) the corporation. From a reflection by wise men it developed into 
strong thought, into a kind of imperative. Nowadays, corporations who do not 
use certain ingredients of the CSR toolkit cannot compete in tender procedures. 
In the second chapter the debate was analysed. The debate, the tradition of CSR 
was not taken for granted, it was re-examined for its roots in a broader cultural 
context, for its origins, for its varieties. This exercise fitted within the goals of 
this thesis, but could also serve as a starting point for further investigation. The 
development of the concept of responsibility throughout the centuries could 
further inspire nowadays businessmen of today in their interpretative quest for 
what responsibility could mean for them.
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 CSR appeared as an open and dynamic concept and it developed in a 
continuous interaction with societal issues. At the same time Frederick criticized 
it for being too much locked up in itself, ignoring other related debates, like 
(business) ethics. Responsibility, strangely enough remained an intuitive concept 
for too long. Hermeneutics could help open up the debate even further, starting 
from a more modest position that not prescribes but rather searches for ways to 
give voice to the possible practices of corporate responsibility.
 Responsibility showed itself as a rather complex and difficult concept. 
Could one think of an even more radical position towards CSR, a position that 
defies the very idea? Is this weak thought not too friendly for this – still always 
capitalist – concept? Earlier I have showed that a radical position towards 
CSR would imply a new metaphysical position. But simultaneously a paradox 
would arise: How can one stop debating on CSR? If I would plea for an end of 
CSR, I would be still be continuing it by this plea as by the implicit invitation 
to respond again. The phenomenon ‘CSR debate’ seems to exist and there are 
two options as far as my relation towards it is concerned: participate or ignore. 
Relativism might lead to indifference, nihilism need not. Would not indifference 
towards a phenomenon that is concerned with the behaviour of corporations 
– that are such a significant part of our world – be irresponsible? The nihilist 
hermeneutic approach opens up spaces for dialogue about what responsibility 
might be in this or that situation. 
 This or that situation, an appreciation of the uniqueness and diversity of 
everyday life situations and a way out of the universalism – relativism trap. This 
escape shows itself in the new ways one can approach the other manifestations 
of CSR.
Corporate output as interpretative practice: CSR policies, web pages containing 
information on the CSR practices of corporations, concepts like ‘stakeholder 
dialogue’ all are examples of CSR as a part of corporate reality that are in fact 
interpretative practices. What content is communicated and to whom? Who are 
the relevant stakeholders? What does the concept ‘dialogue’ mean if applied to 
stakeholders of the corporation? It is all hermeneutics, art of interpretation.
 The toolbox approach of CSR can be very useful for the production 
of corporate output. The corporation perceived as a whole need not be 
abandoned completely, but can it be weakened in such a way that the whole 
is taken slightly less for granted? In hermeneutics there is the concept of the 
hermeneutic circle, which implies an attention for both the whole and the 
constitutive parts. Can we think of a CSR that also appreciates the whole and its 
parts? 
 When the corporation ‘produces’ outputs, these are almost always abstracted 
from their actual creator. While universities use the names of their professors 
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(although this certainly does not mean that universities are weak organizations) 
corporations seldom give credit to the brilliant minds that made up the 
products and services they offer. Why do we know the names of the members of 
the board and not the names of the people that actually are responsible for the 
success of the company? Exceptions are those corporations that are led by their 
founders. If the corporation pays more attention to the individuals that together 
form it, if the corporation slightly reduces its presence, if the corporation 
becomes slightly more transparent, could the corporation then become slightly 
weaker? The corporation could perhaps become more the gathering of a group 
of individuals rather than an independently existing unity.
 On the other hand, it seems that society demands corporations to behave as 
they do. The weakening of CSR could be dependant of the way society perceives 
the corporation, or, rather, the way society tends to judge the corporation. 
If society all too quickly demonises corporate practices corporations can be 
expected to close ranks. Transparency can only increase if mistakes are seen 
as possible consequences of decision-making in complex situations. Is there 
a possibility of a non-violent and still critical relationship between business 
and society? One should keep in mind that the imperatives on societal issues 
are sometimes postulated by rather metaphysically oriented individuals and 
organizations (e.g. the violence of the Animal Liberation Front). Or is this 
interpretation too friendly for CSR practitioners?
 A final remark on corporate output is about corporate tradition itself. 
Although this may sound like a paradox, is enough attention being paid to 
the history of the corporation? Because of the importance of profitability 
and growth companies are simply bought and sold, without any attention for 
the idea of the corporation as a tradition of its own, a culture of its own. It is 
objectified as something that can be traded and there seems to be no attention 
for the story of the corporation, the relationship it has with the people working 
within its borders and the community that surrounds it. Is a corporation not a 
community and is it not part of a community? Has the one-sided view of the 
corporation – as an object that one can buy and sell – not made possible that 
people decide over the corporation with only one purpose in mind? 
  So hermeneutics, with its attention for tradition could help re-focus CSR 
as far as it is corporate output is concerned. On the one hand it could weaken 
the corporation by a reduction of the strength of the corporation, perceived as 
a unity. On the other hand it calls for a weakening of the corporation from the 
perspective of society: a tortoise will not show its head when it knows there is 
someone waiting to chop it off. Finally, more attention for the corporation as a 
community with a tradition of its own demands a less one-sided capitalist view 
of the firm, a weakening of capitalism as well.
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CSR and the individual representative of the corporation: The toolkit-oriented 
approach of CSR leaves the individual level more or less unattended although, 
in the end, individuals represent the corporation and organizational measures 
can never deal with all possible real-life situations. At some point the 
corporation has to give up the objective to control and accept that there will 
always be an area ‘below the radar’ of management control. At that moment, the 
only ‘tool’ the corporation has left is trust. The employee at some point must 
be trusted with the corporation’s interests and in the corporation’s interest. 
The corporation cannot ‘do’ anything but rely on the moral competency of 
the employee. Instead of relying on codes of conduct, the corporation should 
perhaps focus more on the moral competencies of its members and on the 
development of these competencies. Perceived in this way, CSR becomes 
individual interpretative practice. 
 The management control problem even becomes more urgent if one 
acknowledges what Peter Drucker (1999) argues: in our modern society, the 
majority of the labour force has developed from production labourers first 
towards information labourers and now towards knowledge labourers. This 
shift towards knowledge work caused authors like Donald Schön to develop 
their ideas about professionals and the nature of the work of the professional. 
The (translated) title of a work by Weggeman summarizes the management 
problem with this kind of work: don’t even try to manage professionals176. 
More than production workers, professionals have the possibility to ‘fly below 
radar’, simply because their work is so dependent of their personal capabilities 
and creativity. The only managerial tool might be to provide space: a certain 
space where professionals can reflect upon the question of responsibility, thus 
stimulating the continuous development of moral awareness of the members of 
the corporation. This space might resemble what Painter-Morland (2008, 256) 
calls ‘a rhetorical space’. 
While reflecting upon the individual level one has to return to the Vattimian 
concept of l’oltreuomo. This concept was the playful, creative individual, able 
to develop free attitudes towards his or her tradition and to invent countless 
possible futures. If within corporations, a certain space for moral reflection is 
realised, does this concept reveal some ingredients for how such a space could 
be filled?
 Should professional (moral) development be less aimed at direct use 
and more at the tradition one is a part of? Or, aimed at, in words used by 
Gadamer, Bildung, sensus communis, Urteilskraft and Geschmack? Vattimo, in 
The Transparent Society (102, cfr. Section 3.4) associates Bildung with modern 
176  Weggeman (2007). The Dutch title is Leiding geven aan professionals? Niet doen!
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thought. Nevertheless, his philosophy is a constant reflection upon the thought 
of other authors and without thorough knowledge it is impossible to develop a 
playful and creative attitude towards ones tradition. The tradition one is part of 
can be interpreted twofold: the interpretation of the broader cultural traditions 
one is a part of and the corporate tradition one is a part of. One of the critical 
remarks Liker articulates in his The Toyota Way is the way traditional capitalist 
companies tend to ‘buy’ managers, while Toyota prefers longer term training 
programs for management. Managers thus learn to be part of the history of 
the company (Liker 2004, ch. 15). This attention for the corporate identity and 
culture could, on the other hand, again increase the metaphysical potential of 
the corporation.
 In section 4.4, the bridge between theory and practice was found in the 
Vattimian conceptualization of carità. The concept of carità both appreciates the 
diversity of situations one encounters and the diversity of possible answers. CSR 
thus becomes a competency, rather than a ready-to-use toolbox. A competency, 
an ability to observe, to read situations and reflect upon possible answers. Not 
an ability to articulate one best answer, but rather the creativity to interpret. 
 Carità frees CSR from the metaphysical trap, and frees the individual from 
the oppressive force of the corporation. The weakening of the corporation 
and of CSR make the walls of the corporation more transparent or even make 
them dissolve. The individual becomes visible. Does the individual also become 
vulnerable? The ability to respond, it was mentioned before, sometimes 
paradoxically creates a situation that might be threatening, because the 
corporation with its dissolved walls does not offer an opportunity to hide from 
the environment anymore. 
Hermeneutics – that is, nihilist hermeneutic philosophy – offers a possible 
enrichment of CSR, in all its three manifestations. The debate becomes more 
of a continuous dialogue, rather than the search for imperatives. A debate with 
a space for its embeddedness in a broader cultural context, not just aimed 
at ready-to-use managerial tools, but also at the concept of responsibility 
in everyday-life situations. Corporate output could become weaker, as the 
concept of the corporation becomes weaker. The corporation loses some of its 
metaphysical potential and transforms into an interpretative community of its 
members, rather than a whole, that is treated as a sole-purpose machine, with 
people as one of its production factors. CSR as unplanned individual behaviour 
gets the attention it deserves, allowing employees to develop themselves as 
practitioners, able to interpret, able to respond. 
 Hermeneutics does not deny the metaphysical strength of the corporation 
and CSR and does not provide a new kind of metaphysics. Weakened CSR 
makes one acknowledge the tradition one is part of and merely tries to weaken 
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fixed structures. Hermeneutic CSR is always interpretative orientation: where 
do I come from, where am I now and where can I go from where I am. The 
development of this ability to interpret, however, does not start in professional 
life, but already in education that precedes professional life. Therefore this 
chapter ends with some reflections upon the management curriculum.
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4.7  WEAK THOUGHT AND THE MANAGEMENT 
CURRICULUM
If one agrees with the aforementioned, that Corporate Social Responsibility indeed would benefit from hermeneutics, at the level of the debate, at the level of the corporation and at the individual level, this may have far reaching 
consequences for the management curriculum. What does it mean to educate 
l’oltreuomo?
 In the Netherlands, in recent years some promising developments took 
place in higher education (universities of applied sciences). Delnooz (2008) 
investigated the effects of his Creative Action Methodology, a research 
methodology with an emphasis on solving practical problems, with much 
attention for creativity next to research methods. His method is built upon 
the (nihilist) conviction that (in science) there is no fixed truth. The results of 
his study show how much difficulty students have with the nihilist condition, 
and thus verifies the ‘persuasiveness of foundation’ (3.3.2). Developers of 
management curricula should be aware of this persuasiveness and implement 
elements of hermeneutics not just in CSR. As I showed in the second chapter, 
Discounted Cashflow Methods, used in the finance curriculum, are usually 
presented as fixed truths. The possibility to develop a critical reflection of these 
methods could not only cause more awareness of the contingency of theories, it 
might even improve understanding of those theories.
 What does the hermeneutic awareness of the traditions one is part of imply? 
Does it imply a shift from attention for managerial tools to Bildung? Again, 
the Dutch context shows some interesting and promising developments: The 
Dutch education council (OnderwijsRaad) in 2011 published a series of essays 
on Bildung – interpreted contemporarily – in Dutch education. The Utrecht 
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University of Applied Science (Faculty of Education) initiated a process to 
implement Bildung in the education curriculum177. Whether this will result in a 
similar development in the management curricula remains to be seen, but there 
at least are some positive developments (in the Netherlands).
 If indeed the focus of management education shifts towards Bildung and 
the free attitude towards traditions, this implies a fundamental change of the 
management curriculum and perhaps finally CSR would return to the creed 
of one of its founding fathers, again aimed at the ‘individual soul searching’ 
(Bowen 1953) of the management (young) professional. Or am I too utopian, too 
nostalgic for metaphysics?
177  This process also resulted in the book En Denken... (2012), edited by van Stralen and Gude. A 
large numner of authors contributed to this book, that is an attempt to interpret the old concept of 
Bildung in a conteporary way.
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 CHAPTER 5 
CSR RE-DISCOVERED?
Whilst working on the final details of this study, someone posted a tweet, probably to annoy me (‘Stephen Hawking: ‘Philosophy is dead.’’178). The tweet was a reminder of what was written in the third chapter about 
‘framed democracy’ (section 3.3.5). Zabala and Vattimo mentioned the attempts 
of analytic philosophers like Searle – and his idea of ‘sane philosophy’ – to 
marginalize what is known as continental philosophy. Philosophy, according to 
them, should dissolve into science. In the CSR debate, the situation is about the 
same: philosophy – and certainly continental philosophy – has virtually no place in 
the debate. 
 This study, from its very beginning, has been an attempt to illustrate that 
philosophy is by no means ‘dead’. On the contrary, the absence of philosophy in the 
CSR debate has caused lacunae in the debate. CSR could benefit from philosophy. 
CSR could benefit from hermeneutic philosophy. This final chapter consists of 
a reflection upon the original questions, postulated in the introduction, and a 
discussion with some recommendations for further research.
178  Hawking did actually say this in 2010. 
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5.1  HERMENEUTIC PHILOSOPHY AND CSR?
Derrida called responsibility ‘this thing’. What about this ‘thing’ Corporate Social Responsibility? For the majority of CSR scholars and practitioners, CSR would be preferably be a ‘thing’, something one can grasp and 
something one can control. They propose a toolkit approach towards CSR, or a 
dashboard approach, that translates CSR into measurable variables. Red lights 
pop up whenever something is about to go wrong. The CSR manager, like a 
mechanic, performs the necessary corrections and the corporation is on the 
road again.
 In the four preceding chapters, all the premises and hypotheses were 
reviewed and thoroughly elaborated. It is now time to reflect upon the last 
hypothesis: The philosophical hermeneutics of Gianni Vattimo adds value to the 
CSR debate and to CSR practices. It even offers an opportunity to – again returning 
to the quotation of ten Bos and Painter-Morland – ‘reconsider some of our basic 
understandings of certain business practices’ and so perhaps even may ‘make a 
difference to our world’.
 Although Kaulingfreks (2007) especially pointed at the uselessness of 
philosophy, this thesis showed that philosophy sometimes is useful. In the case 
of CSR, a hermeneutic analysis was performed in two steps. It was refreshing 
to read Bowen and the other early authors. Bowen’s attention for the individual 
level and the loss of this attention became one of the re-discoveries of this 
study. The grand question of most of the early authors, however, was the way 
corporations could help to secure the ‘American dream’ against the threats that 
jeopardized it. The accusation of later authors that these front-runners of CSR 
were vague seems odd when one reads their works. Their concern simply had 
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nothing to do with the measurable corporate output that became the focus in 
the CSP era.
 The development of the debate on CSR mainly took place in the US and it 
seems justified to say that CSR is an American concept, which might explain 
that (continental) philosophy did not really influence the debate. Pragmatism 
seems to be the implicit foundation of CSR. By means of hermeneutics and 
more in particular the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo, this study does not 
only provide a novel approach towards CSR, it offers an approach rooted in 
continental philosophy. 
 Corporate Social Responsibility – in its diversity of dialects, like Corporate 
Citizenship, Corporate Social Performance, Sustainability, and Spirituality in 
business – has been analysed from a number of perspectives. Apparently, 
scholars felt a need to explore the possible meanings of CSR by means of 
metaphors, such as citizenship. It already has been implicitly hermeneutic. 
Hence, the introduction of nihilist hermeneutics further opens up the debate 
and invites participants to explore the possibilities of reflecting upon CSR. 
 The reflection upon metaphysics in a work about CSR at first sight may 
have seemed a bit too much. On the other hand, it opened a new perspective 
upon CSR. The characteristics of metaphysics and the way they fitted CSR and 
the corporation showed a side of CSR that until now rarely has been showed. 
To get to e deeper level, the ‘reconsideration of basic understanding of certain 
business practices’, it was necessary to address such fundamental concepts like 
metaphysics and Being. 
 The question of Being, related to CSR, it must be admitted, was not 
addressed explicitly. In section 3.3.2 it appeared that Vattimo considers weak 
thought and weak ontology to be synonyms, and so it seemed valid to examine 
the consequences of weak thought for CSR, without addressing the question 
of Being in the light of CSR. However, is the mere fact that Vattimo uses weak 
thought and weak ontlogy as synonyms a reason to simply continue to do so? 
Is Vattimo’s thought perhaps yet another example of Seinsvergessenheit? Does 
Vattimo perhaps ignore the question of Being? If weak thought can shed light 
upon CSR, can, mutatis mutandis, CSR produce new insights into ontology? 
According to Vattimo, Being gives itself in conversation, in dialogue. Can Being 
give itself in the interpretative practice of resonsibility as wel? Can it give itself 
in the interpretative practice of Corporate Social Responsibility?  I must admit 
that, after reading so many works of Gianni Vattimo, the question of Being 
remains mysterious. It would take yet another study to explore this mystery 
more thoroughly.
 The concept of l’oltreuomo coincides with a discussion among Dutch 
universities of applied sciences. This discussion criticizes the instrumental focus 
of these universities. They are too much focussed at useful competencies and 
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less at general development of the student. The attention for (a modern variety 
of) Bildung among policy makers shows that they acknowledge the need for 
change. The added value of l’oltreuomo could consist of a contribution to new 
visions of the (young) professional and the way he or she is educated. Could 
it be imaginable that future MBA’s pay as much attention to arts as they do to 
finance?
 Is there any added value in Vattimo’s revaluation of carità? It certainly put 
the spotlight at the idea that morality is to be found in the moment of decision. 
Carità is a splendid example of how knowledge of traditions and reflection 
upon these traditions can produce new ethical insights. Does carità dissolve 
when one abandons faith? One does not have to be a believer in the story of 
Wagner’s Ring der Nibelungen to learn something from it. Likewise, when one 
quits believing in the godliness of Christ, does this necessarily imply that the 
Sermon on the Mount loses all of its truth?
At different levels, this thesis produced insights that previously were concealed. 
One of the first discoveries was at the most superficial level, and was caused 
by the very decision to take seriously the reflections of Heidegger on asking 
questions. Simply by making a distinction between Befragte, Gefragte and 
Erfragte the threefold manifestation of CSR revealed itself. This manifestation 
until now was not made before, and I think that it has proven useful. For future 
research, this distinction between CSR – as a debate, as planned corporate 
output and unplanned behaviour of corporate representatives – may prove 
useful as well. For me, it was a simple illustration of how the decision to use 
a certain concept in a new context can produce new insights. The rest of the 
thesis proved the same, although slightly more complex.
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5.2  DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH
The previous section and chapters claim that philosophy can give new and perhaps even useful insights into the CSR debate. Whether such a philosophic approach will influence CSR practices, remains to be 
seen. And must the question – whether the content of this thesis can ‘make a 
difference to this world’ – not almost certainly be answered with a simple ‘no’? 
The sweatshops will not be replaced because of this thesis, won’t they? Is the 
very existence of sweatshops, of the smugglers who play with the lives of those, 
desperately trying to reach Europe, of irresponsibly behaving individuals not 
proof of the necessity of strong thought? Is the grimness of reality itself not the 
best evidence of what happens if naivety rules the world? Is the reluctance to 
accept universally valid moral criteria not a form of naivety?
 Questions like the aforementioned arose during the process of writing this 
thesis. Has it been worthwhile to dedicate such an amount of time and effort in 
this philosophical exercise? Would the time have been better spent on actual 
challenges like sustainability or poverty? However, these questions are modern 
ones that spring from the well of instrumental thought, and they betray a desire 
for immediate results. When, in an interview in 1964 the philosopher Hannah 
Arendt was asked whether she thought about the effects of her writings, she 
answered ‘ich will verstehen’, I want to understand179. This thesis started from 
a certain conviction, that corporations play an important role in society, and 
therefore that reflection upon the role of corporations and the responsibilities 
of corporations is relevant. This study showed that concepts like the corporation 
179  The entire interview (Hannah Arendt im Gespräch met Günther Gauss)can be found at Youtube.
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and corporate responsibility are not self-evident. Although this study may 
not immediately cause changes in the world of CSR, it proposes a new way of 
looking at CSR and invites readers to evaluate their own opinions about the 
subject, time and time again.
 Modern thought looks for answers, while philosophy, certainly when it 
is inspired by someone like Heidegger, highly values questions. The toolkit 
approach towards CSR tends to ignore reflective questions. This study tried to 
articulate that critique and intends to propose a revaluation of the question 
within CSR practices. The desire for action and immediate results causes a 
certain ‘laziness’, that is expressed by what I have called the characteristic 
sophism of metaphysics: the false dilemma, or the love for ‘either – or schemes’. 
The laziness consists in the reduction of complex issues to simpler structures. 
In the political arena, a complex issue like the Greek economic situation 
is reduced to extreme simplicity in order to make a point everybody can 
understand. The grim reality on the one hand asks for immediate action, but, at 
the other hand and at the same time for thorough reflection in order to avoid 
and criticize superficial answers.
This thesis proposes an approach to CSR that does not intend to prescribe. This 
may sound naive and counterintuitive. Is not a lack of ethical prescriptions the 
cause for the existence of sweatshops? A lack of prescriptions might be the 
reason for the existence of sweatshops, but those prescriptions are legislative. 
In countries without a decent legislation and a malfunctioning government 
irresponsible behaviour can flourish. My interpretation of weak thought is not 
utopic thought in disguise. Reality can be harsh and complicated. However, this 
does not imply that ethical imperatives are needed. Imperatives do not improve 
ethical competency, unless they are constructed by the moral actor or used 
by him or her to construct new ones. The ethical schools that try to prescribe 
their students what is right and wrong actually show a deep distrust of them. 
I, the teacher, do not think you are capable of thinking by yourself, so I better 
tell you what is right and what is wrong. If one defines ethics as reflection upon 
morality, then prescriptive ethics might not be ethics at all. Within CSR, more 
attention should be paid to the reflective track.
The connection of CSR and hermeneutic philosophy did produce new 
insights. It has been an example of how I perceive this kind of (applied) 
philosophy: as a wandering around between – in this case – CSR and a 
philosophical body of knowledge. One cannot thoroughly reflect upon CSR 
without having certain knowledge of it and philosophical reflection, based 
upon a superficial knowledge of a philosophical position is impossible as 
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well. This is an important problem of interdisciplinary research: one needs 
to cross the borders of disciplines and that takes quite some effort. Although 
in this study the word ‘interdisciplinary’ deliberately has not been used, it 
is an example of such a study. Perhaps it can be used as a case study for 
further investigation into the methodology of interdisciplinarity. The word 
is used easily and too often without an idea what it means to work ‘inter 
disciplines’. 
This specific proposal, to connect CSR with the hermeneutic philosophy 
of Gianni Vattimo, could be a first step of a much broader research program. 
On the one hand, this research program consists of a further inquiry into the 
possibilities of hermeneutic philosophy for CSR. De Zwart (2009) consisted 
of a study of (a part of) the philosophy of Karl Jaspers, and the afterword 
expresses the ambition to further explore the philosophy of Jaspers in relation 
to organization theory. Philosophers like Ricoeur and Pareyson likewise could 
provide with a broader conception of hermeneutic philosophy and further 
enrich management studies.
  On the other hand, there is the question of the corporation. On many 
occasions in this study I have argued that the corporation is a metaphysical 
concept. Although this study focussed primarily on CSR, it is impossible not to 
think about the corporation as well. I tried to do so without violating the CSR 
focus. Further research into the weakening of organization theory would be 
interesting, both from a philosophical point of view as from a scientific point of 
view. 
Empirical research into possible practices for a weakened CSR would be 
interesting as well. In the first place the challenge would be to discuss the 
concepts of this thesis with professionals. This is especially challenging 
because one would have to avoid the trap of translating the philosophical 
concepts into ready-to-use managerial tools. How is it possible to put these 
thoughts into practice without immediately creating theory-practice gaps 
again, or without presenting this thought as another metaphysical (universal) 
principle? 
 In the second place, research upon the various classifications of CSR and 
related fields would be desirable. Jonker, Stark en Tewes (2011) presented a 
scheme, that could be further explored refined, and this research has provided 
several lines of thought that could be helpful for the development of a map 
of the ‘landscape of thought about ethics within the context of management’. 
Where Jonker et. al. focussed at the different concepts (e.g. Wirtschaftsethik, 
Unternehmensethik, CSR and CC), Wayne Visser has done much research into 
CSR practices worldwide, (in 2010, the Worldguide to CSR, together with Nick 
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Tolhurst and he is also an editor of the CSR International Research Compendium). 
Much work has been done already. However, a thorough map of this 
complicated landscape of CSR c.a. would be desirable.
 In the third and last place, there are the examples that I mentioned just 
briefly in the fourth chapter. These concepts contain aspects of weak thought, 
although they as such cannot be considered to be really weak. The examples 
mentioned can be further explored and perhaps be weakened further as 
well. Perhaps others have examples of their own that are more suitable. Are 
managers, professionals and shareholders willing to discover the consequences 
of weakened CSR, within a weakened conception of the corporation? 
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5.3  EPILOGUE  
Rediscovering CSR. 
The book had finally arrived – Bowen (1953) – at the library of Avans University of Applied Sciences. I don’t know why, but every time I lay my hands upon a book that is considered to be very important by so many 
people, I tend to get very excited.
 Was Nietzsche right about history? As far as CSR is concerned I think he was. 
Someone started to write about Bowen as the founding father of CSR, and ever 
since, Bowen has been the founding father of CSR. However, during the process 
of writing this study I often wondered whether the scholars who mentioned 
Bowen, actually read his book. Carroll’s interpretation of the history of CSR 
became ‘the’ history of CSR. Starting from this point of reference, I tried to 
reveal possible other aspects of the history. My story, however, is not ‘the’ story 
of CSR as well, rather an invitation to further explore other possible stories of 
CSR.
Through the hermeneutic philosophy of Gianni Vattimo.
The books had finally arrived at the library of Avans University of Applied 
Sciences: Vattimo 1961 and 1963. From a library in Turin, the books travelled 
to the national library in The Hague and from there they were sent to Tilburg. 
The books were the missing links in my Vattimo collection. Was it useful for 
my rediscovery of CSR? Not at all, I must confess, but it satisfied my obsessive 
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wish to understand as much as possible of this philosopher. Even the conviction 
that thoroughness is needed for interdisciplinary research does not make it 
necessary to study all of Vattimo’s work. Nevertheless, a stable foundation was 
laid for further research into the life and works of Vattimo.
The fourth chapter contains a number of possibilities to connect CSR and the 
philosophy of Gianni Vattimo. This chapter was an example of how thinking can 
be ‘receiving’, a gift. I previously called it the productive capacity of philosophy, 
but it would be more in line with Heidegger’s vocabulary to speak about a gift. 
Initially, there was the idea of connecting CSR and Vattimo, without any idea 
where this combination would lead. The fourth chapter, from time to time, 
became a somewhat frightening perspective. Reading about CSR and Vattimo 
was not easy, but the challenge was clear. The content of the fourth chapter 
only became clear whilst writing. Sometimes the question arose, whether 
this would be considered ‘scientific’ enough. My own thought seems to be 
contaminated by those philosophers and scientists who would like to see 
philosophy dissolve into science (although the title ‘PhD’ rather suggests the 
opposite).
 This thesis has been a philosophical investigation, with a place for 
philosophy alongside science. This kind of philosophical investigations is one of 
the ways philosophy can have its own place, rather than dissolve into science. 
If I am allowed to use a metaphor form one of my other passions – playing the 
organ – philosophy and science are different cognitive ‘stops’. Like the different 
stops of an organ have their own characteristic sound, there are different 
modes of thinking.
 According to Jaspers, there is a third ‘stop’: faith or religion. Both Frederick 
and Vattimo have given religion a place in their thought. Gianni Vattimo re-
discovered his religious roots and found the solution for the separation of 
theory and practice in the (secularised) Christian concept of carità. In the 
chapter on Vattimo I argued that this is no necessary conclusion for everyone 
(that would make carità a new kind of metaphysics). However, I must admit that 
a CSR based upon the principle of carità appeals to me and perhaps it could 
indeed lead us towards a world more worthwhile living upon, for more than the 
happy few that at this moment share the major part of the wealth of this world. 
 In the end some questions remain: could carità provide with a guiding 
concept for CSR? Could Vattimo’s conception of the oltreuomo provide such a 
guiding principle for professionals, working in and having to make decisions in 
corporations? Or are these questions too much leading questions, imperatives, 
strong thought? Agamben (2011, 92) shows how the monastic interpretation of 
‘rule’ – as a form of life – differs form the more modern (Kantian) interpretation 
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of it. Although this study focused at the works of Gianni Vattimo – and his 
philosophy already contains many clues how to avoid carità to become a 
metaphysical concept – a study into the work of Giorgio Agamben could again 
provide new insights into the way can interpret ‘rules’, especially the ‘rule’ of 
carità.
 Weak thought does not prescribe, or does it? I think that, at the end of 
this study, one prescription seems apparent: personal development. How can 
someone develop a free attitude towards his or her traditions if one does not 
know them? Or am I too much a teacher when I think that education – critical 
education – could be the key for the birth of l’oltreuomo? And am I too much 
a slave of my own (Christian) tradition when I think that carità indeed could 
be a guiding principle for a CSR that overcomes the intrinsic tension between 
people, planet and prosperity? Is the wisdom of Sirach specific for Judeo 
Christian thought or does it provide with more general insights?
‘Do not avert your eyes from the needy, give no one occasion to curse you’ (Sir. 4: 5)
In the introduction, I started with a quotation from Sirach that summoned 
‘to give a hearing to the needy’. Now, this other verse speaks about ‘averting 
one’s eyes from the needy’. The ability to respond does not call for universally 
applicable standards. It is all about looking around and listening carefully, 
whatever ‘questions’ I can distinguish. This ability to respond indeed is 
interpretative practice and cannot solely be dealt with using managerial tools. 
Responsibility, corporate social responsibility should first and foremost be a 
matter of the real moral actors. Corporations, our imaginary friends, may be 
treated as if they are persons and as if they have responsibilities of their own. 
In the end there is always some-body or some-bodies that really take decisions 
that have moral aspects. And if these bodies neglect others, if they avert their 
eyes from the needy, then corporate social irresponsibility is born.
The ability to respond, this ‘thing’ called corporate social responsibility, and the 
invitation this concept to Verwinden is ‘an ‘event’ whose consequences we have 
just begun to understand’ (The End of Modernity, English translation, 180).
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 ABSTRACT  
CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY:  
AN INTERPRETATIVE 
PRACTICE
 
REDISCOVERING CSR THROUGH THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF GIANNI VATTIMO
This thesis connects Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to hermeneutic philosophy. The concept of responsibility, response-ability, is an intrinsically 
interpretative concept, which makes the connection between CSR and 
hermeneutics (hermeneutics is defined as the art of interpretation) an evident 
connection. Nevertheless, the debate on CSR lacks such a connection and this 
thesis explores a way to establish one.
 The method by means of which CSR and hermeneutics are connected 
combines Heidegger’s technique of destructive questioning (Being and Time, 
chapter 1, section 2) with the two-step approach of ethics by Van Tongeren 
(Leven is een kunst, over morele ervaring, deugdethiek en levenskunst, 2012). The 
latter proposes a critical first step that analyses the flaws of a certain ethical 
concept (in this case CSR), followed by a productive second step that contructs 
a new or refined critical insight (in this case the productive step is taken by 
means of the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo).
 Destructive questioning distinguishes between three levels of questioning 
that can be used to approach a certain phenomenon: das Befragte, das Gefragte 
and das Erfragte. Das Befragte, simply translated as ‘CSR at first sight’, is proposed 
as a threefold manifestation of CSR, as 1) a debate, 2) planned corporate 
output, and 3) unplanned behavior of corporate representatives. These three 
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manifestations of CSR are the ways one encounters the phenomenon in reality. 
It is from this starting point that CSR is questioned further.
 A more thorough analysis of CSR, Das Gefragte, gives a more detailed 
analysis of CSR, especially of the debate on CSR. The analysis searches for a 
deeper insight into the flaws of the debate on CSR. These flaws are:
1. There is a gap between theory and practice, caused by a focus of the 
debate on the second manifestation (planned corporate output) and a 
lack of attention for CSR as unplanned individual behaviour.
2. The CSR debate is characterized by a search for universally applicable 
standards. Postmetaphysical insights, especially those that claim that 
late modern society lives under ‘a nihilist condition’ (which means 
that there is no ultimate truth or principle), are simply ignored or 
mistaken for ethical relativism.
3. The debate is primarily an American debate; a continental approach 
towards CSR is rare, and certainly not fully developed yet. 
CSR developed in such a way that, although some early authors certainly 
addressed the individual level, focus gradually shifted towards the development 
of tools that fit the ‘planned corporate output’. A ‘toolkit approach’ towards 
CSR dominated the debate and a ‘reflective approach’ of CSR as unplanned 
behaviour of corporate representatives was neglected. Painter-Morland 
(Business Ethics as Practice, 2008) already reflected upon the lack of connection 
of ethics and everyday life of professionals and Dunne and Ten Bos (Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 2011) illustrated how immensely complex the concept of 
responsibility can be in practical situations. This thesis builds upon the work of 
these scholars and aims to add a perspective: a nihilist hermeneutic one.
 This study explores the possibility of an approach towards CSR that takes 
seriously all three flaws mentioned. This approach has been found with the 
philosophy of Gianni Vattimo (Turin, 1936). The hermeneutic philosophy of 
Vattimo – especially weak thought, the concept that made him especially famous 
– gives an analysis of the nihilist condition and explores the consequences of a 
nihilist position for ethics in general and, more in particular, for responsibility. It 
is a philosophy that attempts to 1) bridge the gap between theory and practice 
and 2) develop a nihilist position that is not necessarily relativist. Thus, these 
philosophical reflections offer an opportunity to develop a new approach 
towards CSR. This new approach corresponds with the second, productive step 
as meant by Van Tongeren. After the first step, the articulation of a critique of 
CSR, a new approach towards CSR is developed. 
 The new approach towards CSR implies that not only the concept 
of responsibility in a corporate context is explored. It also explores the 
nihilist condition and its consequences for the concept of the corporation. 
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Postmetaphysical thought has some implications for the concept of the 
corporation as well. In the vocabulary of Vattimo, the concept of the corporation 
alters when one applies weak thought to it. The alteration does not create a 
fixed new position, rather a first discovery that invites one to further explore 
the possibilities for CSR, C, S and R.
 The aforementioned implies that the thesis is structured in the following 
way: the thesis starts with an introductory chapter, which contains the rationale 
for the study. The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of CSR in its three 
manifestations, while the third chapter explores the life and works of Gianni 
Vattimo. In chapter four the productive step is taken and possibilities for a 
(nihilist) hermeneutic approach of CSR are explored. The fifth chapter contains 
some concluding remarks and ends the thesis.
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 SAMENVATTING:  
CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY:  
EEN INTERPRETATIEVE 
PRAKTIJK
CSR HERONTDEKKEN MET BEHULP 
VAN DE HERMENEUTISCHE FILOSOFIE 
VAN GIANNI VATTIMO
Deze studie verbindt Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) met hermeneutische filosofie. Het concept verantwoordelijkheid, de vaardigheid 
tot antwoorden, is een door en door interpretatief concept, hetgeen de 
verbinding tussen beide – hermeneutiek betekent immers de kunst van het 
interpreteren – een evidente maakt. Nochtans is tot dusver tijdens het debat 
over CSR een dergelijke verbinding niet gemaakt en deze studie verkent de 
mogelijkheden daartoe.
 De methode waarmee CSR en hermeneutiek worden verbonden combineert 
Heideggers techniek van het destructieve vraagstellen (Sein und Zeit, hoofdstuk 
1, paragraaf 2) met de aanpak in twee stappen van van Tongeren (Leven is een 
kunst, over morele ervaring, deugdenethiek en levenskunst, 2012). Laatstgenoemde 
stelt een aanpak voor, waarbij met een eerste stap een bestaand ethisch 
concept kritisch wordt geanalyseerd (in dit geval CSR). De eerste stap wordt 
gevolgd door een tweede, productieve, stap waarmee een nieuw of verfijnd 
inzicht wordt geconstrueerd (in dit geval is deze productieve stap gezet met 
behulp van de filosofie van Gianni Vattimo).
 Het destructieve vraagstellen onderscheidt drie niveaus waarop men vragen 
stellen kan, teneinde een fenomeen te benaderen: das Befragte, das Gefragte 
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and das Erfragte. Das Befragte, eenvoudig vertaald als ‘CSR op het eerste gezicht’, 
wordt in deze studie voorgesteld als een drievoudige manifestatie van CSR, 
namelijk als 1) een debat, 2) als geplande output van organisaties en 3) als 
ongepland gedrag van individuele representanten van de organisatie. Deze drie 
manifestaties zijn de wijzen waarop men doorgaans in de werkelijkheid CSR 
tegenkomt. Vanuit dit startpunt wordt CSR verder bevraagd.
 Een meer grondige analyse van CSR, das Gefragte, voorziet in een meer 
gedetailleerde analyse van CSR, in het bijzonder van het debat over CSR. De 
analyse zoekt naar een dieper inzicht in de tekortkomingen in het debat over 
CSR. Deze tekortkomingen zijn de volgende:
1. Er is een kloof tussen theorie en praktijk, veroorzaakt door een 
eenzijdige focus tijdens het debat op de tweede manifestatie 
(geplande output) en een gebrek aan aandacht voor CSR als 
ongepland gedrag van representanten van organisaties.
2. Het CSR-debat wordt gekarakteriseerd door een streven naar 
universeel toepasbare standaarden. Postmetafysische inzichten, in 
het bijzonder die beweren dat de laatmoderne samenleving er één 
is onder de zogenaamde ‘nihilistische conditie’ (hetgeen er op neer 
komt dat niet zoiets bestaat als een absolute waarheid of beginsel), 
worden eenvoudigweg genegeerd of abusievelijk aangezien voor 
relativistische posities.
3. Het debat is een voornamelijk Amerikaans debat. Een continentale 
benadering van CSR is zeldzaam, en zeker nog niet volwaardig 
uitgewerkt.
CSR ontwikkelde zich zodanig dat – ondanks het feit dat een aantal van de 
eerste auteurs wel degelijk aandacht hadden voor het individuele niveau – de 
voornaamste aandacht uitging naar de ontwikkeling van gereedschappen, 
die passen bij ‘geplande output door organisaties’. Een ‘toolkit-benadering’ 
van CSR domineerde over een ‘reflexieve benadering’ en CSR als ongepland 
gedrag van representanten van organisaties werd genegeerd. Painter-Morland 
(2008) reflecteerde reeds over het gebrek aan verbinding tussen ethiek en het 
alledaagse leven van professionals en Dunne en ten Bos (2011) lieten zien hoe 
ontzettend complex het begrip verantwoordelijkheid eigenlijk is in praktische 
situaties. Deze studie bouwt voort op het werk van deze auteurs en beoogt een 
perspectief toe te voegen: een nihilistisch hermeneutisch perspectief.
 Deze studie verkent de mogelijkheid om CSR te benaderen op zodanige 
wijze dat alle drie tekortkomingen serieus worden genomen. Deze 
benadering is gevonden bij de filosofie van Gianni Vattimo (Turijn, 1936). De 
hermeneutische filosofie van Vattimo – in het bijzonder het zwakke denken, het 
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concept dat hem in het bijzonder beroemd maakte – voorziet in een analyse 
van de nihilistische conditie en de consequenties daarvan voor ethiek in het 
algemeen en, meer in het bijzonder, voor verantwoordelijkheid. Het is een 
gedachtengoed dat poogt om 1) de kloof te dichten tussen theorie en praktijk 
en 2) een nihilistische positie te ontwikkelen die niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
relativistisch is. Deze filosofische reflecties bieden een mogelijkheid om een 
nieuwe benadering van CSR te ontwikkelen. Een benadering die correspondeert 
met de tweede stap, als bedoeld door van Tongeren. Na de eerste stap, 
het formuleren van een kritiek op CSR, is een nieuwe benadering van CSR 
ontwikkeld.
 De nieuwe benadering van CSR is er één die niet alleen het concept 
verantwoordelijkheid onderzoekt in de context van organisaties. Tevens wordt 
onderzocht wat de nihilistische conditie inhoudt en welke consequenties dit 
heeft voor het concept organisatie. Postmetafisisch denken heeft consequenties 
voor het concept van de organisatie. In het vocabulaire van Vattimo: het 
concept van de organisatie verandert als men er het zwakke denken op 
toepast. Deze verandering betekent niet een gefixeerde nieuwe positie, maar 
eerder een eerste herontdekking die uitnodigt tot verdere verkenning van de 
mogelijkheden voor CSR, C, S en R.
 Het hiervoor genoemde betekent voor de structuur van de thesis het 
volgende: het eerste hoofdstuk is een introductie, waarin de rationale voor het 
onderzoek wordt uiteengezet. Het tweede hoofdstuk bevat de analyse van CSR, 
in de drie manifestaties. Het derde hoofdstuk is gewijd aan leven en werk van 
Gianni Vattimo. De productieve stap wordt gezet in het vierde hoofdstuk, waar 
de mogelijkheden voor een (nihilistische) hermeneutische benadering van CSR 
worden verkend. Een vijfde hoofdstuk bevat enkele afsluitende opmerkingen.
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Responsibility, the ability to respond, in general 
but also in the case of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), requires interpretative 
skills. Moral actors continuously interpret 
their environments and are asked to respond 
adequately. In modern times, corporations are 
often treated as moral actors and therefore have 
to implement organizational measures in order 
to meet societal demands. A connection between 
responsibility and hermeneutics (defined as the 
art of interpretation) therefore seems evident.
However, the CSR debate lacks such a connection 
and this study aims at filling the gap, using the 
hermeneutic philosophy of Gianni Vattimo (Turin, 
1936). The connection of Vattimo’s philosophy 
and CSR produces new and surprising insights 
into the concept of CSR and the ways individual 
members of corporations can be reconnected to 
CSR practices.
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